Monetary and Financial Integration in the EMU: Push or Pull?

This paper examines the channels through which monetary union increased financial integration, using panel data on bilateral international commercial bank claims from 1998–2006. I decompose the increase in claims into three channels: a "borrower effect," as a country's EMU membership may leave its borrowers more creditworthy in the eyes of foreign lenders; a "creditor effect," as membership in a monetary union may increase the attractiveness of a nation's commercial banks as intermediaries, perhaps through increased scale economies or through an improved regulatory environment after the advent of monetary union; and a "pairwise effect," as joint membership in a monetary union increases the quality of intermediation between borrowers and creditors when both are in the union. Isolating these three channels through a series of difference-in-differences specifications, I find that the pairwise effect is the primary source of increased financial integration. This result is robust to a number of sensitivity exercises.     

Auctions with costly information acquisition

We characterize optimal selling mechanisms in auction environments where bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid. In addition, these mechanisms must induce the bidders to acquire information about their valuations and to reveal this information truthfully. Using a generalized Groves principle, we prove a very general “full extraction of the surplus” result: the seller can obtain the same profit as if he had full control over the bidders’ acquisition of information and could have observed directly their valuations once they are informed. We also present appealing implementations of the optimal mechanism in special cases. For helpful comments we thank George Deltas, David Martimort, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants in Mannheim, Rutgers, Tel Aviv, Toulouse, the Society for Economic Design 2002 conference in New York, and the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society in Evanston, IL. Yossi Spiegel thanks the IIBR for financial assistance and Charles Zheng thanks the NSF for grant SES-0214471.     

The capital structure and investment of regulated firms under alternative regulatory regimes

This paper explains how regulated firms choose their capital structure and examines the effects of this choice on investment and on regulated prices. It is shown that in equilibrium, firms have an optimal debt level and that given this debt level, the regulated price is set high enough to ensure that firms never become financially distressed. The analysis of the equilibrium yields testable hypotheses concerning the effects of changes in cost parameters and in the regulatory climate on the equilibrium investment level, capital structure, and regulated price. The analysis also shows that a regulatory restriction on the ability of the firm to issue securities may have an adverse effect on investment and consequently may harm consumers.     

Stable Provision vs. Cournot–Nash Equilibria in Pure Public Good Economies

Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998, Journal of Economic Theory 83 , pp. 1–18) demonstrated that in pure public good economies, for some consumers the Lindahl consumption bundles can be inferior (utility-wise) to their Cournot–Nash allocation. In this paper, we prove that in any finite pure public good economy there exists a core allocation that is unanimously preferred, utility-wise, by all consumers over their Cournot–Nash consumption bundles.     

The Role of Debt in Procurement Contracts

This paper develops a theory of capital structure based on the attempts of a firm to alleviate a holdup problem that arises in its bilateral relationship with a buyer. It is shown that by issuing debt to outsiders, the firm can improve its ex post bargaining position vis-a-vis the buyer and capture a larger share of the ex post gains from trade. Debt, however, is costly because the buyer may find the required price too high and refuse to trade. Since debt raises the payoff of claimholders, it strengthens the firm's incentive to make relationship-specific investments, and therefore alleviates the well-known underinvestment problem. A comparative static analysis yields a number of testable hypotheses regarding the firm's financial strategy.     

Monopoly versus competition: The learning by doing case

This paper studies the monopolistic and perfect competitive market structures, where the production process incorporates learning by doing. This analysis provides conditions under which monopoly is preferred to perfect competition from the consumers' point of view.     

Reservations on the classical Laffer curve

Throughout the last two decades, some economists have objected to the conventional shape of one peak point on the Laffer curve. This paper examines the reservations presented in the literature and demonstrates the possibility of a Laffer curve with three peak points. Such a shape may be due to the three heterogeneous population groups of younger workers, adult males, and adult females. These groups respond differently to net wage rate changes, thus reducing the applicability of the changing of tax rates by policymakers.

     

The Role of Financial Development in Growth and Investment

Thisarticle decomposes the well-documented relationship between financialdevelopment and growth. We examine whether financial developmentaffects growth solely through its contribution to growth in ``primitives' or factor accumulation rates or whether it alsohas a positive impact on total factor productivity growth. Ourresults suggest that indicators of financial development arecorrelated with both total factor productivity growth and investment.However, the indicators that are correlated with total factorproductivity growth differ from those that encourage investment.In addition, many of the results are sensitive to the inclusionof country fixed effects, which may indicate that the financialdevelopment indicators are proxying for broader country characteristics.     

Capital Structure and Regulation: Do Ownership and Regulatory Independence Matter?

We study the effect of ownership structure and regulatory independence on the interaction between capital structure and regulated prices using a comprehensive panel data of publicly traded European utilities. We find that firms in our sample tend to have a higher leverage if they are privately controlled and regulated by an independent regulatory agency. Moreover, the leverage of these firms has a positive and significant effect on their regulated prices, but not vice versa. Our results are consistent with the theory that privately controlled regulated firms use leverage strategically to obtain better regulatory outcomes.