The Only Solution to the Decline in Business Ethics: Ethical Managers

This paper defines business ethics as a seriesof behaviors that adhere to values held by theindividual manager, the manager's supervisorsand subordinates, general society and, mostimportantly, the manager's customers andclients. The concept of business ethics isexplored through several levels of businessorganizations and operating environments.The paper then examines recent evidence of thedecline in business ethics by noting a fewexamples involving Beech-Nut, Hertz, MichaelMilken, E.F. Hutton, Sears, Salomon Brothers,Dalkon Shield, Exxon Valdez, S&L scandal,brokerage analysts. Surveys are cited toindicate that the American public believes thatbusiness ethics are declining.To further analyze the topic, the authorreports on a series of structured interviewswith managers in a variety of organizations.Fourteen senior managers were interviewed: 4from large county government, 3 from stategovernment, 4 from large corporations, 3 fromsmall businesses. The managers were asked theiropinions concerning the decline of businessethics, and for their recommendations topossibly retard the decline. All managers saidthey believed that ethics are in decline andthat the public believes ethics are declining.The recommendations for retarding or reversingthe decline yielded several suggestions: teachethics in schools and business organizations,develop and enforce Codes of Ethical Conductwithin all organizations, establish bettermonitoring and reporting mechanisms, and hireethical managers.The paper builds on theinterview results by coupling the managers'remarks with admonitions from many authors:while teaching ethics and Codes of EthicalConduct are important, the most importantfactor is the ethical behavior of managers(leaders). Ethical leadership is fundamentalsince ethical behavior is an individual – not acorporate – matter. In practice, ethics is notsomething that a manager ``does'; it issomething that the manager ``is.'     

A comparison of several approximations to the power function of the likelihood ratio test in covariance structure analysis*

In this paper we compare alternative asymptotic approximations to the power of the likelihood ratio test used in covariance structure analysis for testing the fit of a model. Alternative expressions for the noncentrality parameter (ncp) lead to different approximations to the power function. It appears that for alternative covariance matrices close to the null hypothesis, the alternative ncp's lead to similar values, while for alternative covariance matrices far from H_o the different expressions for the ncp can conflict substantively. Monte Carlo evidence shows that the ncp proposed in Satorra and Saris (1985) gives the most accurate power approximations.     

Risk and the miller equilibrium: Capital structure choice with risk-averse investors

Merton Miller's (1977) tax model of equilibrium capital structure choice results in capital structure irrelevance and the existence of tax clienteles, assuming the restrictive case of risk-neutrality. Relaxation of the assumption of risk-neutrality in Miller's tax framework, allowing utility-maximizing risk-averse investors, indicates that capital structure irrelevance continues to hold under reasonable assumptions about utility. Evaluation of resulting tax clienteles shows that marginal tax rates do not restrict investors from investing in equities but do affect the tax status of purchased bonds.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.     

FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE: THE OPPORTUNITY CURVE

A model depicting first-mover dynamics is proposed wherein certain types of strategic barriers activated by the first-mover strategy figure prominently in preserving benefits in the time dimension. Strategic barriers conferring singularity (i.e. one-time benefit) are considered to be the most effective preservers of first-mover advantage. the theoretical model is tested empirically in a study of six major industries. Benefits operationalized as industry share and profit share were found to decline consistently with industry age according to an exponential function designated the opportunity curve.