The ARCO decision: Inroads into the per se rule under Section 1 of the Sherman Act

In this study, the author analyzes the 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decision inAtlantic Richfield Company vs. USA Petroleum Company approving Atlantic Richfield’s maximum pricing plan improsed on its distributors (despite the Court’s recognition that theper se rule forbade such schemes). Theper se rule had been one of the last substantial measures of effective antitrust policy administered by enforcement authorities and the courts, perhaps even more fundamental than scrutiny of proposed mergers and predatory practices. That principle has been weakened by the ARCO decision. The author addresses some of the likely consequences of the ascendancy of the Chicago School and the NeoClassical theory generally in antitrust interpretation.     

Optimal fiscal zoning when the local government is a discriminating monopolist

Monopoly zoning by local governments has been studied extensively since the original article by White [1975, in: E. Mills and W. Oates, eds., Fiscal zoning and land use controls (Lexington Books, Lexington, MA)]. However, little or no attention has been paid to the possibility of monopolistic discrimination under such a regime. The question is: When will zoning multiple lot sizes be feasible given that buyers with different valuations of land cannot be coerced into purchasing particular lots? The literature on imperfect price discrimination by monopolists is brought to bear on this question. It is shown that the resulting zoning strategy may or may not involve multiple lot sizes. The factors determining the optimal strategy are studied in detail, with particular emphasis on the nature of the market for undeveloped land in the community.     

Upward influence tactics and their effects on job performance ratings and flexible working arrangements: The mediating roles of mutual recognition respect and mutual appraisal respect

Supervisor's human resources (HR) decisions have a significant impact on the employees they manage but have been found to be subject to bias. The upward influence tactics use by subordinates can play a role in this. We investigated the effects of seven upward influence tactics on supervisor job‐performance ratings and the extent of subordinate flexible working arrangements (FWAs). Supervisors are often responsible for determining whether employees are granted FWAs. We posit an alternative theoretical mechanism by which upward influence tactics bring about their effects, mediated through two distinct types of respect, mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect. We collected data from 389 matched supervisor–subordinate dyads, and found that both mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect mediated relationships between several upward influence tactics and both job‐performance ratings and FWAs. Our findings show that upward influence tactics affect the quality of the relationship between employees and their supervisors, specifically, these two forms of mutual respect. Further, both mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect may explain why supervisors show favoritism to some subordinates over others, in reaching HR decisions in these areas.     

Evaluating the British Model of Electricity Deregulation

Abstract ** :  A key aspect of the 1990 reforms to the British electricity supply industry was the introduction of a formal system of regulation by an autonomous regulatory body. It was expected that replacement of monopolies in some areas by markets and price‐setting in monopoly areas using a simple incentive formula would mean that regulation of the industry would be 'light'. This article examines how regulation has turned out in practice. It concludes that the promise of 'light' regulation has not been fulfilled. Regulation of competitive markets is a major regulatory activity, incentive regulation has evolved into a complex and intrusive form of rate‐of‐return, while regulation of industry structure has allowed the industry to descend into a concentrated, vertically integrated structure, at odds with the aims of the reforms .     

Random coefficient regression and the long-run phillips curve for the U.S.

This research suggests that a random coefficient regression model is well-suited for analyzing long-run versus short-run movements in wages and unemployment and is an improvement over some empirical techniques typically used.     

The causes of government expenditure growth: A survey of the U.S. evidence

The growth of government budgets can be broken down into a-institutional and institutional components. The former component — the familiar substitution, income, and population/public goods-tax sharing effects — is estimated to contribute about two-fifths of the growth of U.S. government spending. The latter component — rent-seeking political redistributions, bureaucracy and perceptual/informational impedimentia — is important, too, but an exact imputation cannot be asserted given the state of the art in empirical public choice theory. The cross-effects on spending of the growth of regulation and tax preferences or tax expenditures, though interesting, is not pursued.     

A theory of reciprocity

People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, it predicts that identical consequences trigger different reciprocal responses in different environments. Finally, the theory explains why outcomes tend to be fair in bilateral interactions whereas extremely unfair distributions may arise in competitive markets.