Performance signals in the public sector: the case of health care

Although there are no traditional markets and money prices inthe public sector, consumers and providers may respond to signalsof organisational performance. We present a simple dynamic modelof the demand and supply for elective surgery in the UK NationalHealth Service in which waiting time acts as the prime indicatorof performance. The model is tested using a panel of quarterlydata for 123 English health authorities over an eight-year period.We find that supply is increasing and demand is decreasing inmeasures of the previous period waiting time. The results implythat health care systems which are rationed by waiting do respondto indicators of waiting times. The paper adds to the smallbut consistent body of research which demonstrates that publicsector systems respond to important aspects of reported performance.     

The option of joint purchase in vertically differentiated markets

Summary. Within the framework proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) for modelling quality differentiation, consumers are assumed to make mutually exclusive purchases. A unique pure strategy equilibrium exists in this case. In this note, we allow consumers to buy simultaneously different variants of the differentiated good. We call this the “joint purchase option”. The paper proposes a detailed analysis of price competition when this option is opened: first, we show that either uniqueness, or multiplicity, or absence of price equilibrium arise, depending on the utility derived from joint purchase relative to exclusive purchase. Second, we characterize these equilibria, whenever they exist. Received: July 25, 2001; revised version: October 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The second author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Interuniversity Attraction Pole Program- Belgian State- Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs under contract PAI 5/26. Correspondence to: X.Y. Wauthy     

Recent Developments at DG Competition: 2013–2014

The Directorate General for Competition at the European Commission enforces competition law in the areas of antitrust, merger control, and state aids. In 2013–2014 important antitrust decisions (Samsung and Motorola) were in the area of standard essential patents. In merger control the European Commission carried out an ex-post evaluation of past mergers in the INEOS/Solvay case in order to obtain valuable insights for the merger under review. In state aid, as a part of the State Aid Modernisation programme, guidelines were prepared to help EU member states to design and carry out ex post assessments of state aid schemes.     

Pollution and life expectancy: How environmental policy can promote growth

This article investigates the influence of environmental policy (EP) on growth in an AK-type growth model, when finite lifetime is introduced and the link between pollution and life expectancy (through the detrimental impact of pollution on health) is taken into account.Using an overlapping generations model à la Blanchard [Blanchard, O. (1985). Debt, deficits and finite horizon. Journal of Political Economy, 93:223-247], we demonstrate that finite lifetime introduces a “generational turnover effect” which modifies the influence of the EP on growth. Thus, when lifetime is finite and independent from pollution, we show that the “generational turnover effect” limits the detrimental impact of the EP on growth, if agents smooth their consumption over time. When pollution negatively influences life expectancy through health, we demonstrate that the “generational turnover effect” is magnified and that the EP and growth have an inverted U-shaped relationship in the steady-state. In this case, we show that the environmental policy is more likely to promote growth (i.e. it stimulates growth for a wider range of environmental taxes) when the impact of pollution on health is important and/or public expenditures in health are low. Finally, using numerical simulations, we find that for the value of parameters that we have chosen, the EP will be more likely to promote growth when agents smooth consumption over time.     

Optimal Regulation of a Fully Insured Deposit Banking System

We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information when the market value of deposit insurance can be determined using Merton's (1977, 3-11) formula. We show that, under the assumption that transferring funds from taxpayers to financial institutions has a social cost, the optimal regulation combines different levels of capital requirements combined with decreasing premia on deposit insurance. On the other hand, it is never efficient to require the banks to hold riskless assets. Finally, chartering banks is necessary in order to decrease the cost of asymmetric information.     

Conflicts of interest,information provision,and competition in the financial services industry

In some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer's needs. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures, specialized banking and one-stop banking.     

The Learning Transfer System Inventory (LTSI) translated into French: internal structure and predictive validity

The Learning Transfer System Inventory (LTSI, Holton et al., 2000 ) considers 16 factors likely to influence the transfer of training to the workplace. The purpose of this study is to translate the Learning Transfer System Inventory into French and to examine (1) the internal structure of the translated instrument; and (2) its predictive validity. The Learning Transfer System Inventory was administered to 328 participants from six companies during the week following the end of a training program. The transfer questionnaire was filled in by 106 of those participants 1–3 months later. The results showed that a principal component analysis reveals a factor structure very similar to the original structure: the 16 original factors are replicated. Second, seven factors display statistically significant correlations with transfer: learner readiness, motivation to transfer, transfer design, opportunity to use, transfer‐performance expectations, performance‐outcomes expectations and performance self‐efficacy. Comparisons with four similar previous studies allow us to draw directions for future research on the instrument.