Adjusting for Beta Bias: An Assessment of Alternate Techniques: A Note

This paper tests the effectiveness of techniques proposed by: Scholes-Williams; Dimson; Fowler, Rorke, and Jog; and Cohen, Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb to control for bias in beta estimates from thin trading and price adjustment delays. Each technique produces beta estimates that reduce the amount of this bias, but the amount of reduction in the best case is only 29%.     

Real Earnings Management in Sales

We surveyed 1,638 sales executives across 40 countries regarding their companies’ likelihood of asking sales to perform real earnings management (REM) actions when earnings pressure exists. Using this information, which we refer to as companies’ REM propensities, we study how company characteristics and environmental conditions relate to the responses received. The use of cash‐flow incentives for sales personnel and the distribution of interfunctional power in favor of finance rather than sales are both associated with companies’ REM propensities. In addition, we show that sales executives preemptively change their behaviors in anticipation of top management's REM requests. Sales executives working for public companies and companies in the United States reported higher levels of REM propensity. The data also support an association between REM propensity and finance–sales conflict. These findings and others are compared and contrasted with existing empirical and survey‐based research on REM throughout the paper.     

DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICT AND MONETARY POLICY

This paper develops a public choice theory of monetary policy and compares it with political-macroeconomic outcomes theory. The paper develops support for the public choice theory from recent historical evidence. It then employs this theory to explain the difficulty of effecting monetary reform and, in the absence of reform, the difficulty of implementing sustained periods of monetary restraint.     

Long‐Term Return Reversals: Overreaction or Taxes?

Long‐term reversals in U.S. stock returns are better explained as the rational reactions of investors to locked‐in capital gains than an irrational overreaction to news. Predictors of returns based on the overreaction hypothesis have no power, while those that measure locked‐in capital gains do, completely subsuming past returns measures that are traditionally used to predict long‐term returns. In data from Hong Kong, where investment income is not taxed, reversals are nonexistent, and returns are not forecastable either by traditional measures or by measures based on the capital gains lock‐in hypothesis that successfully predict U.S. returns.