Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Bayesian MCMC Mapping of Quantitative Trait Loci in a Half-sib Design: a Graphical Model Perspective

Graphical models provide a powerful and flexible approach to the analysis of complex problems in genetics. While task-specific software may be extremely efficient for any particular analysis, it is often difficult to adapt to new computational challenges. By viewing these genetic applications in a more general framework, many problems can be handled by essentially the same software. This is advantageous in an area where fast methodological development is essential. Once a method has been fully developed and tested, problem-specific software may then be required. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the potential use of a graphical model approach to genetic analyses by taking a very simple and well-understood problem by way of example.     

Forecasting category sales and market share for wireless telephone subscribers: a combined approach

The ability to forecast market share remains a challenge for many managers especially in dynamic markets, such as the telecommunications sector. In order to accommodate the unique dynamic characteristics of the telecommunications market, we use a multi-component model, called MSHARE. Our method involves a two-phase process. The first phase consists of three components: a projection method, a ring down survey methodology and a purchase intentions survey. The predictions from these components are combined to forecast category sales for the wireless subscribers market. In the second phase, market shares for the various brands are generated using the forecast of the number of subscribers that are obtained in Phase 1 and the share predictions from the ring down methodology. The proposed methodology produces the minimum Relative Absolute Error for each market as compared to the forecasts from each individual component in the first phase. The value of the proposed model is illustrated by its application to a real world scenario. The managerial implications of the proposed model are also discussed.     

IntraLATA long-distance demand: carrier choice, usage demand and price elasticities

Competition in the long-distance market in the US continues to intensify; the 1996 Telecommunications Act has led to increased competition in long-distance telephony especially as the Regional Bell Operating Companies have begun to gain entry to long-haul, long-distance markets. In order to better understand the implications of having increased service offerings, models of how customers choose between carriers (and the impact of this choice on subsequent usage) will be useful. We develop the first publicly available models that simultaneously estimate choice and usage for intraLATA long-distance in the US. Utilizing a generalized Tobit model, the price responsiveness of usage and carrier choice are estimated. The results are generally consistent with expectations both in terms of theory and of practical experience in the industry.     

Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.     

Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing

This paper addresses two very old issues in human society: espionage and double crossing. Our major conclusion points out that there will be a serious over rewarding problem in the direct mechanism due to double crossing in espionage, and a competitive mechanism with a relative performance regime can possibly mitigate the over rewarding problem and still extract the information.