An Experimental Investigation of Hard and Soft Price Ceilings in Emissions Permit Markets

Tradable emissions permits have been implemented to control pollution levels in various markets and represent a major component of legislative efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions. Because permits are supplied for a fixed level of pollution, allowing the market for permits to determine the price, price control mechanisms may be needed to protect firms from price spikes caused by fluctuations in the demand for permits. We test permit markets in an experimental laboratory setting to determine the effectiveness of several price control mechanisms, with special attention on the soft price ceiling. We focus on a static setting similar to some of the earliest experimental work focused on price ceilings. Results indicate that both permit supply adjustments and price ceilings (hard ceilings) effectively limit elevated prices in this setting. By contrast, reserve auctions to implement soft ceilings do not consistently control prices, especially when a minimum reserve permit price is applied. Furthermore, the grandfathering of permits allows permit sellers to realize significant welfare gains at the expense of buyers under a soft ceiling policy. Our results thus highlight several advantages of hard ceilings for controlling short term price increases.     

Debt and Development

This paper examines incentive and valuation effects of debt financing on land investment. When land is debt financed, the landowner holds both a development option on the land and a default option on the debt. Because development typically devalues the default option, investment may be delayed past the point at which efficient investment would otherwise proceed. The incentive to underinvest is shown to be more pronounced as debt level increases, i.e., as the debt becomes riskier. This agency problem provides an explanation as to why land is generally difficult to debt finance and may also explain why debt levels are relatively low for “land-intensive” real estate firms. Novel comparative statics show that debt value may increase for a given increase in asset volatility as well as for a given increase in interest rate. Renegotiation and restrictive contract provisions are considered as mechanisms to promote efficient investment policy in the presence of debt financing.     

Implementing Electricity Restructuring

Electricity is one of the last U.S.industries in which competition is replacingregulation. We briefly review the technologyfor producing and delivering power, the historyof electricity policy, and recent state andinternational experience. We then outline themajor questions facing policymakers as theydecide whether, when, and how to implementrestructuring. We conclude with some thoughtson the California electricity crisis and otherpolitical controversies. Although theCalifornia experience has come to define whatit means for electricity markets to fail, mostof the problems it raised are among those weknow how to solve or prevent. The stillunresolved make-or-break issue remains whetherthe cooperation necessary to maintainreliability is compatible with the degree ofcompetition necessary to bring about greaterefficiency and lower prices.     

The costs of uncoordinated regulation

Patents encourage firms to undertake research and development by protecting innovator revenues from competition. Controls on pollution of the environment are intended to close the gap between the private and social costs of natural resource use. This paper examines the incentives that are created by the interaction of these two separate pieces of regulation. A model is developed that shows how an incumbent, patent-holding firm can take advantage of environmental regulation to exclude rivals from her market.     

Comparing the costs and benefits of diversification by regulated firms

Previous work on the diversification of regulated firms has focused exclusively on either the costs of cross-subsidy or on the welfare gains resulting from economies of scope. Using theory and numerical simulations, we identify conditions under which gains from economies of scope and increased competition tend to outweigh the costs of cross-subsidization. We use a perfect competition model of the unregulated market to examine tradeoffs under economies of scope. Effects of increased competition are assessed using Cournot models with linear and constant elasticity demands. Diversification tradeoffs depend upon magnitudes of variables that regulators should be able to estimate or otherwise judge.     

The market price of risk and the equity premium: A legacy of the Great Depression?

By positing learning and a pessimistic initial prior, we build a model that disconnects a representative consumer's subjective attitudes toward risk from the high price of risk that a rational-expectations econometrician would deduce from financial market data. We follow Friedman and Schwartz [1963. A Monetary History of the United States, 1857-1960. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ] in hypothesizing that the Great Depression heightened fears of economic instability. We use a robustness calculation to elicit a pessimistic prior for a representative consumer and let him update beliefs via Bayes’ law. Learning eventually erases pessimism, but while it persists, pessimism contributes a volatile multiplicative component to the stochastic discount factor that a rational-expectation econometrician would detect. With sufficient initial pessimism, the model generates substantial values for the market price of risk and equity premium and predicts high Sharpe ratios and forecastable excess stock returns.     

Strategy matters: strategic positioning and performance in the education services sector

• The present study explored the strategic positioning behaviour of Australian educational services institutions to see whether their choice of strategy impacted their competitiveness in international markets. A sample of schools, colleges and universities, were asked which of Porter's generic positioning strategies they used. Correspondence and cluster analysis were used to examine these relationships and discriminant analysis was used to see whether there was a relationship between strategy choice and performance. The results showed institutions that lacked a coherent strategy did not perform well, highlighting the importance of educational administrators to develop clear and coherent strategies that position their offerings effectively to targeted market segments. Indeed, a failure to apply strategic principles may risk the long term sustainability of the institution.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Inflation Uncertainty on Output Growth and Inflation in Thailand*

We explore the impact of inflation uncertainty on output growth in Thailand, an emerging market economy with moderate inflation. Inflation and output uncertainty are modeled in a bivariate constant conditional correlation generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (AR(p)‐cccGARCH(1,1)) specification. We include the exchange rate in the mean equations, and use the headline and core inflation rates and industrial production to generate inflation and output uncertainty series. These series are then used in Granger causality tests to make inferences about the effect of monetary policy‐induced inflation uncertainty. Causality tests show a positive relation from inflation to inflation uncertainty. Additionally, increased inflation uncertainty decreases output. These results are consistent with real costs associated with moderate inflation. Finally, we find no evidence that monetary policy reduced these costs.