School Choice and the Distributional Effects of Ability Tracking: Does Separation Increase Inequality?

Tracking programs have been criticized on the grounds that they harm disadvantaged children. The bulk of empirical research supports this view, but existing studies compare outcomes across students placed in different tracks. Track placement is likely to be endogenous with respect to student outcomes. We use a new strategy for overcoming the endogeneity of track placement and find no evidence that tracking hurts low-ability children. Previous studies have also been based on the assumption that students' enrollment decisions are unrelated to whether or not the school tracks. When we account for the possibility that tracking programs affect school choice, we find evidence that they may help low-ability children.     

Shopping from a List: International Studies of Consumer Online Experiences

In response to the growth of online shopping, consumer groups from around the world participated in two mystery shopping exercises. These exercises, conducted during the Christmas holiday seasons of 1998 and 2000, involved buying a variety of products from web sites located both domestically and abroad. A number of serious problems were identified within the research, especially lack of disclosure of key consumer information and failures in delivering goods and refunding consumers when goods were returned. The research has been used by consumer organizations to enhance consumer education and to lobby governmental and self-regulatory bodies for greater consumer protection in the online environment.     

Managerial Equity Ownership and the Demand for Outside Directors

This paper examines the linkage between the use of outside directors and managerial ownership. We conjecture there are two linkages: the standard incentive‐alignment demand for monitoring when managers own little stock and an entrenchment‐amelioration demand when managerial stock ownership is high. As a consequence, we predict the association between managerial ownership and board composition will be nonlinear (U‐shaped if the entrenchment effect is sufficiently pronounced). Using UK data, we find that both quadratic and logarithmic models outperform the simple linear relationship assumed in prior research and that the substitution between managerial ownership and board composition is stronger than hitherto supposed.     

Consistent estimation in the bilinear multivariate errors-in-variables model

A bilinear multivariate errors-in-variables model is considered. It corresponds to an overdetermined set of linear equations AXB=C, A∈ℝ^m×n, B∈ℝ^p×q, in which the data A, B, C are perturbed by errors. The total least squares estimator is inconsistent in this case.  An adjusted least squares estimator is constructed, which converges to the true value X, as m →∞, q →∞. A small sample modification of the estimator is presented, which is more stable for small m and q and is asymptotically equivalent to the adjusted least squares estimator. The theoretical results are confirmed by a simulation study. Acknowledgements. We thank two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and corrections.? A. Kukush is supported by a postdoctoral research fellowship of the Belgian office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs, promoting Scientific and Technical Collaboration with Central and Eastern Europe.? S. Van Huffel is a full professor with the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.? I. Markovsky is a research assistant with the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.? This paper presents research results of the Belgian Programme on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction (IUAP V-22), initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister's Office – Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs of the Concerted Research Action (GOA) projects of the Flemish Government MEFISTO-666 (Mathematical Engineering for Information and Communication Systems Technology), of the IDO/99/03 project (K.U. Leuven) “Predictive computer models for medical classification problems using patient data and expert knowledge”, of the FWO projects G.0078.01, G.0200.00, and G0.0270.02.? The scientific responsibility is assumed by its authors.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.     

CAN INEFFICIENT TRADERS CREATE VALUE?

I examine the aggregate expected profit generated by informed traders of diverse ability in a competitive market. I assume that efficient traders get perfect information on asset values whereas inefficient traders get noisy information. In the presence of order size restrictions, I show that the aggregate expected profit generated by efficient and inefficient traders together can be higher than that generated by efficient traders alone. Thus, inefficient traders can create value in a constrained trading environment.