As earthquakes can result in multi-dimensional negative consequences such as human loss and building damage, the ability to make accurate economic loss estimations immediately after the occurrence is crucial. Unfortunately, in many earthquake-stricken countries such as Iran, governments are often unable to quickly or accurately assess post-earthquake losses. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to extend the model developed by Chan et al. (Nat Hazards 17:269–283, 1998) to two independent variables to develop an earthquake economic loss estimation method based on the economic and socio-economic indices gross domestic product (GDP) and disposable personal income (DPI) and a seismic hazard probability function. A global cell map is also considered to assess the GDP and DPI based on the population in each cell affected by the earthquake. In the final stage, using the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale, 18 earthquake damaged areas in Iran are taken as case study to estimate the economic losses using the new model presented in this paper.
I.IntroductionChlorobenzoic acids(CBAs)have been released to the envi-ronment intentionally due to their use in agriculture asherbicides,or unintentionally due to the function,they playedin the aerobic transformation of many chlorinated pollutants,such as polychlorinated biphenyls(PCBs)and alkyl benzenes.Moreover,chlorobenzoic acids are the major intermediate prod-ucts of aerobic catabolism of PCBs and one of the rate-limitingsteps in the overall PCBs degradation process.Degradation ofchl… 相似文献
Abstract. Suppose that governments care about their tax revenue and local firms have some say in environmental regulations. Then, the level of employment and environmental compliance may be negotiated. We find that firms located in different countries can improve their threat‐point payoffs by mutual migration. This in turn affects the negotiated output/employment and environmental regulations, which causes profits to increase if the firm's threat‐point payoff is higher than that of the local government. The model predicts that pollution‐intensive firms or firms with highly inelastic demands are more likely to move out. Increases in the government's valuation of the environment, or in the degree of globalization also cause mutual migration of dirty firms. The effect of a government caring about consumer surplus leads to a lower pollution tax, reducing firms' incentives to move out. JEL classification: F2, Q0 相似文献
