THE MARKET SELECTS THE WRONG FIRMS IN THE LONG RUN*

We consider the effects of free entry on the market structure and social welfare of an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly. Even if we allow for the existence of different types of firms initially, only one type (in almost all cases) can survive in the long run. Free entry leads an economy to a symmetric equilibrium, in which the excess entry theorem holds. Further, we consider the socially optimal policy for this economy. In cases of either (i) a concave demand (which implies strategic substitutability) or (ii) strategic complementarity (which implies a convex demand), the type of firms that should remain in the market to achieve social optimality does not necessarily coincide with the type of firms that will survive in the long run. The market may select not only the wrong number of firms but also the wrong type of firms in the long run.     

Work and family practices in Japanese firms: their scope,nature and impact on employee turnover

Using firm-level data from Japan, this study examines the effects of four commonly used work and family practices on employee turnover: flextime, maternity leave, child care leave, and nursing care leave. Overall, we find statistically significant associations between work and family practices and female employee turnover in Japan. In stark contrast, we do not find such a statistically significant linkage between work and family practices and male employee turnover. As such, this study highlights the potential moderating effect of individual characteristics such as gender on the relationship between work and family practices and employee attitudes and behaviours.     

Economic influences on perceived value,quality expectations and customer satisfaction

Consumer research has extensively analysed psychological determinants of customer satisfaction. As macro‐level customer satisfaction data were not available until recently, researchers have only taken first steps towards analysing economic determinants of customer satisfaction. Based on a more complex conceptual framework and on data from Germany and Japan, this article examines how economic processes influence the perceived value of goods and services, quality expectations and customer satisfaction. Using principal component analysis, regression analysis and structural equation modelling, this study finds that perceived value is positively influenced by both economic growth and lagged economic expectations. Customer satisfaction is positively influenced by economic growth and negatively by current economic expectations, with half of the impact mediated by perceived value. Economic expectations positively influence expectations regarding the quality of goods and services. These results imply that consumer researchers should no longer ignore economic influences on consumer attitudes. Marketing managers are advised to be cautious not to misinterpret economic‐induced variations in customer satisfaction as caused by corporate performance.     

Designing the optimal public pension system

This paper uses a two‐period overlapping generations model in order to provide a theoretical design for the optimal public pension system based on a partial equilibrium analysis. Household preferences depend on two periods' consumption and leisure and are positively homogeneous of degree m with respect to consumption in the working and retired periods. We present characteristic features of the optimal public pension system in this paper. First, differences in the population growth rate do not affect the large/small relation between the optimal net lifetime burden rates of generations. Second, we present the optimal public pension system explicitly if m < 1 and m ≠ 0. Third, the difference between the market time‐preference rate and the social time‐preference rate provides a crucial insight into the optimal burden rate of each generation.     

Environmental regulation and technology transfers

This paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign firm with advanced abatement technology to license it to a domestic firm without this technology. Furthermore, when the domestic firm's production technology is less efficient than that of the foreign firm, the foreign firm may freely reveal its technology to the domestic firm. These improvements through the voluntary transfer of technology imply that environmental regulations have positive impacts on innovation.     

Technological retard in small least developed countries — small is beautiful but fragile?

This paper argued the technological retard and its influence to stagnant economic growth in small least developed countries. First we measured the technological development by UNIDO's TCI, and found that the level of technical complexities in island or inland countries was lower than the normal level by 27 and 57 per cent. We also found that the development of technical complexity is very important to industrialization in developing countries. Thus the stagnant technological improvement is one of the reasons for low growth of LDCs handicapped by smallness or isolation. Secondly we analyzed the relation between stagnant technological improvement and the low growth of small LDCs by a simple growth model, which combines the Romer-type non-linear production function and human capital growth equation. The brain drain was explicitly considered a main hindrance of human capital formation in these LDCs.     

Interregional economic-demographic model of the Tokyo region

The Tokyo Metropolitan Area consists of four prefectures, and experienced a rapid social inflow of population from other areas in 1960s, and a removal of residential population from CBD to suburban cities within the Area in 1970s. Tokyo prefecture at the centre functioned as CBD, and showed a continuous growth of economic activities, while the leading sector changed from secondary to tertiary sector. The number of daily commuters to Tokyo prefecture has increased to two million persons. Thus in the Tokyo prefecture several variables like social inflow, employment in secondary sector and residential population reached to historical highest values in late 1960s and early 1970s, An economic-demographic model is constructed by pooling data of four prefectures for 1965–1979 to describle these rapid changes in four prefectures.

The model consists of seven blocks (population, commutation, employment, production, income and expenditure, capital stock, price) and contains 142 equations. Social movement of residential population is explained by per capita income, housing stock, endowment of social overhead capital, and land price. Daily commuters are explained by labor productivities. Private and public investments are endogenously explained in the model. Potential type variables of income and population are used to describe the interregional linkages in various equations. After final test the model could properly explain the turning point period of Tokyo, and drastic changes of Metropolitan Area. The model is then applied to the forecast up to 1990, and several simulation studies to clarify various policy effects.     

Fixed Point Theorems for Discontinuous Maps on a Non‐convex Domain

This paper introduces economists to some fixed point theorems for discontinuous mappings with non‐convex images on a non‐convex domain. These theorems have recently been developed based on a new approach by mathematical economists and mathematicians. The new method of proof is first transformed into a sort of metatheorem, which is then used to obtain a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a map to have a fixed point. Some fixed point theorems for discontinuous maps are then explained in more concrete cases. The formulations are intended for easier applications towards economic models involving discontinuity as well as non‐convexity.     

An experimental approach to the effectiveness of an incentive system against moral hazard in the insurance market

Although traditional Japanese insurance theory has tended to assume the basic altruism of policyholders, this assumption may not be warranted. Many people might be opportunists rather than altruists. So in the actual insurance market, moral hazard may occur not accidentally but naturally. Without effective incentive mechanisms, policyholders may deviate from their original purpose. It is important to design penalties as negative incentives for the control and prevention of moral hazard. We test these propositions here by means of a game theory and questionnaire. The reason why we use a game theory and carry out the questionnaire is that it is not suitable to apply the econometric model to collect reliable data about moral hazard.