What Works at Work: Overview and Assessment

This article discusses why it is difficult to measure the effects of management practices on organizational performance. In spite of these difficulties, a collage of evidence suggests that innovative workplace practices can increase performance, primarily through the use of systems of related practices that enhance worker participation, make work design less rigid, and decentralize managerial tasks. A majority of U.S. businesses have adopted some innovative work practices. However, only a small percentage of businesses have adopted a full system of innovative practices. We outline several constraints on the diffusion of new work practices, and suggest directions for future research     

Academic Workers and Union Membership: An Inevitable Dilution of Solidarity?

The growth of service employment and new forms of work has supposedly fostered the diffusion of individual orientations at the expense of traditional forms of union solidarity. These developments suggest that academics are likely to manifest an individualist orientation and a weak attachment to trade union membership. Based on a survey of unionized employees in a university setting, we examine whether there are differences in union attachment and solidarity between professionals and other occupational groups.     

Organizational Innovation in the Apparel Industry

The traditional mass production process in apparel manufacturing is contrasted with innovative techniques based on teamwork and greater employee participation. Although economic forces have encouraged the spread of innovative work organization, so far, these techniques have been implemented only within traditional human resource strategies that maintain sharp distinctions between production workers, on the one hand, and managers, supervisors, and engineers, on the other.     

EXPECTATIONS FORMATION AND RISK IN FOUR FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS

[Scientific enquiry] is a matter of comparing the corollariesof a whole group of hypotheses to a whole group of facts. Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Paris,1906.     

Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance

Using a large hand-collected data set from 2001 to 2006, we find that activist hedge funds in the United States propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two-thirds of the cases. Hedge funds seldom seek control and in most cases are nonconfrontational. The abnormal return around the announcement of activism is approximately 7%, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism. Our analysis provides important new evidence on the mechanisms and effects of informed shareholder monitoring.     

IMPACTS OF PRIVATISATION POLICY IN EUROPE

This paper examines the economic implications of the privatisation that has been occurring in Europe. Different sectors and different countries have developed separately, but policymakers can learn common lessons. Considerable experience of privatisation has produced a mounting body of empirical evidence. Developing more powerful analytical tools also permits greater rigour in studying the behaviour of newly privatised undertakings. This paper examines the nature of privatisation processes and looks at the forms of adjustment to regulatory regimes that have occurred to accommodate the newly privatised undertakings. It draws upon new empirical evidence and previous econometric studies to consider privatisation's efficiency effects, especially regarding technical or X-efficiency.¹     

CAPITAL–LABOUR SUBSTITUTION AND ENDOGENOUS FLUCTUATIONS: A MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION APPROACH WITH VARIABLE MARKUP*

This paper analyses an overlapping generations model with endogenous product diversity where strategic interactions between producers are introduced; it examines how they affect the stability properties of the steady state. Because of free entry, strategic interactions between producers imply a new dynamic feature, markup variability, promoting indeterminacy and endogenous cycles. Indeed, in contrast to the model without strategic interaction, endogenous fluctuations can occur when the substitution between the production factors, capital and labour, is not too weak, but in accordance with empirical estimates.     

MONETARY CREDIBILITY VS. VOTER APPROVAL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EXCHANGE‐RATE STABILIZATION DURING CRISES

This paper analyzes how political institutions affect the execution of exchange‐rate policy. By focusing on policy‐makers' responses to the emergence of speculative pressure on their currencies, we argue that the effect of democratic institutions on exchange‐rate stability is likely to be conditioned by the officially announced exchange‐rate regime. Officially fixed exchange rates are the main instrument of autocrats to signal commitment to long‐term stability. Autocratic governments with strictly fixed exchange rates are thus more likely to defend their exchange rates than autocrats with an intermediate regime because the latter implicitly signal that they care less about monetary stability. In contrast, democrats defend more often in intermediately than in fully fixed official regimes by using a combination of external and internal adjustments, which reduce the negative effects of a devaluation on voters. Our analysis of 189 currency crises between 1975 and 1999 supports this conditional effect.