Adverse workplace conditions, high-involvement work practices and labor turnover: Evidence from Danish linked employer-employee data

Using Danish linked employer-employee data, we find that: (i) exposing the worker to physical hazards leads to a 3 percentage point increase in the probability of voluntary turnover from the average rate of 18%; (ii) working in night shift results in an 11-percentage point hike; and (iii) having an unsupportive boss leads to a 6-percentage point jump. High involvement work practices are found to play a significant role in mitigating the adverse effects of workplace hazards. Finally, the worker under adverse workplace conditions is found to improve the 5-year odds of rectifying such workplace adversities by quitting the firm.     

On the Uniqueness of the Welfare–maximizing Number of Firms Under Cournot Oligopoly

Under Cournot oligopoly with a homogeneous product, we present a sufficient condition that guarantees the uniqueness of the welfare–maximizing number of firms to attain the global maximum level of welfare by implementation of a piecemeal policy changing the number of firms gradually. We adopt Selten's (1973) 'fitting–in function' method, which relates an individual firm's output to an industry's output. When the number of firms is unique, then introducing a lump–sum profit tax (subsidy) can attain the optimal level of welfare. Indirect entry regulation is superior to direct entry regulation from the standpoint of welfare if each entrant engages in rent–seeking activities.     

Factors determining residents’ preparedness for floods in modern megalopolises: the case of the Tokai flood disaster in Japan

This study examines how flood risk perception and home ownership affect residents’ preparedness for floods, focusing specifically on the case of the Tokai flood disaster in Nagoya City, one of Japan’s biggest metropolises, in 2000. The greatest rainfall ever recorded in Nagoya City (566.5 mm) occurred on 11–12 September 2000; as a result, a local river burst its banks and flooded the city. A survey was conducted of residents of the affected area in Nagoya City and its adjacent region. The respondents were asked to rate the extent of their experience with, anticipation of, and preparedness for floods before and after the Tokai disaster in terms of taking special measures against floods. The results showed that the degree of preparedness for floods was determined by the level of fear of floods and the amount of damage sustained during the Tokai flood, especially for homeowners. However, the residents’ preparedness did not depend on their anticipation of floods. These findings show that preparedness for floods depends on ownership of a home, fear of flooding, and the amount of damage from previous floods rather than on previous experience with and anticipation of floods.     

Location choice,competition, and welfare in non-tradable service FDI

We investigate whether non-tradable service FDI is efficient from a welfare point of view. A fixed number of firms strategically decide which markets to locate in and then compete in quasi-Cournot fashion. Considering firm location in two symmetric markets, non-tradable service FDI may or may not be efficient for the source country, depending on the total number of firms, competition in markets and the curvature of the demand function. In contrast, non-tradable service FDI is always efficient for the host country and the overall economy. This implies that any policy that affects firm location between two symmetric markets will not be beneficial from a welfare viewpoint.     

Stability of nonlinear homogeneous difference equations

A class of nonlinear homogeneous difference equations is considered in which each coefficient is a homogeneous function of variables. A sufficient condition of relative stability is presented using a nonlinear generalization of the Perron-Frobenius theorem due to Morishima (“Equilibrium, Stability and Growth,” Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1964).     

CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence from micro data

In this paper, we use unique data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002 to show that CEO turnover is significantly and inversely related to firm performance, although the magnitude of the relationship is modest. In addition, we find that this turnover-performance link is weaker for listed firms that are still controlled by the state and those that have a relatively weak non-state controlling shareholder. In contrast, the appointment of independent directors enhances the turnover-performance link. Moreover, the listing suspension mechanism, adopted by China's securities regulatory agency, appears to be effective in improving the turnover-performance tie. Finally, listed firms with CEOs holding additional positions among the controlling shareholders have a weaker turnover-performance link. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 796–817.     

Precautionary Principle and the Optimal Timing of Environmental Policy Under Ambiguity

I consider a problem in environmental policy design in which I focus on stock pollutants. In particular, I consider stock pollutants that cause severe damage on the environment and do not depreciate at all once they are released into the atmosphere and the ocean. The purposes of this paper are: (1) to provide an economic foundation for environmental policies based on the precautionary principle and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and (2) to show that this optimal timing rule has a reservation property. Furthermore, I analyze the effect of an increase in ambiguity on the optimal timing of adopting some environmental policy, and show that an increase in ambiguity decreases the optimal timing of adopting the environmental policy.     

Endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly with partial foreign ownership and asymmetric increasing marginal costs

This study examines a timing game in a mixed duopoly wherein public and private firms compete by taking account of the increasing marginal cost of both firms, as well as partial foreign ownership of the private firm. This study finds that if the private firm has a strong cost advantage over the public firm, public leadership is a risk dominant equilibrium irrespective of foreign ownership ratio. This result means that the cost difference between the public and private firms matters in selecting the risk-dominant equilibrium of the timing game. Additionally, if the private firm has only a weak cost advantage over the public firm, then private leadership (public leadership) is the risk dominant equilibrium if the foreign ownership ratio is (not) small.