An experimental approach to the effectiveness of an incentive system against moral hazard in the insurance market

Although traditional Japanese insurance theory has tended to assume the basic altruism of policyholders, this assumption may not be warranted. Many people might be opportunists rather than altruists. So in the actual insurance market, moral hazard may occur not accidentally but naturally. Without effective incentive mechanisms, policyholders may deviate from their original purpose. It is important to design penalties as negative incentives for the control and prevention of moral hazard. We test these propositions here by means of a game theory and questionnaire. The reason why we use a game theory and carry out the questionnaire is that it is not suitable to apply the econometric model to collect reliable data about moral hazard.     

Environmental regulation and technology transfers

This paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign firm with advanced abatement technology to license it to a domestic firm without this technology. Furthermore, when the domestic firm's production technology is less efficient than that of the foreign firm, the foreign firm may freely reveal its technology to the domestic firm. These improvements through the voluntary transfer of technology imply that environmental regulations have positive impacts on innovation.     

Fixed Point Theorems for Discontinuous Maps on a Non‐convex Domain

This paper introduces economists to some fixed point theorems for discontinuous mappings with non‐convex images on a non‐convex domain. These theorems have recently been developed based on a new approach by mathematical economists and mathematicians. The new method of proof is first transformed into a sort of metatheorem, which is then used to obtain a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a map to have a fixed point. Some fixed point theorems for discontinuous maps are then explained in more concrete cases. The formulations are intended for easier applications towards economic models involving discontinuity as well as non‐convexity.     

INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE‐CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE‐ENTRY OLIGOPOLY

This study is a theoretical examination of whether employee‐controlled firms (ECFs) enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market excessively or insufficiently, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The excess entry theorem is well known in oligopoly theory. According to this theorem, a greater number of profit‐maximizing firms enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market than is optimal for welfare maximization. We demonstrate the possibility that insufficient entry arises when ECFs compete in a free‐entry market. In particular, we show that if both the demand and cost functions are convex, insufficient ECF entry necessarily occurs. Our results suggest that competition among firms seeking purposes other than profit might lead to insufficient entry because differences in competing firms’ objectives affect the intensity of market competition.     

The Contributions of Professors Fischer Black,Robert Merton and Myron Scholes to the Financial Services Industry

This paper is written as a tribute to Professors Robert Merton and Myron Scholes, winners of the 1997 Nobel Prize in economics, as well as to their collaborator, the late Professor Fischer Black. We first provide a brief and very selective review of their seminal work in contingent claims pricing. We then provide an overview of some of the recent research on stock price dynamics as it relates to contingent claim pricing. The continuing intensity of this research, some 25 years after the publication of the original Black–Scholes paper, must surely be regarded as the ultimate tribute to their work. We discuss jump‐diffusion and stochastic volatility models, subordinated models, fractal models and generalized binomial tree models for stock price dynamics and option pricing. We also address questions as to whether derivatives trading poses a systemic risk in the context of models in which stock price movements are endogenized, and give our views on the ‘LTCM crisis’ and liquidity risk.