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21.
We use a nonlinear commodity market model to assess, theoretically and empirically, the impacts of recent reforms of the CAP on prices and economic welfare in the EU. The empirical analysis is based on an aggregate structural econometric model of the EU wheat economy and its links to the rest of the world. Instability issues are also investigated. Impacts of CAP reforms on the variance of domestic and world prices are analysed and a Monte Carlo simulation is used to evaluate uncertainty in the model's welfare computations. Recent reforms led to a net welfare gain within the EU during the period 1993–2000. Additional budgetary costs are less than the welfare gains of consumers and producers. Producers gained as lower price support was overcompensated by additional direct payments.  相似文献   
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The leading political–economy–of–trade models are virtually silent on two fundamental questions raised by Rodrik in 1995. Why are trade policies systematically biased against trade? And why are tariffs rather than more efficient production subsidies adopted to redistribute income? This paper shows that systematic political grass–root support for trade–restricting and inefficient tariffs emerges when the government has a revenue goal and collecting taxes is costly. Even if no tax instrument enjoys an advantage with respect to collection costs and the factor ownership distribution is unbiased, more people support tariffs than import or production subsidies. More generally, the presence of tax–collection costs creates a grass–root support bias for taxes over subsidies as instruments to redistribute income.  相似文献   
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Faced with a record level of unemployment, the present debate in Germany is to extend the weekly hours of work. In this paper the employment effects of an economy-wide increase in weekly hours are quantified on the basis of a computable general equilibrium model for different specifications of the wage setting rule and the use of additional policy-induced public income. The simulation results back the argument of the opponents of longer working time that not more jobs will be created. However, when the higher tax revenues from GDP growth are used to reduce social security contributions, then the claim of the proponents that more jobs will be created can be supported.  相似文献   
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In search of solutions to the international debt crisis, attention has recently been focused on a new financing technique, so-called debt-equity swaps. An essential difference between these and the usual swapping of debt into equity is that the former allow a wider range of applications. The following article seeks to elucidate the possible contribution of debt-equity swaps towards easing the debt burden and to estimate the potential for a reduction in external debt and its effect on the balance of payments of the debtor nation.  相似文献   
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We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.  相似文献   
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Technological proximity and the choice of cooperation partner   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper provides empirical tests of hypotheses of cooperative behavior provided by evolutionary approaches in the resource-based view of the firm. The influences of “technological proximity”, individual incentives to cooperate and managerial tools to the choice of research partner are analyzed. Using German patent data we can show the positive influence of those three determinants. The results of this paper confirm theories dealing with the path-dependency of research activities.   相似文献   
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