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121.
Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma.
In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to
reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge
sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties.
We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also
punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease
the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly
lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation.
We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University
of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson,
Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful
comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available
from the authors. 相似文献
122.
Consider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the bidders’ types. Such an estimate can
be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing rule
yielding truthful bidding as an equilibrium, whether bidders’ types are affiliated or independent. We highlight the link between
the estimator and full surplus extraction, providing a necessary and sufficient condition for ex-post full surplus extraction, including the possibility of independent types. The results offer sharp insights into the strengths
and limits of simple auctions by identifying the source of informational rents in such environments.
Harstad acknowledges hospitable accommodation by the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, and the Olin School of Business,
Washington University in St. Louis, during parts of this research. We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Richard
McLean and Jeroen Swinkels. 相似文献
123.
Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters.
The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is
shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates
in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety
of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued
formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented
observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.
Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar
participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful
suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University
of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín).
Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin 相似文献
124.
Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search
to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In
equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with
the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes
under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter
values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used
to achieve separation.
Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000 相似文献
125.
126.
Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts
subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU)
model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in
fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts
are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in
better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets.
Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian
National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges
the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055.
Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan 相似文献
127.
In the mid-nineties FIFA decided to increase from two to three the number of points assigned to the winning team of a soccer
match played under traditional round-robin national leagues. Since a game of soccer can be regarded as a contest, FIFA's measure
provides an interesting case-study for analysing how a change in the system of rewards (from a zero to a non-zero sum rule)
may affect the contestants' equilibrium behaviour. In this paper we try to assess, both theoretically and empirically, whether
FIFA's new point rule has changed soccer towards a more offensive game, in which teams adopt more risky strategies. In particular,
we evaluate the “na?ve hypothesis” according to which the measure would induce every team to play always more offensively,
and we explore the extent to which the change in teams' behaviour may be affected by quality differentials between teams.
Our most important hypothesis is that when the asymmetry between opposing teams is large enough, an increase in the reward
for victory induces the weaker team to play more defensively, rather than the opposite. By looking at a subset of matches
held in the Portuguese first division league, which approximate the conditions of our model, we find support for this hypothesis.
First version received: July 1999/Final version received: May 2001 相似文献
128.
Kwang-Hyun Chung Rudolph A. Jacob Ya B. Tang 《International Advances in Economic Research》2003,9(2):152-162
This study examines motivation and stock market reactions of firms announcing earnings in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) after
filing with the Security Exchange Commission (SEC). Most firms announce earnings in the WSJ before SEC filing. Firms that
reverse this sequence are voluntarily delaying public earnings announcements. The authors find that these firms are not only
poor financial performers but also engage in earnings managements. They are delaying their WSJ announcements to postpone announcing
bad news. The authors find significant stock price reactions to both the SEC filing and the WSJ announcement. The price reaction
to earnings is incomplete at the SEC filings. The market continues reacting to firms' subsequent WSJ announcements as if the
SEC filing fails to communicate earnings information to some investors. 相似文献
129.
A Survey and a Theoretical Model of Distance Education Programs 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Reza G. Hamzaee 《International Advances in Economic Research》2005,11(2):215-229
In search of a distance education programs crucial success factors, this research was conducted through a designed survey and evaluation instrument, for a predominantly doctoral program at DE University (DEU, an adopted name). Also, the survey has identified some challenging factors along with students most crucial reasons for adopting distance education programs. The author has presented a Testable theoretical model of distance education programs. The top four success factors were revealed to be program quality, general recognition and academic integrity, students satisfaction, and students progress toward the ultimate goal of graduation. Lack of time and worries about the degree recognition by prospective academic and nonacademic employers were the most crucial challenging factors.The 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference Lisbon, Portugal, March 10–14. This research is appreciably funded by a research grant from Walden University. 相似文献
130.
Synopsis It has been proposed that open thermodynamic systems will act to dissipate available energy gradients by self-organizing into
coherent structures that, with time, evolve and develop into nested hierarchies – panarchies – that adapt to internal and
external changes according to a characteristic adaptive cycle. This paper seeks to apply these ideas in the purely societal
realm by investigating the role of money in economic systems. Money represents the value embodied in goods; a value that is
separate from the exact nature of those goods. We suggest that money thereby liberates the ‘free value’ of economic desire
and that this free value has properties analogous to energy. The result is the self-organization of structures and systems
(‘econosystems’) that dissipate this ‘free value’. Econosystems act at different scales, and nested levels of econosystems
form a panarchy, having effects that can be observed. In particular, it appears that money facilitates the creation of relationships
between econosystem actors, increasing the connectedness of the econosystems that envelop those actors. We have identified
a phenomenon whereby freed social value (i.e. money) can aggregate, or pool, at a larger econosystem scale in structures such
as banks. These pools act as gradients that actors at the neighborhood scale can exploit for self-organization in the econosystem.
Thus, econosystem actors appear to be freed from thermodynamic constraints by using money as a means of self-organization.
However, because of these pools of aggregated social exergy, connectedness is increased at the larger scale of the econosystem.
The potential consequence of this dynamic is that money may act to push larger scale econosystems toward a state of heightened
vulnerability to collapse, while freeing smaller scale actors from apparent constraints. In this way, we propose that money
acts to skew information feedback loops between econosystem actors and larger scale structures such as economies and ecosystems.
相似文献