Planning through the Socialization of Property Rights: The Community Reinvestment Act

This paper reassesses themes developed in the authors' Economic Abundance: An Introduction (Dugger and Peach 2009) in the context of the so-called "Great Recession." In this paper, we make several arguments. First, there is always a substantial gap between actual production and the capacity of the economy to produce. Second, the great recession widened the production gap, but did not change the basic relationship. Third, the anti-recessionary policies, adopted during the recession, were anti-abundance policies, for the most part. Fourth, almost by definition, short-term (cyclical) fiscal and monetary policy regimes do not address longer-term structural issues or the creation of widely shared abundance. Last, but not least, despite the great recession, and the myopic policy responses it generated, the abundant economy — based on a largely undamaged joint stock of knowledge — remains a genuine possibility.     

The Alleged Value Neutrality of Economics: An Alternative View

This paper analyzes bank lending activities for owner-occupied housing loan extensions to minority members of Mississippi’s population. We analyze data on housing loan applications and accessibility patterns among the minority Black population relative to the majority White population groups in the State. The study looks hard at data for evidence of any patterns of discrimination toward minority housing loan applicants. And a Probit model is applied to examine the relative importance of economic variables (such as employment status, income level, and credit rating) versus noneconomic parameters (such as geographical location) in the housing loan decision making of banks toward minority borrowers. The evidence from our comparative data analysis suggests that there is a consistently high denial rates for minorities, which is not explained by financial (economic) factors. The formal test of discrimination with the Probit analysis also indicates some evidence of discrimination from, at least, the standpoint of redlining practices, albeit only with a modest predictive power.     

CONSTRAINING COMPETITION WITH STATE MANDATED FACILITY REQUIREMENTS

We find that state mandated facility requirements may constrain the size and location of funeral homes. Many states have funeral regulations that require funeral homes to have embalming rooms, chapels, and casket display rooms. Often these facilities go unused, providing no discernible benefit to consumers while imposing unnecessary costs on firms. Using a case study, we present evidence that Arizona's more extensive facility requirements reduce the number of small funeral homes relative to Florida and prevent them from locating in shopping centers. We estimate that eliminating Arizona's cumbersome facility requirements would save consumers approximately 14% on their funeral expenditures. (JEL L51, L84, L88)     

Economic rents and mutual fund performance: An empirical investigation

We investigate the monthly returns of 377 open-end mutual funds during the September 1981–1994 period to learn whether economic rents can be garnered through the judicious selection of the advertising and sales method in the mutual fund industry. Specifically, we seek to learn whether direct sales or mass marketing produces economic rents under the assumption that those rents would be passed on to consumers to build a “high quality” image to differentiate the product line. Results suggest that no-load funds produce superior net returns except in the aggressive growth category.     

Taxes versus quantities for a stock pollutant with endogenous abatement costs and asymmetric information

We compare emissions taxes and quotas when a (strategic) regulator and (non-strategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov perfect decision rules. Firms make investment decisions that affect their future abatement costs. For general functional forms, firms’ investment policy is information-constrained efficient when the regulator uses a quota, but not when the regulator uses an emissions tax. This advantage of quotas over emissions taxes has not previously been recognized. For a special functional form (linear–quadratic) both policies are constrained efficient. Using numerical methods, we find that a tax has some advantages in this case.     

Building rational cooperation on their own: Learning to start small

We report experimental results for a twice‐played prisoners' dilemma in which the players can choose the allocation of the stakes across the two periods. Our point of departure is the assumption that some (but not all) people are willing to cooperate, as long as their opponent is sufficiently likely to do so. The presence of such types can be exploited to enhance cooperation by structuring the twice‐played prisoners' dilemma to “start small,” so that the second‐stage stakes are larger (but not too much larger) than the first‐stage stakes. We compare conditions where the allocation of stakes is chosen exogenously to conditions where it is chosen by the players themselves. We show that players gravitate toward the payoff‐maximizing strategy of starting small in a twice‐played prisoners' dilemma. Intriguingly, the salutary payoff effects of doing so are larger than those that arise when the same allocation is exogenously chosen.     

The evolution of private governance: Neither anarchism nor Statism

I read E. P. Stringham’s book on private governance against the background of Morris Hoffman’s account of the evolution of legal punishment. This allows us to see how the evolution of private governance moves through three levels of punishment: the first-party punishment of conscience and guilt, the second-party punishment of retaliation and revenge, and the third-party punishment of retribution. This suggests that neither pure anarchism nor pure statism is possible, because every social order shows some form of governance, and no authoritarian state can ever hold an absolute monopoly on governance to the exclusion of private governance. One can also see that liberal states leave lots of room for private governance, which allows for adaptive flexibility in solving public problems in ways that promote peace and prosperity.     

ECONOMICS: BETWEEN PREDICTION AND CRITICISM

We suggest that one way in which economic analysis is useful is by offering a critique of reasoning. According to this view, economic theory may be useful not only by providing predictions, but also by pointing out weaknesses of arguments. It is argued that when a theory requires a nontrivial act of interpretation, its roles in producing predictions and offering critiques vary in a substantial way. We offer a formal model in which these different roles can be captured.     

Taxes versus quotas for a stock pollutant

We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem where the regulator and polluter have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and environmental damage depends on pollution stock. An increase in the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve, or a decrease in the slope of the marginal damage curve, favors taxes. An increase in the discount rate or the stock decay rate favors tax usage. Taxes dominate quotas if the length of a period during which decisions are constant is sufficiently small. An empirical illustration suggests that taxes dominate quotas for the control of greenhouse gasses.