On the Trade-off Between Work-related Training and Labor Mobility: The Role of Firing and Exit Costs

Within an incomplete-contract framework, we examine the consequences of contract renegotiation for contract design/enforcement and training market efficiency. Specifically, we show how the imposition of either firing costs or exit costs can bind together employers and employees in longer-lasting employment relationships that allow both agents to amortize their training investments. Nevertheless, the model implies that, although firing and exit costs provide institutional solutions to the training under-investment problem, this is achieved at the expense of allocative efficiency (efficient separations). Empirical evidence supports the existence of such a trade-off.revised version received July 23, 2003     

基于消费行为视角的可持续消费分析

消费与环境的可持续性存在密切关系，改变消费过程已被认为是朝向可持续发展的重要步骤，消费行为及其驱动力影响可持续消费的实现。本文基于消费行为理论视角，用一个综合方法构建了一个可持续消费模型，探讨了可持续消费的本质，并指出其政策意义。     

Luddites, the industrial revolution, and the demographic transition

Technological change was unskilled-labor-biased during the early industrial revolution, but is skill-biased today. This implies a rich set of non-monotonic macroeconomic dynamics which are not embedded in extant unified growth models. We present historical evidence and develop a model which can endogenously account for these facts, where factor bias reflects profit-maximizing decisions by innovators. In a setup with directed technological change, and fixed as well as variable costs of education, initial endowments dictate that the early industrial revolution be unskilled-labor-biased. Increasing basic knowledge then causes a growth takeoff, an income-led demand for fewer but more educated children, and a transition to skill-biased technological change in the long run.     

Choosing the Best Training Programme: Is there a Case for Statistical Treatment Rules?*

When treatment effects of active labour market programmes (ALMPs) are heterogeneous in an observable way across the population, the allocation of the unemployed into different programmes becomes particularly important. In this article, we present a statistical model that can be used to allocate unemployed into different ALMPs. The model presented is a duration model that uses the timing‐of‐events framework to identify causal effects. We compare different assignment rules, and the results suggest that a significant reduction in the average duration of unemployment may result if a statistical treatment rule is introduced.     

Identity Talk of Aspirational Ethical Leaders

This study investigates how business leaders dynamically narrate their aspirational ethical leadership identities. In doing so, it furthers understanding of ethical leadership as a process situated in time and place. The analysis focuses on the discursive strategies used to narrate identity and ethics by ethnic Chinese business leaders in Indonesia after their conversion to Pentecostal–charismatic Christianity. By exploring the use of metaphor, our study shows how these business leaders discursively deconstruct their ‘old’ identities and construct their ‘new’ aspirational identities as ethical leaders. This leads to the following contributions. First, we show that ethical leadership is constructed in identity talk as the business leaders actively narrate aspirational identities. Second, the identity narratives of the business leaders suggest that ethical leadership is a context-bound and situated claim vis-à-vis unethical practice. Third, we propose a conceptual template, identifying processes of realisation and inspiration followed by significant shifts in understanding, for the study of aspirational ethical leadership.     

Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Our findings indicate that the pay‐to‐performance relation is weak. Board size and ownership concentration are the only corporate governance characteristics that explain variations in executive compensation. Executive characteristics like skills, title and educational attainment all explain variations in executive compensation. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find a stronger pay‐to‐performance relation in firms with better designed bonus plans.