The Invisible Multipliers of Joint-products

This paper proposes a hybrid input-output model to estimate the intermediate requirements embodied in the final disposal--such as reclamation and incineration - of non-marketable scraps and wastes from industries or households. The model is based on a mixed technology assumption in order to connect the monetary distribution of the ordinary goods and services with the physical distribution of the scraps and wastes as joint-products. Moreover, some demand-pulled invisible multipliers, in terms of the scraps and wastes, have been explored by performing a numerical simulation. From the invisible multipliers, we find the paradoxical phenomenon that the reduction in the amount of final disposal and the promotion of material recycling decreases the intermediate demand of the scraps and wastes for material recycling if there is a time-lag in the introduction of the appropriate recycling technology.     

Urban Interventionism and Local Knowledge

Not only do government interventions tend to compromise the knowledge-utilizing properties of the price system, they also impinge directly and in important ways on local knowledge, or Hayek's “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place.” This local knowledge includes norms and trust levels that promote impersonal market interactions and complement more familiar forms of production-related skills and know-how. Thus, along with the well-known Hayekian lesson that the effective use of local knowledge depends on an extensively used and well-functioning price system, it is equally important to appreciate the reverse: i.e., the role of certain kinds of local knowledge in enabling the extensive use and smooth functioning of the price system to occur. In this way, interventionism can diminish the price system's effectiveness not only by directly distorting relative prices, but also indirectly by undermining local knowledge. As is generally true of interventionism, these consequences tend to reinforce the interventionist propensities of public choosers.     

Learning from private information in noisy repeated games

We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff functions and the map from actions to signal distributions depend on an unknown state. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are determined by the solutions to a family of linear programming problems. Using this characterization, we develop conditions under which play can be as if the players have learned the state. We provide a sufficient condition for the folk theorem, and a characterization of the PTXE payoffs in games with a known monitoring structure.     

The regulations for indoor air pollution in Japan: a public health perspective

In recent years public health problems caused by indoor air pollution, known as ‘Sick Building Syndrome in housing’, or ‘Sick House Syndrome’ in Japan, have been drawing strong public concern. After conducting extensive exposure assessment, government authorities have taken effective measures to solve the problem. However, as a result of diversification and increase in quantities of industrial chemicals, existing regulations do not cover enough ranges of various potential hazardous chemicals. Hence, the regulations seek to be changed from hazard‐based regulation to a risk‐based one. Good indoor air quality (IAQ), which does not pose unacceptable health risks from all pollutants affecting indoor air, should be ensured for all public people. The objective of this study is to clarify the remaining issues to be solved urgently, related to the regulations to ensure a good IAQ. We reviewed enormous numbers of the existing governmental and industrial voluntary standards and/or guidelines, literature and documents concerning IAQ research in the past 40 years. Our results showed six subjects from those remaining issues. Based on these subjects we created a new scheme to control the IAQ; we especially regarded a comprehensive labeling system as one of the important strategies.     

Third-Degree Price Discrimination in the Presence of Asymmetric Consumption Externalities

In this paper, we consider third-degree price discrimination in two markets in the presence of asymmetric consumption externalities; we establish that under plausible conditions, a firm reduces its price in the market with low price elasticity of demand. The firm can increase its profits by reducing the price for these consumers and enlarging the demand for other consumers, provided that positive consumption externalities exist. Moreover, we show that third-degree price discrimination enhances not only the firm’s profit but also total consumer surplus.

Does aid affect inequality?

We show that there was a negative correlation between pro-poor aid and inequality in the period before the mid-2000s. This article provides an explanation for this observed relationship. Using panel data on 34 countries for the period 1996–2014, we test the hypothesis that pro-poor aid has an inequality-reducing effect. To demonstrate that the negative correlation is not spurious, we use dynamic panel techniques with alternative specifications. We show that the share of pro-poor aid has a negative effect on inequality. In addition, we show that the interaction term between the poverty rate and the change in pro-poor aid has a significant effect. These empirical results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. The results imply that aid can reduce inequality by altering the allocation of aid, rather than by increasing the amount of aid.     

Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring

We demonstrate that efficiency is achievable in a certain class of N player repeated games with private, almost perfect monitoring. Our equilibrium requires only one period memory and can be implemented by two state automata. Furthermore, we show that this efficiency result holds with any degree of accuracy of monitoring if private signals are hemiindependent. Whereas most existing research focuses on two player cases or only a special example of N player games, our results are applicable to a wide range of N player games of economic relevance, such as trading goods games and price-setting oligopolies.     

A test for rational bubbles in stock prices

This paper presents two necessary conditions for the absence of rational bubbles on the assumption that the discount rate is stationary. One condition is that real stock prices and real dividends are cointegrated with the time-varying cointegrating vector. The other is that the order of integration of real stock prices is equal to that of real dividends. The first condition is different from that proposed on the assumption of a constant discount rate. In contrast, the second condition is the same as that presented on this assumption. Examining the second condition using Japanese data, we find that Japanese stock prices and dividends satisfy the necessary condition. First version received: May 2000/Final version accepted: April 2001