An Algorithmic Approach to Optimal Asset Liquidation Problems

This paper examines discrete-time optimal control problems arising in the context of optimal asset liquidation using recently published algorithms and code. We address these questions within a realistic framework, assuming that the order placement decisions must be adapted dynamically. Furthermore, we show how a duality-based technique can be used to assess the quality of our numerical solution.     

Divergent and convergent logic of firms: Barriers and enablers for development and commercialization of innovations

This paper describes and discusses similarities and differences in the priorities, interests, and interactional goals of companies involved in the development and commercialization of innovation. We refer to such priorities, interests, and interactional goals as the logic of firms, and point to how differences among companies in these regards may enable or inhibit the development and commercialization of innovation. A case study in drug development, from a Taiwanese biopharmaceutical, illustrates two types of innovations: generic and novel drug development. Findings suggest how logic places focus on how certain actors may be more motivated toward innovation, but also on how the logic portrayed by actors can promote certain types of innovations (in this case generic ones), while inhibiting others (novel innovations). The paper concludes that companies need to have convergent logic (i.e. have the same priorities and similar or complementary interests and interaction goals) if an innovation process is to be successful. The focus on priorities, interests, and interactional goals of companies in innovation processes complements previous research that has primarily focused on the actual interaction, not what motivates it. The construct of shared logic nets as a means of analyzing convergent logic and gaps between different types of logic help to understand enablers and barriers to innovation.     

The Effectiveness of Capital Regulation on Bank Behavior in China

This paper examines the impact that ownership and governance structures have on how Chinese banks react to regulatory pressure. We find that the current regulatory regime induces banks to increase their capital, but its effectiveness in doing so varies based on whether the bank is listed or not, and also who is the majority shareholder. We also find that the degree of central government ownership and the political ties the chief executive officer of the bank has play an important role in the risk‐taking behavior of banks. Overall, our results have a number of policy implications supporting the need to further reduce state ownership of banks in China to mitigate the prevailing moral hazard and dual‐agency problems that arise from the government being both the regulator and the majority shareholder.     

BIASES IN RESEARCH: THE CASE OF RUBBER GROWING IN MALAYSIA

This paper measures the impact of technological progress in Malaysian rubber growing and tests the hypothesis that past research has been biased in favour of raising the productivity of capital rather than labour. It also demonstrates the methodological usefulness, in relation to a long-lived perennial crop, of separating embodied from disembodied technical change. The analysis indicates that research leading to new embodied technology has not been biased since it has raised the productivity of all input factors at about the same rate over time. However, disembodied technological change has not shifted the production hypersurface in an unambiguously neutral fashion. These results are especially pertinent to the debate about the future direction of rubber growing research.     

Innovation killers: how financial tools destroy your capacity to do new things

Most companies aren't half as innovative as their senior executives want them to be (or as their marketing claims suggest they are). What's stifling innovation? There are plenty of usual suspects, but the authors finger three financial tools as key accomplices. Discounted cash flow and net present value, as commonly used, underestimate the real returns and benefits of proceeding with an investment. Most executives compare the cash flows from innovation against the default scenario of doing nothing, assuming--incorrectly--that the present health of the company will persist indefinitely if the investment is not made. In most situations, however, competitors' sustaining and disruptive investments over time result in deterioration of financial performance. Fixed- and sunk-cost conventional wisdom confers an unfair advantage on challengers and shackles incumbent firms that attempt to respond to an attack. Executives in established companies, bemoaning the expense of building new brands and developing new sales and distribution channels, seek instead to leverage their existing brands and structures. Entrants, in contrast, simply create new ones. The problem for the incumbent isn't that the challenger can spend more; it's that the challenger is spared the dilemma of having to choose between full-cost and marginal-cost options. The emphasis on short-term earnings per share as the primary driver of share price, and hence shareholder value creation, acts to restrict investments in innovative long-term growth opportunities. These are not bad tools and concepts in and of themselves, but the way they are used to evaluate investments creates a systematic bias against successful innovation. The authors recommend alternative methods that can help managers innovate with a much more astute eye for future value.     

Information Asymmetry and Corporate Investment Decisions: A Dynamic Approach

This paper develops a dynamic model of the financing and operating decisions of firms in the presence of information asymmetry. When the value of growth opportunities is not fully recognized, securities are undervalued, thus influencing the financing and investment decisions. The agency‐based underinvestment problem is re‐examined under information asymmetry. For firms with greater growth opportunities, the investment distortion resulting from information asymmetry is especially significant. Information asymmetry also increases the expected bankruptcy cost. The cost of information asymmetry in terms of both the firm value and the information spread under the optimal capital structure could be substantial.     

The impact of employee satisfaction on quality and profitability in high-contact service industries

The extant operations management literature has extensively investigated the associations among quality, customer satisfaction, and firm profitability. However, the influence of employee attributes on these performance dimensions has rarely been examined. In this study we investigate the impact of employee satisfaction on operational performance in high-contact service industries. Based on an empirical study of 206 service shops in Hong Kong, we examined the hypothesized relationships among employee satisfaction, service quality, customer satisfaction, and firm profitability. Using structural equations modeling, we found that employee satisfaction is significantly related to service quality and to customer satisfaction, while the latter in turn influences firm profitability. We also found that firm profitability has a moderate non-recursive effect on employee satisfaction, leading to a “satisfaction–quality–profit cycle”. Our empirical investigation suggests that employee satisfaction is an important consideration for operations managers to boost service quality and customer satisfaction. We provide empirical evidence that employee satisfaction plays a significant role in enhancing the operational performance of organizations in the high-contact service sector.     

Imported inputs and privatization in downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

This paper examines welfare implications of privatization in a mixed oligopoly with vertically related markets, where an upstream foreign monopolist sells an essential input to public and private firms located downstream in the domestic country. The impact on domestic welfare of privatizing the downstream public firm is shown to contain three effects. The first is an output distortion effect, which negatively affects welfare since privatization decreases the production of final good for consumption. The second is an input price lowering effect resulting from a decrease in derived demand for the input. When the level of privatization increases, a decrease in final good production lowers input demand, causing input price to decline and domestic welfare to increase. The third is a rent‐leaking effect associated with foreign ownership in the downstream private firm. The rival domestic firm strategically increases its final good production, causing profits accrued to foreign investors to increase and domestic welfare to decline. Without foreign ownership in the downstream private firm, the optimal policy toward the public firm is complete privatization as the output distortion effect is dominated by the input price lowering effect. With foreign ownership, however, complete privatization can never be socially optimal due to the additional negative impact on domestic welfare of the rent‐leaking effect. We further discuss implications for domestic welfare under different privatization schemes (e.g., selling the privatization shares to the upstream foreign monopolist or to the rival domestic firm).     

SUBSIDIES AS OPTIMAL FISCAL STIMULI

Theoretical macroeconomic models typically take fiscal policy to mean tax‐and‐spend by a ‘benevolent government’ that exploits potential aggregate demand externalities inherent in the imperfectly competitive nature of goods markets. Whilst shown to raise aggregate output and employment, these policies crowd‐out private consumption and typically reduce welfare. On account of their widespread use to stimulate economic activity, we consider the use of ‘tax‐and‐subsidize’ instead of ‘tax‐and‐spend’ policies. Within a static general equilibrium macro‐model with imperfectly competitive goods markets, we examine the effects of wage and output subsidies and show that, for a small open economy, positive tax and subsidy rates exist which maximize welfare, rendering no intervention suboptimal. We also show that, within a two‐country setting, a Nash non‐cooperative symmetric equilibrium with positive tax and subsidy rates exists, and that cooperation between governments in setting these rates is more expansionary and leads to an improvement upon the non‐cooperative solution.