Debt, managerial compensation and learning

Using a dynamic model with uncertainty and asymmetric information, we study the impact of debt and bankruptcy on managerial compensation and learning. In this model, compensation has two roles to play—providing incentives to the manager and learning about his type. We show that debt, through bankruptcy, acts as a substitute of compensation in both dimensions and derive conditions under which debt lowers average compensation, pay-performance sensitivity and increases learning. We also examine the choice of debt and show that firm value can be increased due to debt's effect on managerial compensation, abstracting from other costs and benefits of debt. Finally, we conduct comparative statics with respect to the underlying parameters.     

BILATERALISM AND FREE TRADE*

We study a setting with many countries; in each country there are firms that can sell in the domestic as well as foreign markets. Countries can sign bilateral free‐trade agreements that lower import tariffs and thereby facilitate trade. We allow a country to sign any number of bilateral free‐trade agreements. A profile of free‐trade agreements defines the trading regime. Our principal finding is that, in symmetric settings, bilateralism is consistent with global free trade. We also explore the effects of asymmetries across countries and political economy considerations on the incentives to form trade agreements.     

Paragons of virtue? Competitor entry and the strategies of incumbents in the U.S. local telecommunications industry

We investigate whether the presence of new competitors has influenced the behaviour of U.S. incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) with respect to pricing, advertising and the extent of diversification that they engage in. This issue is explored empirically, using data for the major local exchange carriers for the years 1994 to 1998. The period straddles periods of both absence and presence of competition in the industry, since the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has opened hitherto closed markets to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). While a recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) report on local competition documents vigorous entry during the past years, the market share of the entrants is insubstantial. Our results indicate that the threat provided by market entrants has notably influenced the strategic behaviour of ILECs. The findings show that the incumbent U.S. local operators, particularly the larger ILECs, aggressively protect their profit streams from traditional business. The evidence demonstrates that the ILECs have responded to the Telecommunications Act 1996, and to the threat of market entry it has created, through entry deterrence. This strategic behaviour has been successful in providing ILECs with protection of their monopolistic markets so far.     

Scale efficiencies in US telecommunications: An empirical investigation

In this paper we evaluate scale efficiency patterns of local operating companies in the US telecommunications industry. Scale efficiency is defined as the ability of each company to operate as close to its most productive scale size as possible, and is calculated using data envelopment analysis. The analysis of scale efficiencies is conducted for a set of 39 local operating companies, over six time periods: 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 and 1990. During these time periods, several technical and institutional changes took place in the industry which are likely to have had an impact on the abilities of the companies to exploit feasible scale efficiencies, and we find that scale efficiencies have steadily increased over these time periods. We also establish that the Bell operating companies are no different from the independent companies in their ability to be scale efficient; single-state firms are relatively more scale efficient; line digitization, during the periods studied, has not significantly impacted scale efficiency; and firms belonging to multi-company parents are more scale efficient. Additionally, policy regime changes, such as the introduction of intra-LATA toll market competition and incentive regulation schemes, have positively impacted firms' abilities to attain scale efficiency, while micro-segment competition in local markets have, so far, not had the expected impact.     

Will African Agriculture Survive Climate Change?

Measurement of the likely magnitude of the economic impact ofclimate change on African agriculture has been a challenge.Using data from a survey of more than 9,000 farmers across 11African countries, a cross-sectional approach estimates howfarm net revenues are affected by climate change compared withcurrent mean temperature. Revenues fall with warming for drylandcrops (temperature elasticity of –1.9) and livestock (–5.4),whereas revenues rise for irrigated crops (elasticity of 0.5),which are located in relatively cool parts of Africa and arebuffered by irrigation from the effects of warming. At first,warming has little net aggregate effect as the gains for irrigatedcrops offset the losses for dryland crops and livestock. Warming,however, will likely reduce dryland farm income immedia-tely.The final effects will also depend on changes in precipitation,because revenues from all farm types increase with precipitation.Because irrigated farms are less sensitive to climate, wherewater is available, irrigation is a practical adaptation toclimate change in Africa.     

On axiomatic characterization of some non-additive measures of information

An axiomatic characterization of non-additive measures of information associated with a pair of probability distributions having the same number of elements has been given. This quantity under additional suitable postulates leads to the non-additive Entropy, Directed-Divergence and Inaccuracy of one or more parameters.     

Analyzing the underlying dimensions of firm profitability

In this paper we decompose a traditional measure for firm's performance, return on sales, into four components that capture the impact of productivity, price recovery, product mix and capacity utilization, respectively, on a firm's profitability. The new measures are used as an illustration to explain changes in the performance of firms in the US telecommunications industry following deregulation. Changes in the overall profitability margin of these firms are explained by substantial but offsetting changes in their productivity, price recovery ability, product-mix maximization and capacity utilization, that have occurred as a consequence of deregulation. The new measures enable us not only to illustrate relative differences between firms in a given cross-section but also to shed light on how changes take place over time in the different components that underlie firms' profitability.