Can stochastic discount factor models explain the cross-section of equity returns?

We propose a multivariate test of the capital asset pricing model (C-CAPM) of the cross-sectional variation in equity returns in which we compare cross-sectional variation in equity returns to the cross-sectional variation in their conditional covariance with stochastic discount factors. We use a multivariate generalized heteroskedasticity in mean model to estimate 25 portfolios that are formed on size and the book-to-market ratio. Each portfolio is allowed to have its own no-arbitrage condition. We find that although the conditional covariances of returns with consumption exhibit negative variation across size, they do not vary across the book-to-market ratio. Thus, C-CAPM can capture the size effect, but not the value effect. The fit is, however, improved by allowing the coefficients on the consumption covariances to be different. The value effect appears to be associated with the book-to-market ratio as well as size. On its own the book-to-market ratio does not generate additional information about average returns to C-CAPM. A possible explanation for these findings is that both small and low book-to-market ratio firms are expected to have higher rates of growth.     

Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance

This paper investigates the causes and consequences of activist block share purchases in the 1980s. We find that activist investors were most likely to purchase large blocks of shares in highly diversified firms with poor profitability. Activists were not less likely to purchase blocks in firms with shark repellents and employee stock ownership plans. Activist block purchases were followed by increases in asset divestitures, decreases in mergers and acquisitions, and abnormal share price appreciation. Industry-adjusted operating profitability also rose. This evidence supports the view that the market for partial corporate control plays an important role in limiting agency costs in U.S. corporations.     

Discussion of “The financial reporting of fair value based on managerial inputs versus market inputs: evidence from mortgage servicing rights”

Contrary to the guidance provided by regulators and industry associations suggesting that mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) be recorded as Level 3 assets, Altamuro and Zhang identify that 25 % of banks classify them as Level 2 assets. This variation in the asset classification of a single asset type provides a unique setting to examine the role of inputs in the fair value measurement process. Altamuro and Zhang find that the fair value of MSRs based on managerial inputs (Level 3) better reflects the economics of the underlying assets than the fair value of MSRs based on market inputs (Level 2). This discussion examines the institutional features of the MSR market, particularly the market concentration and the illiquidity of the market, that are important when considering this result. The discussion also raises a number of questions about the inputs used in the fair value process and calls for further research on this topic.     

Short-Sale Restrictions and Price Clustering: Evidence from SEC Rule 201

We provide a novel test of information-based theories of price clustering by examining trade, order, and the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) quote price clustering during periods when information is removed from the market. We use a natural experiment of short-sale restrictions resulting from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 201 to more effectively determine the impact of information on price clustering. We find evidence of increased price clustering for trades, orders, and NBBO prices during short-sale restrictions. Overall, our findings indicate that short-sale restrictions harm the price discovery process and lead to a reduction in market efficiency.     

Integration managers: special leaders for special times

Although the integration of an acquired company with the parent organization is a delicate and complicated process, traditionally no one has ever been responsible for that process--for charting how the two companies will combine their operations, for seeing to it that the integration project meets its deadlines and performance targets, and for educating the new people about the parent company and vice versa. Some enlightened companies have recognized this gap and have appointed a guide--the integration manager--to shepherd everyone through the rocky territory that two organizations must cross before they can function effectively together. The authors have interviewed a number of these leaders in depth, as well as some of the people with whom they've worked. They've determined that integration managers help the merger process in four principal ways: they speed it up, create a structure for it, forge social connections between the two organizations, and help engineer short-term successes. In this article, the authors detail five acquisitions--at TI, General Cable, Meritor Automotive, Lucent, and Johnson & Johnson--and discuss the role that integration managers played in each. They describe exactly what sort of person should do this job. The integration manager must be able to jump into complex situations quickly, relate to many levels of authority smoothly, and bridge gaps in culture and perception. The ever-changing organizations of the Internet age will need leaders with similar skills. In fact, the authors contend, the integration manager should be considered a prototype for the leader of the future.