Attitude Sophistication and Effective Teaching in Economics

Little attention has been given to the measurement of changes in attitudes and beliefs resulting from instruction in economics. This deficiency is met by Mann and Fusfeld who relate attitude changes to growth in students' knowledge (cognition) and to characteristics of both students and instructors. The findings from this research suggest a conflict among the goals of instruction. They also imply greater persistence of changes in attitude than of changes in knowledge.     

Currency returns, market regimes and behavioral biases

Covered interest rate parity assumes that there is no risk premium on the hedged returns on currencies. However, empirical evidence indicates that risk premiums are not identically zero, and this is referred to as the forward premium puzzle. We show that there exist market regimes, within which behavioral biases affect decisions, and a type of parity holds within regimes. The foreign exchange market switches between regimes where there is a premium. This paper presents various tests for the hypotheses of currency regimes and regime dependent risk premiums. Based on the existence of regimes, a diversified currency portfolio is created with a mean-variance criterion. Using the Federal Exchange Rate Index as a proxy for the currency benchmark and the U.S. T-Bill as the risk free asset, the similarity between the benchmarks and the implied equilibrium hedged and unhedged portfolios provides evidence for regimes and decision bias. Within each regime interest rate parity is appropriate for modeling currency returns.     

Dismantling the south-west coalition: further evidence of distributive politics in preemption legislation

Economics of Governance - The factors influencing legislative voting behavior have often been studied. This is especially true regarding antebellum federal preemption legislation. Several...     

Why do diners tip: rule-of-thumb or valuation of service?

When diners decide how much to tip, is the decision based on social convention or on conscientious appraisal of server productivity? Previous researchers in economics and social psychology are generally inconclusive on this question. A common finding in the literature is that tip size and service quality are unrelated, a result usually obtained from OLS regressions. OLS is only appropriate if service quality is exogenous. It is argued that service quality is very likely endogenous in any regression of tip size; good quality encourages good tips, but server expectations of good tips encourage good quality. This simultaneity is accounted for by jointly estimating percentage tips and customer rankings of service quality on a sample of 247 diners in a Central Minnesota restaurant. Included are explanatory variables consistent with both the social psychology and economic views of tipping. In contrast to previous studies, it is found that service quality significantly affects tip size and when servers expect higher tips, customers rank service quality higher. Also it is found that patronage frequency and coupon redemption have no effect on percentage tips, but server gender influences quality significantly. It is concluded that the results are generally supportive of an economic hypothesis of tipping.     

AIDS is your business

If your company operates in a developing country, AIDS is your business. While Africa has received the most attention, AIDS is also spreading swiftly in other parts of the world. Russia and Ukraine had the fastest-growing epidemics last year, and many experts believe China and India will suffer the next tidal wave of infection. Why should executives be concerned about AIDS? Because it is destroying the twin rationales of globalization strategy-cheap labor and fast-growing markets--in countries where people are heavily affected by the epidemic. Fortunately, investments in programs that prevent infection and provide treatment for employees who have HIV/AIDS are profitable for many businesses--that is, they lead to savings that outweigh the programs' costs. Due to the long latency period between HIV infection and the onset of AIDS symptoms, a company is not likely to see any of the costs of HIV/AIDS until five to ten years after an employee is infected. But executives can calculate the present value of epidemic-related costs by using the discount rate to weigh each cost according to its expected timing. That allows companies to think about expenses on HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs as investments rather than merely as costs. The authors found that the annual cost of AIDS to six corporations in South Africa and Botswana ranged from 0.4% to 5.9% of the wage bill. All six companies would have earned positive returns on their investments if they had provided employees with free treatment for HIV/AIDS in the form of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART), according to the mathematical model the authors used. The annual reduction in the AIDS "tax" would have been as much as 40.4%. The authors' conclusion? Fighting AIDS not only helps those infected; it also makes good business sense.     

Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents

We consider models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy games in which agents employ imitative decision rules. We introduce committed agents: for each strategy, we suppose that there is at least one agent who plays that strategy without fail. We show that unlike the standard imitative model, the model with committed agents generates unambiguous infinite horizon predictions: the asymptotics of the stationary distribution do not depend on the order in which the mutation rate and population size are taken to their limits.     

The welfare costs of unreliable water service

Throughout the developing world, many water distribution systems are unreliable. As a result, it becomes necessary for each household to store its own water as a hedge against this uncertainty. Since arrivals of water are not synchronized across households, serious distributional inefficiencies arise. We develop a model describing the optimal intertemporal depletion of each household's private water storage if it is uncertain when water will next arrive to replenish supplies. The model is calibrated using survey data from Mexico City, a city where many households store water in sealed rooftop tanks known as tinacos. The calibrated model is used to evaluate the potential welfare gains that would occur if alternative modes of water provision were implemented. We estimate that most of the potential distributional inefficiencies can be eliminated simply by making the frequency of deliveries the same across households which now face haphazard deliveries. This would require neither costly investments in infrastructure nor price increases.     

Time-varying parameters in the almost ideal demand system and the Rotterdam model: will the best specification please stand up?

This article assesses the ability of the Rotterdam Model (RM) and of three versions of the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) to recover the time-varying elasticities of a true demand system and to satisfy theoretical regularity. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the RM performs better than the linear-approximate AIDS at recovering the signs of all the time-varying elasticities. More importantly, the RM has the ability to track the paths of time-varying income elasticities, even when the true values are very high. The linear-approximate AIDS, not only performs poorly at recovering the time-varying elasticities but also badly approximates the nonlinear AIDS.     

Strategic nonlinear pricing

The objective of this paper is to examine the role of nonlinear strategies in a standard oligopoly framework. We demonstrate that nonlinear pricing may indeed emerge as an equilibrium strategy, but only when firms produce differentiated products, when one firm retains market power due to a cost advantage, or as part of an equilibrium in mixed strategies. In addition, we examine the role of nonlinear pricing in a spatial-competition framework. Our main conclusion is that in highly competitive markets, nonlinear pricing strategies are not likely to emerge as an equilibrium.