Office triage and the physician's supply curve

This paper contains a theoretical and empirical model of the physician firm. The utility maximizing physician chooses the number of hours of labor to supply and the mix between patient visits and time per visit. Theory suggests that a serious specification error may occur if one estimates the labor supply curve and patient demand curve without simultaneously estimating the mix between patient visits and time per visit. A Chi-Square specification test reveals that this “triage” model statistically dominates the simple supply/demand model. Estimation results indicate relevant backward-bending labor and negatively sloped service supply functions.     

Marketmaking in the Laboratory: Does Competition Matter?

This paper is the first experimental study of the effects of competition and adverse selection on the performance of market maker (MM-) markets. Information distribution may is either symmetric or heterogeneous. MM-markets are either monopolistic (the specialist markets), or competitive (the multi MM-market). Welfare comparisons are with respect to a continuous double auction (DA-) market. Informed subjects receive an imperfect signal of the true state of the world. We find three main results. First, competition among market makers significantly reduces the bid-ask spread, and increases transaction volume. Second, competition among market makers induces competitive undercutting, yielding net trading losses for market makers as a group in most periods. Third, from the perspective of uninformed traders, a competing MM-regime is optimal, since it minimizes their expected trading losses.     

Does Child Labour Displace Schooling? Evidence on Behavioural Responses to an Enrollment Subsidy

It is often argued that child labour comes at the expense of schooling and so perpetuates poverty for children from poor families. To test this claim we study the effects on children's labour force participation and school enrollments of the pure school-price change induced by a targeted enrollment subsidy in rural Bangladesh. Our theoretical model predicts that the subsidy increases schooling, but its effect on child labour is ambiguous. Our empirical model indicates that the subsidy increased schooling by far more than it reduced child labour. Substitution effects helped protect current incomes from the higher school attendance induced by the subsidy.     

How Do Banks Determine Capital? Evidence from Germany

Abstract. We analyse whether the determinants of capital found in the previous literature hold for the special German banking sector comprising three characteristic banking groups including savings banks, cooperative banks and other banks, which differ regarding their ownership and their access to the capital market. Through the use of accounting data from German banks between 1992 and 2001 we find evidence in accordance with the buffer theory of capital for all German banking groups. Furthermore, we also detect some remarkable differences between the three banking groups regarding their determination of capital due to institutional characteristics.     

Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.     

On Markov error‐correction models,with an application to stock prices and dividends

This paper considers Markov error‐correction (MEC) models in which deviations from the long‐run equilibrium are characterized by different rates of adjustment. To motivate our analysis and illustrate the various issues involved, our discussion is structured around the analysis of the long‐run properties of US stock prices and dividends. It is shown that the MEC model is flexible enough to account for situations where deviations from the long‐run equilibrium are nonstationary in one of the states of nature and allows us to test for such a possibility. An empirical specification procedure to establish the existence of MEC adjustment in practice is also presented. This is based on a multi‐step test procedure that exploits the differences between the global and local characteristics of systems with MEC adjustment. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bridging the cultural divide: Trust formation in university–industry research collaborations in the US,Japan, and South Korea

Academia and industry increasingly work together, but this is not always an easy endeavor. In this article we investigate how relational mechanisms facilitate trust formation in university–industry research collaborations (UICs) in three countries and contribute to the understanding of international similarities and differences in UICs by considering institutional factors, specifically, the strength and maturity of UICs in each country. Analyzing survey data of 618 recent UICs in the US, Japan, and South Korea, we identify the activities of innovation champions as a critical trust building mechanism between firms and universities that complements initial trust formation through tie strength, partner reputation, and contractual safeguards. We find that partner reputation and champion behavior are more important for trust formation in South Korea than in the US and Japan, indicating that in ‘emerging UIC countries’ where most firms and universities have little collaboration experience, reputation and the leadership by innovation champions are more important for trust formation in UICs than in ‘advanced UIC countries’ with strong and mature UIC networks. From a public policy perspective, our findings suggest that networks between firms and universities should be generally strengthened and collaboration partners should be provided with effective contractual safeguards to enhance trust formation in UICs.     

Exit Deterrence

This paper is the first to provide a general context whereby potential entry can lead incumbent firms to permanently reduce the intensity of competition in a market. All previous results found that potential entry would lead to lower prices and greater competition. Examining markets where entry occurs by the acquisition of access rights from an existing incumbent, we demonstrate that, where competitive choices are strategic complements, a more efficient entrant may be unable to acquire those rights from a less efficient incumbent due to the unilateral accommodating behavior of the efficient incumbent. Similarly, such accommodating behavior may deter efficient investment by an incumbent. These results have implications as to how economists view potential entry and its benefits.