Co-evolution of Preferences and Information in Simple Games of Trust

In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the `information technology' of individual decision-makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally by players who differ in their informational as well as in their preference type. Relative success of alternative decisions feeds back on the type composition of the population which in turn influences rational decision-making. An indirect evolutionary analysis of an elementary yet important basic game of trust shows that under certain parameter constellations the population dynamics of the evolutionary process specify a unique completely mixed rest point. However, as opposed to previous studies of preference formation in the game of trust there is no convergence to but only circumventing the rest point if the informational status of individuals evolves rather than being chosen strategically.     

Asymmetric information without common priors: an indirect evolutionary analysis of quantity competition

The common prior assumption justifies private beliefs as posterior probabilities when updating a common prior based on individual information. We dispose of the common prior assumption for a homogeneous oligopoly market with uncertain costs and firms entertaining arbitrary priors about other firms’ cost-type. We show that true prior beliefs can not be evolutionarily stable when truly expected profit measures (reproductive) success.     

Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past individual (their partner’s donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one’s choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be irrelevant. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, C72, D3     

‘Thinking Before Acting’ or ‘Acting Before Thinking’: Antecedents of Individual Action Propensity in Work Situations

We introduce the concept of ‘individual action propensity’ to examine the approach of individuals towards solving situations for which they lack knowledge and/or experience about what to do. We focus on a naturally contrasting pair of responses: ‘thinking before acting’ or ‘acting before thinking’, and associate low action propensity with thinking one's way into understanding how to act, and high action propensity with acting one's way into understanding such situations. We build on regulatory mode theory – with its dimensions of locomotion and assessment and the trade‐off between speed and accuracy – to examine individual characteristics as predictors of individual action propensity. We find that individual action propensity is associated with being a woman, having fewer years of formal education, not relying on help‐seeking behaviours, and having a positive attitude towards spontaneity. Our findings shed light on why individuals take action, or not, and provide implications for research on organizational action propensity.     

Another view on optimal design for estimating the point of extremum in quadratic regression

In this paper we illustrate how certain design problems can be simplified by reparametrization of the response function. This alternative viewpoint provides further insights than the more traditional approaches, like minimax, Bayesian or sequential techniques. It will also improve a practitioner’s understanding of more general situations and their “classical” treatment.     

Monetising the Classical Equations: a theory of circulation

The Classical Equations describe output and income in real terms.To use them to analyse aggregate demand, the transactions theydescribe must be ‘monetised’. A sum of money equalto the wage bill of the capital goods sector can be shown tobe necessary and sufficient to carry out all transactions, ina process of circulation which also defines an expression forvelocity. When money has intrinsic value, the quantity approachmay hold in the short run but, in the long run, money will beendogenous. In these conditions, the rate of interest will bedetermined by the supply and demand for reserves, but when moneyis purely nominal, only a minimum rate will be fixed, and therate of interest will have to be pegged. The Appendix developsthe Classical Equations and shows that they define an invariableunit of account.     

The Alchemy of the Can Opener: How an Austrian Economist Found Himself Supporting Dictatorial Imposition of a Liberal Order

Why would Hayek, the great critic of ‘rational constructivism’ and defender of spontaneous orders, think a transitional dictatorship could work? Here I attempt to dissect the alchemy of ‘turning a constitution into a can opener’ as Farrant &; McPhail (2014 Farrant, A., &; McPhail, E. (2014) Can a Dictator Turn a Constitution into a Can-opener: F. A. Hayek and the Alchemy of Transitional Dictatorship in Chile, Review of Political Economy, 26(3), pp. 331–348.[Taylor &; Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]) put it. Hayek argues against the imposition by an external source of order upon a society. He stresses the importance of an evolving culture and tradition, noting that they should be spontaneous orders not command systems, and that the culture of a society must be accepting and supportive of its institutions. Sometimes the culture is more important than the formal institutions of a society for efficiency. So why would Hayek argue that a transitional dictator could impose a constitution upon the people? It will be argued here that if Hayek had pursued the theoretical line set out in his Constitution of Liberty, he might have responded to the situation in Chile differently.