Monotone dependence in graphical models for multivariate Markov chains

We show that a deeper insight into the relations among marginal processes of a multivariate Markov chain can be gained by testing hypotheses of Granger noncausality, contemporaneous independence and monotone dependence. Granger noncausality and contemporaneous independence conditions are read off a mixed graph, and the dependence of an univariate component of the chain on its parents—according to the graph terminology—is described in terms of stochastic dominance criteria. The examined hypotheses are proven to be equivalent to equality and inequality constraints on some parameters of a multivariate logistic model for the transition probabilities. The introduced hypotheses are tested on real categorical time series.     

Non‐linear geographics and the economics of transition and democratization1

The purpose of this study is to analyse the effects of geography on the transition process in authoritarian political regimes, and to investigate the nature of the links between political change, economic reforms and geographical location. A simple model of transition and democratization is presented wherein we show that the effectiveness of repression by the incumbent elite is a negative function of the distance to the ‘free world’. In consequence, geography has conflicting effects on shifts in political power. This article provides a rationale for the counterintuitive fact that the first authoritarian country to start a transition process towards democratization is not necessarily the one nearest to the free world.     

Spillover effects and conditional dependence

A better understanding of cross-market linkages and interactions would help to better manage international financial exposure. So far, no attempt has been made to investigate the degree of price and volatility spillovers in a non-Gaussian conditional framework. We present a new model for these transmission mechanisms that relies on asymmetric-t marginal distributions and a copula function to characterize the conditional dependence. Rendering the dependence parameter time varying, we investigate how the dependence structure is affected by stock return innovations.     

The Political Economy of Education and Development in an Open Economy

If the price effect of opening up a developing economy may be expected to act as a disincentive for investment in human capital, the opposite is likely to be true of the income effect, especially in the presence of credit market imperfections among the poor. It is shown in this paper that this may no longer be the case in a society initially dominated by an oligarchic capitalist elite that is afraid of losing its political control in favor of an educated middle class. Although it may sometimes be in its interest to democratize by subsidizing education when the economy is closed, incentives to do so disappear when the economy is open to trade or factor flows.     

A trucker's dilemma: Managerial behavior under an operating-ratio standard

A model of an individually regulated trucking firm is extended to reflect collective regulation by the operating-ratio method as conducted for many years by the ICC. The game-theoretic extension predicts that managers will not respond to a required operating ratio, in cartel-like manner, by increasing expenses in pursuit of higher profit. This result undermines the Commission's stated belief that an operating-ratio standard, even when applied collectively, imparted such an incentive. An empirical test supports the conclusion that tighter regulation, measured by higher achieved operating ratios, did not invite increased employment of the variable factors. On the contrary, tighter regulation is found inversely related to the employment of all factors and, implicitly, to industry output. Deregulation of entry and rates was thus a more likely source of improved managerial efficiency than merely switching from an operating ratio to a return-on-equity standard, as tbe Commission did in 1978.     

Public research/industry relationships: Efficiency conditions

If economists of technical change dealt with the public research/industry interface, the literature lacks empirical contributions. The present paper is clearly empirical. It investigates the efficiency of the relationships between public research institutions and industry from the point of view of the firm looking for solutions to its problems. The empirical work is based on the study of 32 cases of partnerships in France. It suggests that the efficiency of the interface depends on the context (nature of innovations, public research skills needed, duration of relationships, technological strategies of firms) and on the strategies of public research institutions (organizational linkages adopted). Four hypotheses are examined to test these efficiency conditions.     

Triggers,templates and twitches in the tracking of emerging strategic issues

A longitudinal investigation of group tracking of potential new applications and markets created by an emerging technology (cellular telephones) is used to gain more understanding of the shifts of cognitive frames of reference in the environmental tracking of emerging strategic issues. The dynamics of frame of reference shifts is examined through the derivation and operationalization of the concepts of templates, triggers and twitches. The results posit that examining the frame of reference shifts can be more informative than examining the frames themselves. Implications for strategic management practice and research are addressed.     

Political foundations of the resource curse

In this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much, and (2) resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path. However, (3) resource booms, by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections, increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy. (4) The overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes. Countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create. Countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse.