E-banking comes to town: Exploring how traditional UK high street banks are meeting the challenge of technology and virtual relationships

UK high street banks are continuing to extend the choice of channel through which customers can manage their moneycolon; an obvious example is e-banking. They have been keen to exploit technological advances and changing customer attitudes to alternative channels. Additionally, competition from leaner new market entrants has provided an added incentive to adopt new approaches. In the light of such developments, it is worth reflecting on the changing nature of the bank–customer relationship. This paper suggests that banks are finding it difficult to manage relationships effectively due, in large measure, to the sheer volume of customer data generated by new interactive, technology-based channels. Paradoxically, it seems that the more data banks have about customers the less likely they are to know them on a personal level. It is further suggested that channels such as e-banking potentially reduce the level of personal contact between bank and customer to the extent that a ‘virtual’ relationship develops. This paper concludes that, given the tendency towards ‘virtualisation’, it is inconceivable that bank–customer relationships will become any more intimate in the future. Indeed, a greater degree of personalisation in customer communication may be the very best that banks are able to offer.     

Wealth Effects of International Investments and Agency Problems for Korean Multinational Firms

This paper recognizes the recent surge in cross‐border investments by MNCs from newly industrialized countries and investigates the wealth effects of FDI announcements by Korean firms, which are the leading FDI providers in Asia. The empirical results indicate that for Korean MNCs: 1) cross‐border investments increase shareholder wealth; and 2) they do not obtain the firm‐specific technological advantages over international competitors. The paper also presents evidence that cross‐border investments do not increase shareholder wealth for the 30 largest chaebol‐affiliates, and that shareholder wealth losses are greater when corporate ownership is concentrated, as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) .