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Libor Market Models versus Swap Market Models for Pricing Interest Rate Derivatives: An Empirical Analysis

We empirically compare Libor and Swap Market Models for thepricing of interest rate derivatives, using panel data on pricesof US caplets and swaptions. A Libor Market Model can directlybe calibrated to observed prices of caplets, whereas a SwapMarket Model is calibrated to a certain set of swaption prices.For both models we analyze how well they price caplets and swaptionsthat were not used for calibration. We show that the Libor MarketModel in general leads to better prediction of derivative pricesthat were not used for calibration than the Swap Market Model.Also, we find that Market Models with a declining volatilityfunction give much better pricing results than a specificationwith a constant volatility function. Finally, we find that modelsthat arechosen to exactly match certain derivative prices areoverfitted; more parsimonious models lead to better predictionsfor derivative prices that were not used for calibration. JELClassification: G12, G13, E43.     

Prostate cancer

Prostate cancer is the most common internal cancer in American males. There are many variables that effect prognosis, with the Gleason scoring system being one of the most important factors. There is controversy regarding the ideal treatment in various subsets of prostate cancer patients. Posttreatment prostate specific antigen values have prognostic significance.     

Hedging emerging market bonds and the rise of the credit default swap

On October 5, 2001, when credit spreads were widening, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange CME de-listed the full menu of emerging market Brady bond futures contracts. This is intriguing because at a time when interest in hedging and speculating in emerging market sovereign credit risk should be at its peak, the CME de-listed precisely the sort of contract designed to hedge and speculate in sovereign credit risk. This paper finds statistical evidence suggesting that the developing over the counter CDS contract acted as a substitute product for the Brady bond futures contract thereby undermining the Brady bond futures contract and contributing to its demise.     

Why are IPOs underpriced? Evidence from Japan's hybrid auction-method offerings

We document discretionary underpricing and partial adjustment of IPO prices in the public offer tranche of Japan's hybrid auction regime, in which investor information differences are not important, there are no roadshows, preferential allocations are negligible, institutional investing is low, and the public offer tranche cannot fail. The magnitude and variation of underpricing in our sample, which spans relatively hot and cold markets, are similar to those reported for US IPOs. The evidence is most consistent with underpricing arising from an implicit contract to allocate risk related to initial mispricing where, in exchange for guaranteeing a minimum price, the underwriter participates indirectly in upside performance. The results raise important questions about interpretations of IPO underpricing in the US.     

Computer Use and Productivity Growth in US Federal Government Agencies, 1987–92

We examine the impact of information technology (IT) on productivity in the public sector econometrically, using data from the BLS Federal Productivity Measurement Program and from Computer Intelligence Infocorp, and by interviewing some government officials. We estimate a production function for government services that includes IT capital as an input, and find a strong positive relationship across federal agencies between productivity growth and computer-intensity growth during the period 1987–92, controlling for growth in compensation and other outlays per employee, and in the number of employees. Our estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that there are 'excess returns' to IT capital.     

Equilibrium dominance in experimental financial markets

We examine the predictive power of equilibrium dominance inexperimental markets where firms with investment opportunitieshave an informational advantage over potential investors andare permitted to purchase a money-burning signal. Equilibriumdominance often fails to predict well when a Pareto-superiorsequential equilibrium is also available. Instead, equilibriumselection appears to be related to the potential earnings ofa more valuable firm that can signal its type successfully bydefecting from the sequential equilibrium.