Do collective bargaining institutions crowd out discussion and implementation of firm‐related training programs? Evidence from Japan

The paper empirically examines labor‐management communication concerning in‐house training programs and its relation to the actual on‐ and off‐the‐job training policy and wage structure. Using governmental datasets from Japan, we study how different labor‐management communication institutions may affect the training interests of employers and employees differently. We classify these institutions in terms of whether they have a legal (i.e. statutory) foundation (‘de jure’) or not (‘de facto’). We find that collective bargaining, with legal grounds, may crowd out employees’ willingness to communicate about training. However, the existence of ‘de facto’ communication channels such as joint labor‐management councils or shop floor committees is positively correlated with both on‐ and off‐the‐job of training. At the same time, the existence of unions is positively correlated with the steepness of wage profiles for mid‐career workers, which is consistent with the fact that employers and employees assume a long‐term relationship. Thus, we show that a multi‐tiered structure of labor‐management communication, together with a long‐term orientation toward the employment relationship, contributes to strengthen employees’ voice in training matters.     

Dynamic Analysis of an Endogenous Growth Model with Investment‐specific Technological Change

This paper examines a dynamically optimal subsidy policy in a continuous‐time version of the endogenous growth model developed by Krusell (Krusell, P. (1998) “Investment‐Specific R&D and the Decline in the Relative Price of Capital”, Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 131–141), in which investment‐specific technological progress occurs endogenously because of R&D performed by monopolistic firms. It is demonstrated that a combination of the time‐invariant subsidy for investment and the time‐variant subsidy for R&D enables the market equilibrium to replicate the socially optimal allocation.     

Optimal pricing and quality choice of a monopolist under Knightian uncertainty

This paper analyzes a simple vertical product differentiation model with demand uncertainty and derives a risk neutral monopolist's optimal market entry timing, her optimal pricing and optimal quality choice by incorporating Knightian uncertainty, irreversibility, and flexibility in quality-enhancing investment into a continuous-time stochastic model. It is shown that an increase in Knightian uncertainty induces decreases in the optimal price, the optimal quality, and the value of undertaking the quality-enhancing investment by the monopolist. The social optimal entry timing, pricing and quality are also analyzed.     

Partial Agglomeration or Dispersion in Spatial Cournot Competition

We revisit works by Pal and Matsushima, which, respectively, present different equilibrium locations. We consider nonlinear transport costs and show that Pal's result (dispersion) is more robust than Matsushima's (partial agglomeration). Pal's result holds true for any transport cost function, while Matsushima's does not hold under strong concavity or convexity of the transport cost function. If we consider sequential move of location. Pal's result holds for any transport costs. On the other hand, Matsushima's does not hold except for linear transport cost. We also discuss welfare and show that nonlinearity of the transport cost function yields rich welfare implications.     

UNCERTAINTY AVERSION AND PORTFOLIO INERTIA

In stock markets, we often observe portfolio inertia, i.e., a situation in which some stocks are not traded or not priced for a few minutes or longer. This is neither an exceptional situation in which some stock price soars too high to be priced, nor the one where some stock price plummets too much to be traded. By introducing the concept of ‘Knightian uncertainty’, Dow and Werlang (1992) account for the existence of portfolio inertia, which has not been accounted for under the concept of ‘risk’. This paper provides a characterization of the spread between buying and selling prices based on a parameter proposed by Ozaki and Streufert (1999, 2001) that enables us to estimate the attitude towards Knightian uncertainty, and shows that an increase (a decrease) in Knightian uncertainty expands (shrinks) the interval in which an investor never changes her initial position. Furthermore, we analyse the effect of an increase in Knightian uncertainty on portfolio inertia based on Epsilon‐contaminations.     

A sensitivity analysis in a nonlinear Leontief model

Conclusion We have shown that in a nonlinear Leontief model where non-decreasing returns are allowed for, if some elements of the final demand vector are increased, then each activity level (i. e., gross output) goes up or remain unchanged and the maximum rate of increase in activity levels must be realized among those sectors for which the final demand is raised. It is also shown that this maximum rate of increase in activity levels is not greater than the maximum rate of increase in the final demands.It should be noted that we do not require the indecomposability ofA (x). WhenA (x) is indecomposable, the final demand vector can be allowed to be non-zero nonnegative, and we can derive a set of propositions similar to those presented in this article.     

How do Asia's two most important consumer markets differ? Japanese–Chinese differences in customer satisfaction and its formation

Little is known about international differences in the formation of customer satisfaction, particularly regarding developed and emerging markets in Asia. This lack of knowledge limits the competitiveness of Western companies in Asia. From the perspectives of economic and cultural country differences, this study thus compares customer satisfaction and its formation between Japan, China, and Germany (Western reference country). Customer satisfaction is higher in Japan than China for goods and private services but lower for public services. It is influenced more strongly by perceived quality and less strongly by perceived value (difference moderated by switching costs), public brand image, and quality expectations in Japan than China. Economic differences between developed (Japan, Germany) and emerging (China) markets influence consumer preference structures more strongly than cultural differences. Due to larger inter-Asian cultural variance than Western managers might expect, Chinese consumer preference structures differ more from Japanese than German consumer preference structures.