Market Instability in a Stackelberg Duopoly

m -period duopoly model with inventory costs, where each firm chooses when to produce. We find that, in contrast to most existing works concerning endogenous roles of the firms, no pure strategy equilibrium exists when m is strictly larger than two. This result indicates that no stable pattern of allocation of roles exists except for a two-period model; thus the leader-follower relationship inevitably becomes instable. Received August 1, 2000; revised version received July 20, 2001     

Entrepreneurs' capital accumulation behavior and long-run equilibrium

The purpose of this paper is to derive some interesting results on long-run equilibrium by considering entrepreneurs' capital accumulation behavior explicitly. Our framework is a two class, two production sector model in order to analyze the dynamic stability properties in the cases of Kaldor's saving assumption and Pasinetti's saving assumption. We shall introduce a further adjustment mechanism: the speeding up (slowing down) of capital accumulation in that sector in which the rate of profit is higher (lower).     

Sufficient conditions for the optimal degree of progression to decrease with the government revenue requirement

This paper derives some sufficient conditions under which an increase in the tax revenue requirement leads to a less progressive tax structure in the context of the educational investment model.     

Price Premiums for Eco-friendly Commodities: Are ‘Green’ Markets the Best Way to Protect Endangered Ecosystems?

‘Green’ markets represent a means through which public goods can be privately provided. A green product is an impure public good consisting of a private good (e.g., rain forest honey) bundled with a jointly produced public good (e.g., biodiversity protection). In the context of ecosystem protection, popular green commodities include eco-tourism excursions, coffee grown under forest canopies (‘shade-grown’), tagua nuts for buttons and ornaments, rainforest nuts and oils for cosmetic products, and rain forest honey. We examine the dynamic efficiency of eco-friendly price premiums in achieving ecosystem protection and rural welfare goals by contrasting the use of price premiums to the use of payments that are tied directly to ecosystem protection. We demonstrate analytically and empirically that direct payments are likely to be more efficient as a conservation policy instrument. Depending on the available funds, the direct payments may be better or worse than green price premiums in achieving rural welfare objectives. If direct payments are not feasible for social or political reasons, we demonstrate analytically and empirically that the price premium approach is likely to be more effective at achieving conservation and development objectives than the currently more popular policy of subsidizing capital acquisition in eco-friendly commercial activities.     

Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets

We investigate the optimal behavior of a public firm in a mixed market involving private firms and one public firm. Existing works show that welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is suboptimal when the number of firms is given exogenously. We allow free entry of private firms and find that, in contrast to the case with the fixed number of firms, welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is always optimal in mixed markets. Furthermore, we find that mixed markets are better than pure markets involving no public firm if and only if the public firm earns nonnegative profits.     

Mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration

Abstract We investigate a mixed market where a state‐owned welfare‐maximizing public firm competes against profit‐maximizing private firms. We use a circular city model with quantity‐setting competition. In contrast to a pure market case discussed by Pal (1998a) , spatial agglomeration of private firms always appears in equilibrium. All private firms locate at the same point, and the public firm locates at the opposite side. We also find that this equilibrium pattern of the location is second best provided that output of each private firm cannot be controlled by the social planner. JEL Classification: H42, L13
Oligopole mixte et agglomération spatiale Les auteurs examinent un marché mixte où une entreprise publique possédée par l'État et cherchant à maximiser le niveau de bien‐être est en concurrence avec des entreprises privées qui cherchent à maximiser leurs profits. On utilise un modèle de cité circulaire où la concurrence se fait en choisissant la quantité produite. En contraste avec le cas du marché parfait discuté par Pal (1998a), l'agglomération spatiale des entreprises privées paraît être en équilibre. Toutes les entreprises privées se localisent au même point, et l'entreprise publique se localise du côté opposé. Il appert que ce pattern d'équilibre de localisation est un équilibre de second ordre compte tenu du fait que la production de chaque entreprise privée ne peut être contrôlée par le planificateur social.     

Vilfredo Pareto on Labor: A Critical Re-examination

This article comprehensively examines Vilfredo Pareto's thoughts on labor and highlights their significance within his body of work. Like the other pioneers in neoclassical economics, Pareto disregarded worker subjectivity toward labor performance and the resulting variability in the substance of labor. Thus emasculating the human traits of labor, in his theory of pure economics, Pareto identified the nature of labor exchange with that of the exchange of nonhuman objects, thereby subsuming the former under his general equilibrium system. This neoclassical principle of rationalizing the market determination of labor exchange on its deindividuation governed Pareto's speculations throughout his work. Even his arguments in applied economics in favor of worker solidarity and strikes were grounded on this principle. It remained the basis for Pareto's opinions on actual labor relations. Pareto's frustration here turned him into an anti-unionist, but it also helped to mold his prime ideas regarding sociology and his awareness of the limits of economics. However, Pareto's adherence to his former concept of labor exchange contradicting its nature became a chief cause of his failure to integrate his economic thinking with its sociological counterpart and occasioned his sympathy with Fascism. Thus, this article concludes that Pareto's thoughts on labor profoundly affected his entire body of thought and that their flaw is not exclusive to him but inherent in neoclassical economics.     

A Two-stage Price-setting Duopoly: Bertrand or Stackelberg

This paper investigates a two-stage price-setting duopoly with differentiated goods. First, each firm announces its price; second, it chooses its actual price; and finally the market opens. Once a firm announces a price, it is able to discount it but not raise it. The model includes Stackelberg-type and Bertrand-type equilibria as possible outcomes. Whether Bertrand or Stackelberg appears in equilibrium depends on the properties of demand functions crucially. We find three patterns of equilibrium outcomes; one case has Bertrand equilibrium only, another has Stackelberg only, and the other has both equilibria     

Current accounts of Japanese airports

The paper examines the current account of 41 major airports. When we exclude depreciation costs, only seven airports are profitable. When depreciation is excluded, only three airports are making profits. Airports managed by local governments are very difficult to sustain financially without subsidies. Airports with more than 5.2 million passengers are profitable when depreciation is taken into account, however most local airports have fewer than 2.5 million passengers. When depreciation costs are excluded, airports need at least 2.7 million passengers to be viable.