Consumer mobility and community tax bases : The financing of local public goods

In a model of economic ‘clubs’, size is fixed and members consuming a public good raise the question of composition; with whom would they rather consume? This depends on the way collective consumption is financed, and three results are proven With a poll tax, clubs must be homogeneous in income for all to be satisfied With a marginal benefit (Lindahl) tax, no consumer is ever satisfied with any composition; and with an income tax, at least one consumer in each club is always dissatisfied. Satisfaction implies there exists no club composition preferred to the existing one.     

A comparison of alternative methods of updating input-output coefficients

In recent years there has been a growing number of input-output models of economies ranging in scale from the rural to the national. While offering invaluable insights into the interaction of sectors within an economy, the input-output model suffers from the fact that its coefficient values are altered over time due particularly to technological change. Two of the prominent techniques designed to update these technical coefficients, the RAS and linear programming methods, are compared herein with regard to changes in U.S. national coefficients between 1963 and 1967. Suggestions for improvements to the latter method are outlined.