电路的任意节点状态的机助分析

文中介绍了一种直接求解任意一节点电压的方法,并讨论了其机助分析问题,给出了两种实现方案.     

在中国农村地区发展投资银行的必要性分析

资金短缺一直是中国农村经济发展的障碍,投资银行进入农村地区,一方面可以拓宽农村的融资渠道,另一方面可以完善农村的金融体系,从而促进农村经济的发展.文章从中国农村经济的发展、金融需求主体、金融体系的完善等三个方面的需要分析了在在中国农村地区发展投资银行的必要性.     

显微镜下察趋势

2007年被称为住房保障元年，2008年呢？ 房价、土地、保障房、物业税，这些对市场而言颇具敏感度的词汇，在2007年被屡屡提及，2008年仍是大家的最爱。而2007年底的中央经济工作会议传达出的“紧缩”、“防通胀”信号，更为这些信号增添了变数。     

加快燕大科技园建设和发展步伐 为推动区域经济社会发展作贡献

燕山大学国家大学科技园(以下称"燕大科技园")是依托燕山大学的人才.科技成果等综合智力资源优势兴办并发展起来的.经过几年的努力,已经成为燕山大学实现社会服务功能和产学研互动的重要平台,是燕山大学及地方科技企业重要的孵化基地,同时也是区域经济发展和技术进步的主要创新源泉之一.     

循序渐进地推进我国金融深化的对策选择

随着金融改革力度的不断加大,我国的金融深化问题已成为金融领域的重要问题之一。目前我国金融业飞速发展,金融结构发生显著的变化,金融深化程度不断提高。我们要积极主动地面对金融深化进程中存在的市场效率损失问题,建立一个高效的金融市场,推动和指导中国金融深化进一步深入,使金融深化带动经济增长。     

新农村农业经济组织模式的研究

文章对当前代表性的几种农业经济组织模式进行了研究，认为建设新农村要立足于发展种养殖业，运用现代企业管理理论，以土地经营权入股的方式，构建新农村经济组织，实现发展农业生产力，提高农民收入的目的。     

对新一轮土地利用规划修编的思考

土地利用规划是国家加强土地管理,统筹各业用地,保障社会经济可持续发展的一项重要措施。本文简要回顾了以往我国土地规划的编制和实施,分析了上一轮土地利用规划在编制和实施中存在的问题,提出规划决策机制/创新机制以及规划的弹性机制,为如何进行土地利用分区提出建议,从宏观上为新一轮土地利用规划修编提供参考。     

Structural change,savings and current account balance

Private savings have experienced remarkable divergences across countries in recent years. In this paper we use a new factor, economic structural changes, to explain the differences of private savings in developing countries and its impacts on current account balance. We point out that growth related structural changes can be decomposed into productivity changes and job reallocations, which will affect private savings differently through wage effect and labor reallocation effect. Wage variation resulting from productivity growth will increase private savings, while labor reallocation moving from low income to high income sectors will reduce savings. Using sector level data, we find strong empirical evidence that structural change patterns have a significant impact on private savings and current account balance. This result provides another way to understand the recent “savings glut” in East Asian countries and also has some implications for the large current account imbalance issue.     

A Theory on REIT’s Advisor Choice and the Optimal Compensation Mechanism

This paper proposes a model which examines the power of monitoring and forcing contract on improving managerial efficiency. We put particular focus on its implication regarding the choice of advisor type used by REITs. This question has long been a puzzling one in real estate literature. Our model provides a theoretical justification regarding the potential appeal of external managerial structure, which is usually regarded as being inferior to internal managerial structure. A crucial driving force regarding advisor choice is the heterogeneity on monitoring power between internal and external advisors and across REIT firms. Provided that the gap of monitoring power is large enough between internal and external advisors, shareholders could make use of the heterogeneity, and induce higher effort levels from external advisors. We motivate the rationale for expecting a “monitoring advantage” over external management from two aspects: the dual-role of external advisory firm and a bigger reputational cost associated with external advisor. Furthermore, we are able to specify the range within which an improved monitoring power is Pareto-optimal for both REIT shareholders and advisors. One implication is that, as agents, it may also be to the benefit of advisors to be better monitored. Finally, we compare the difference between fixed and stochastic forcing contracts. Our findings show that with their imperfect performance measures, the stochastic forcing contracts always dominate the fixed one.