Social Capital and the Terms of Trade for Farmland

Social capital is a person or group's sympathy for or sense of obligation to another person or group. This article introduces social capital into a neoclassical model of farmland exchange and shows how relationships alter the terms of trade. Empirical evidence from a survey of farmers shows that the type of relationship farmland sellers have with farmland buyers has a statistically significant and economically important effect on the minimum-sell price for farmland. Compared to the minimum-sell price when selling to a total stranger in an arm's-length transaction, farmland sellers discount prices to friendly neighbors and relatives and require a premium from unfriendly neighbors and influential people in the community.     

Book Reviews

The first review is of a business novel that contains important lessons about teams and teamwork. The enjoyable story is based on the product development activities of a fictitious Fungible Company, and is an absorbing book to read. The second review covers a book on Total Quality Management (TQM). As our reviewer points out, this book deals with both the philosophy and tools, covering all aspects of TQM.
Finally, we inaugurate a new feature, Brief Notes. From time to time, we will provide short comments about books that may have a specialized or some limited value to practitioners.     

ON ESTIMATING STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY: AN EXPLORATORY APPROACH

Traditional methods of estimating market volatility use daily return observations from a stock index to calculate monthly variance. We break with tradition and estimate stock market volatility using the daily, cross-sectional standard deviation of returns for all firms trading on the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange. We find a significantly positive relation between risk and return. Market volatility is estimated to be about half the volatility level previously reported. The intraday, cross-sectional market volatility measure provides findings consistent with risk-return theory.     

Ethics,gratuities, and professionalization of the purchasing function

This study investigated (1) whether potential future purchasing agents were predisposed to accept gratuities or whether the practice of gratuity acceptance is a manifestation of the job itself, (2) whether the existence of a code of ethics forbidding gratuity acceptance curtails the occurrence, and (3) whether disparities in ethics policies between the sales and purchasing functions affect gratuity acceptance. Hypotheses based upon the concepts of organizational concern and institutionalized ethics are developed and empirically tested. Results suggest that future purchasing agents are predisposed to accept gratuities and that formal written ethics policies decrease the acceptance of gratuities. Disparities in ethics policies between the sales and purchasing functions concerning gratuities failed to affect gratuity acceptance significantly.Gregory B. Turner is assistant professor of marketing at Livingston University. He has published inThe International Journal of Logistics Management and theTransportation Journal.G. Stephen Taylor is Associate Professor of management at Mississippi State University. His research interests include ethics in computer usage, performance appraisal, and turnover control.Mark F. Hartley is Assistant Professor and National Association of Purchasing Management/Carolinas-Virginia chair of Purchasing at the College of Charleston. His research interests include ethics and professionalization of the purchasing function.     

Free Agency and the Allocation of Labor in Major League Baseball

In this paper we examine the allocation of labor under free agency by developing and testing a model to predict the migration of free agents. Data for individual players are used in a logit model that estimates the probability that a free agent will change teams as a function of several independent variables. Along with other authors, we find that free agents tend to migrate to big cities. In addition, we find evidence that the allocation of labor may be different under free agency than under the reserve clause and suggest a reason why Coase's theorem may not be applicable to this labor market.