Sample size requirements in structural equation models under standard conditions

When a research of risk considers researchers who wish to utilize structured equation modeling (SEM), all users would ask for their sample size. The paper argues for the formulation of a single barebones minimum standard to be accompanied by a hierarchy of higher quality standards. The paper also offers a specific recommendation for such a barebones standard and ranks quality standards by their sample size cost. In sum, the solution to this problem involves integration: over the multitude of standards, over both single-study and multi-study perspectives, and over a broad array of research environments. Our solution deals with the multitude of solutions. It seeks maximum flexibility to accommodate a multi-study perspective, and it is sensitive to the needs of research settings where sample size is constrained or collection is costly. For these reasons we offer important suggestions and summarize recommendations.     

Optimales Vertragsdesign bei moralischem Risiko in der Rückversicherung

This paper addresses the optimal design of risk sharing arrangements in reinsurance contracts with asymmetric information concerning the primary insurer’s behavior. The latter usually has significant unobservable discretions, for instance with respect to risk selection, implying a moral hazard problem. We show that the existence of moral hazard strongly affects the characteristics of the reinsurance indemnification rule, i. e. the connection between the level of losses and the indemnity, which is specified in the contract. For this analysis, a standard model framework from the theory of optimal reinsurance with perfect information is modified by the assumption that the primary insurer has unobservable control of the probability distribution of the extent of losses. In particular, the solution indicates that for this situation, a Pareto-optimal indemnity rule is less steep, and therefore the primary insurer’s share in a marginal increase of the loss is greater, compared to the case of complete information. A deductible, however, turns out not to be a suitable approach in this context.     

Consumer specialization and the Romantic transformation of the British Grand Tour of Europe

This paper posits that significant changes in 19th century British recreational travel patterns resulted from a change in the manner in which tourists used entertaining stimuli in order to attain pleasure. Consumers no longer merely viewed arousing stimuli, but attempted to use them to produce emotional states of being which they could partially modify to intensify pleasurable feelings (Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, sorrow, and the feeling brain, William Heinemann, 2003). The impetus for this modification stemmed from an increasing awareness that emotional responses could be to some degree self-cultivated, as embodied in the Romantic ethos that become popular at the time via the emergence of the paperback novel and magazine industry (Campbell, The romantic ethic and the spirit of modern consumerism, Blackwell, 1987). By learning how to manipulate and modify mental images in a way that may not necessarily correspond with objective reality, Romantic tourists learned to elicit pleasure through engaging of their imagination. Such a change in the mode of pleasure seeking had important long run economic consequences for tourist regions throughout the European continent.     

Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment

Reliable institutions, i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep foster cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that ‘the system’ had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that learned that attempts only did not affect their payoffs or that were not exposed to corruption at all.     

A theory of social license when regulatory pressure is jointly produced by an EPA and an NGO

We develop a model in which social pressure on a firm to behave well is jointly produced by a state regulator (EPA) and an NGO. The EPA and NGO differ in how they trade-off business versus environmental interests and also have access to different instruments in pursuit of their objectives. In particular, while the EPA will typically have the tools for detecting misbehaviour, the NGO can influence the intensity of social hostility directed towards those found to have misbehaved. EPA and NGO efforts may be strategic complements or substitutes, depending upon circumstances. We present a taxonomy of outcomes in the game between EPA and NGO in the spirit of Fudenberg and Tiroles’s (Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 74(2):361–366, 1984) classic taxonomy of business strategies. We also consider strategic delegation from NGO supporters to an NGO that has tastes over environmental and business interests different to their own.     

An interest rate peg might be better than you think

Active interest rate policy is frequently recommended based on its merits in reducing macroeconomic volatility and being a simple device. Yet, it might be outperformed by an even simpler policy. A peg can be welfare-enhancing and can uniquely be implemented.     

The effects of the monetary policy regime shift to inflation targeting on the real interest rate in the United Kingdom

This paper studies the effects of the monetary policy regime shift to inflation targeting on the stochastic properties of the real interest rate in the U.K. The empirical analysis suggests a constant mean of the real interest rate that shifts with the monetary policy regime change to inflation targeting in October 1992. The mean-reverting level of the real interest rate has decreased from 5.1% to 2.3% per annum with the change in monetary policy to inflation targeting. In addition, the shift in monetary policy regime to inflation targeting has reduced the volatility of the real interest rate and increased the persistence of real interest rate deviations from the mean. The results suggest that the central bank can affect the stochastic properties of the real interest rate through the choice of monetary policy regime over a long period of time.