The Evidence on Product-Market Diversifying Acquisitions and Joint Ventures by U.S. Banks

We examine the acquisition and joint venture strategies of U.S. banks from 1980 to 1998 to diversify into non-banking sectors. We find that the market responds favorably to both types of expansions, with the gains being shared between acquiring banks and their targets and venture banks and their non-bank partners, respectively. Acquisitions expose acquiring banks to significant increases in nonsystematic, market, and total risk, while joint ventures result in significant decreases in the nonsystematic and total risk measures for participating banks. Our results suggest that product-market expansions, in general, provide U.S. banks with value-enhancing opportunities, and that joint ventures may improve both the return and risk characteristics of the partner banks.     

The Informational Efficiency of the Equity Market As Compared to the Syndicated Bank Loan Market

The loan market is a hybrid between a public and a private market, comprised of financial institutions with access to private information about borrowing firms. We test whether this is reflected in informationally efficient price formation in the loan market vis-a-vis the equity markets, and reject this private information hypothesis. We also reject a liquidity hypothesis which suggests that equity markets always lead loan markets, despite bank lenders' access to private information, because of greater liquidity in equity markets. We further test, and reject, an asymmetric price reaction hypothesis that states that loan returns are more sensitive to negative information whereas equity returns respond symmetrically to both positive and negative information. We find evidence most consistent with an integrated markets hypothesis that suggests that both the equity and syndicated bank loan markets are highly integrated such that information flows freely across markets. This is particularly true when the equity market makers are also loan syndicate members.      

The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI Activity

The effects of bilateral tax treaties on FDI activity have been unexplored, despite significant ongoing activities by countries to negotiate and ratify these treaties. This paper estimates the impact of bilateral tax treaties using both U.S. inbound and outbound FDI over the period 1980–1999. Robust to a wide variety of alternative specifications, we find little evidence that bilateral tax treaties increase FDI activity, contrary to OECD-stated goals for such treaties.     

Compensation, Incentives, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness

The common folklore that giving options to agents will make them more willing to take risks is false. In fact, no incentive schedule will make all expected utility maximizers more or less risk averse. This paper finds simple, intuitive, necessary and sufficient conditions under which incentive schedules make agents more or less risk averse. The paper uses these to examine the incentive effects of some common structures such as puts and calls, and it briefly explores the duality between a fee schedule that makes an agent more or less risk averse, and gambles that increase or decrease risk.     

Employee Stock Options, Corporate Taxes, and Debt Policy

We find that employee stock option deductions lead to large aggregate tax savings for Nasdaq 100 and S&P 100 firms and also affect corporate marginal tax rates. For Nasdaq firms, including the effect of options reduces the estimated median marginal tax rate from 31% to 5%. For S&P firms, in contrast, option deductions do not affect marginal tax rates to a large degree. Our evidence suggests that option deductions are important nondebt tax shields and that option deductions substitute for interest deductions in corporate capital structure decisions, explaining in part why some firms use so little debt.     

Small Business and the Value of Community Financial Institutions

This paper examines whether community banks have a niche in the production of soft information when lending to small firms. A composite measure of soft information production is created from owner ratings of bank performance characteristics using survey data from a national sample of U.S. small firms. These characteristics capture some important aspects of soft information such as the bank’s knowledge of the owner’s business. This composite measure is related to the size of the owner’s primary bank, a measure of the intensity of market competition and proxies for the strength of banking relationships. After controlling for several sources of endogeneity, this composite measure is found to be significantly higher if the owner currently banks at a CFI and experiences less loan officer turnover.     

Bank Consolidation and Small Business Lending: The Role of Community Banks

This paper examines how bank consolidation activity affected small business lending in local U.S. banking markets during two 3-year study periods, focussing on the role played by community banks in the process. During the 1994–1997 period, we find that consolidation activity involving big banks is associated with lower loan growth, whereas community bank consolidations and a greater presence of community banks in the market are associated with higher loan growth. During the 1997–2000 period, consolidation activity is either unrelated to small business loan growth or is associated with higher loan growth. In both study periods we find that, net of organization reclassifications due to consolidation or asset growth, the share of small business lending funded by community banks rose, particularly in markets undergoing consolidation.     

Entrepreneurial activity, risk, and the business cycle

This paper analyzes a model in which the risk associated with entrepreneurial activity implies that the amount of such activity is procyclical and results in amplification and intertemporal propagation of productivity shocks. In the model risk averse agents choose between a riskless project and a risky project with higher expected output (‘the entrepreneurial activity’). Agents who become entrepreneurs need to bear part of the project-specific risk for incentive reasons. More agents become entrepreneurs when productivity is high, because agents are more willing to bear risk and need to bear less risk for incentive reasons. Furthermore, cross-sectional heterogeneity can be countercyclical.