International Trade,Offshoring and Heterogeneous Firms

Recent trade models determine the equilibrium distribution of firm‐level efficiency endogenously and show that freer trade shifts the distribution towards higher average productivity because of entry and exit of firms. These models ignore the possibility that freer trade also alters the firm‐size distribution via international firm migration (offshoring); firms must, by assumption, produce in their “birth nation.” We show that when firms are allowed to switch locations, new productivity effects arise. Freer trade induces the most efficient small‐nation firms to move to the large nation. The large country gets an “extra helping” of the most efficient firms while the small nation's firm‐size distribution is truncated on both ends. This reinforces the large‐nation productivity gain while reducing or even reversing the small‐nation productivity gain. The small nation is nevertheless better off allowing firm migration.     

Environmental Product Standards in North–South Trade

Consumption is one channel through which the environment is damaged. To protect the environment, various product standards have been introduced across the world. This paper uses a new economic geography framework to explore the effects of environmental product standards on environment in a North–South trade model. It examines the situation in which the North unilaterally introduces an environmental product standard. Specifically, those products that do not meet the standard are not allowed to be sold in the North's market. It is found that such a standard may worsen the North's environment but improve the South's environment as a result of firm relocation.     

Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application

We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference. We characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized Nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core. The model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers. Although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium, full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient.     

COMPETITIVENESS AND STABILITY OF COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOR

We investigate the relationship between the degree of competition and the stability of collusive behaviour, by introducing the element of relative performance in the objective functions of the firms. We show that an increase in the degree of competition destabilizes the collusion. This relation differs starkly in the standard symmetric Cournot and Bertrand duopoly models, with the former being more unstable than the latter.     

Coverage area expansion, customer switching, and household profiles in the Japanese broadband access market

This paper examines the diffusion process of Internet broadband access in Japan by modeling the household choice of access modes. Estimates reveal that the characteristics of users, rather than those of the access modes, play a significant role in demand substitution across the modes. Simulation exercises indicate that had optic fibers (fiber-to-the-home; FTTH) been made available to the whole country in 2005, only 10% of households would have switched to that mode. This result implies that once chosen, the household choice of access mode persists, and that indirect network effects are an important element in decisions to adopt the new technology of broadband. Finally, policy implications are discussed.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN MULTI-STAGE DUOPOLY GAMES*

This paper presents an investigation of the endogenous timing in multi-stage duopoly games in which duopolists choose two variables over two periods. The paper elaborates the two-stage strategic commitment game discussed by Brander and Spencer (1983). Duopolists decide their outputs and cost-reducing investments and they are allowed to choose which action to take first. The paper discusses two types of games; one is a three-stage game in which each duopolist can commit to the order of choices before it chooses its output or cost-reducing investments, and the other is a two-stage game in which it cannot. The paper finds that at least one firm chooses its output first. Furthermore, the three-stage game has the unique equilibrium outcome in which both firms choose their outputs first.     

Profit-Enhancing Parallel Imports

We investigate competition between a domestic intellectual property right holder and a foreign imitator and consider how parallel imports affect their profits. We consider a two-country model. Country A is a developed country where intellectual property rights are highly protected, and country B is a developing country where protection is weak. The intellectual property right holder can sell the products for both markets while the imitator cannot export the products to country A. We find that permitting parallel imports can be beneficial for both players because it serves as a commitment device to soften price competition.     

Entry regulation and social welfare with an integer problem

This paper elaborates on Salop (1979) who showed that the number of firms at free-entry equilibrium is excessive from the viewpoint of social welfare (excess-entry theorem). This paper considers an integer problem of the number of firms entering the market. We find that the excess-entry theorem does not hold true if the marginal production cost is increasing, while it holds true if the marginal production cost is constant. This result warns against the use of the excess-entry theorem for rationalizing entry regulation such as the notorious Japanese Large-Scaled Retail Act restricting the new entry of retailers.     

The Calendar Structure of the Japanese Stock Market: The ‘Sell in May Effect’ versus the ‘Dekansho‐bushi Effect’

We report on a seasonal pattern that has persisted in the Japanese stock market for more than half a century: Mean stock returns are significantly positive for months during the first half of the calendar year and significantly negative for months during the second half. Dubbed the Dekansho‐bushi effect, this seasonality is independent of other known calendar anomalies, such as the so‐called January effect. The Dekansho‐bushi effect should be distinguished from the ‘sell in May effect,’ because Japanese stocks perform well in June and poorly in November and December. The Dekansho‐bushi effect varies in magnitude among firms and is particularly significant among small firms with high book‐to‐market ratios. Nonetheless, the effect exists, regardless of a company's size or book‐to‐market ratio.