Investment Incentives Under Emission Trading: An Experimental Study

This paper presents the results of an experimental investigation on incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology under emissions trading. Our experimental design mimics an industry with small asymmetric polluting firms regulated by different schemes of tradable permits. We consider three allocation/auction policies: auctioning off (costly) permits through an ascending clock auction, grandfathering permits with re-allocation through a single-unit double auction, and grandfathering with re-allocation through an ascending clock auction. Our results confirm both dynamic and static theoretical equivalence of auctioning and grandfathering. We nevertheless find that although the market institution used to reallocate permits does not impact the dynamic efficiency from investment, it affects the static efficiency from permit trading.     

Incentives to adopt new technologies under different pollution-control policies

The paper investigates the incentives for polluting firms to adopt new technologies under pollution-control policies such as effluent taxes and auctioned permits. We pay explicit attention to the output market. Firms can choose among two types of technologies, a conventional one with high marginal abatement costs and a new one with low margainl abatement costs but higher fixed costs. We find that taxes almost always induce complete adoption or no adoption at all. Permits, in contrast, allow for partial adoption. Moreover, ex post, permits can always induce first best, whereas taxes cannot if partial adoption is socially optimal.     

Pollution control in a Cournot duopoly via taxes or permits

We consider an asymmetric Cournot duopoly with firms facing linear Leontief technologies. A pollutant is generated proportional to the quantity of output. The government may regulate the firms by imposing Pigouvian taxes or by issuing a number of tradeable permits. We characterize the optimal tax as well as the optimal permit policy as a function of a critical damage parameter. It turns out that in general neither the social optimum is enforceable, nor is one of the two policies always superior to the other. For a wide range of parameters, however, the permit policy leads to a higher welfare.This paper has been written for the most part during a visit to the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California. The author would like to express his gratitude to the Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences for its hospitality, to P. Chander, W. Trockel, the participants of seminars at California Institute of Technology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Purdue University, the universities of Bielefeld, Dortmund, and Mannheim, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments, and especially to Jeanne Netzley for her T_EX-nical support at Caltech. Financial support by the state government of Nordrhein-Westfalen (von Bennigsen-Foerder Preis) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Incentives for Investment in Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology in Emission Permit Markets with Banking

We examine the incentives that firms have to invest in cleaner abatementtechnology when the banking of permits is allowed in emission permittrading schemes. We show that under certainty permit banking can distortincentives for investment and lead to a sub-optimal amount of investmentspending. Under imperfect information, aggregate abatement costuncertainty and investment irreversibility provide arguments for allowingbanking. We generalize the model to consider these, showing that somebanking is desirable but that it need not be the case that the privatebanking solution is optimal.     

A comparison of endogenous and exogenous timing in a social learning experiment

We experimentally investigate social learning in a two-agent prediction game with both exogenous and endogenous ordering of decisions on a continuous action space. We are first in comparing exogenous and endogenous ordering within one framework, which enables a direct comparison of both structures in terms of informational efficiency, strategic delay and welfare. More efficient observational learning leads to more accurate predictions in the endogenous setting and increases informational efficiency compared to an exogenous setting. However, strategic delay induces waiting costs that offset these benefits and lead to a parity of exogenous and endogenous ordering in terms of welfare results. Our results hold relevance for the efficient design of decision regimes in contexts characterized by continuous action spaces.     

Barriers Against Globalizing Corporate Ethics: An Analysis of Legal Disputes on Implementing U.S. Codes of Ethics in Germany

Global firms need to decide on the correspondence between their corporate ethics and the globalization of their activities. When firms go global, they face ethical complexities as they operate in different legal and cultural environments that may impact the admissibility and appropriateness of their approach to institutionalize and implement corporate ethics. Global firms may have good reasons to establish global codes of ethics that are to be obeyed by all employees worldwide. However, developing and implementing such codes can be rather difficult due to various, and partly competing, conditions in the countries of operation. In this article, two legal disputes are analyzed to illustrate some of the difficulties that may emerge when firms globalize their codes of ethics. I argue that these conflicts can be mitigated when firms carefully design their codes and the processes of code implementation.     

Blockchain Applications in Supply Chain Transactions

Blockchains, a disruptive technology with potentially many applications in modern‐day supply chain (SC) transactions, have not been adequately reflected by theory. Researchers and business managers must understand where and when blockchains’ application may be expected and investigated. The present study clarifies the discussion about blockchain application areas (BAAs) in SC transactions and their relevance for businesses. This study combines the findings from three methodological approaches: an extant literature review, a Delphi study, and a survey of 151 German machinery and equipment sector business managers. The results further our understanding of blockchains’ business opportunities among SC transactions and verify and extend Iansiti and Lakhani’s (Harvard Business Review 2017; 95: 118) blockchain adoption framework. Verified customer reviews and product quality certification are identified as the most relevant blockchain usages in SC transactions. Interestingly, we anticipate the least likely adoption of blockchains to occur for document‐signing processes despite arguments within the literature that suggest otherwise. Two newly identified BAAs—logistics and delivery systems—and token‐curated registries rank among the top four most relevant. The present study’s valuation of BAAs advances theory and will likely affect business strategies by indicating where, when, and why businesses should participate in blockchain networks.     

Lost Generations: Long-Term Effects of the COVID-19 Crisis on Job Losers and Labour Market Entrants,and Options for Policy*

This paper discusses the potential long-run effects of large-scale unemployment during the COVID-19 crisis in the labour market on vulnerable job losers and labour market entrants in the United States. The paper begins by contrasting measures of the scale of job loss during the crisis. These measures are paired with estimates from past recessions indicating that the costs of job loss and unemployment can reduce workers’ earnings and raise their mortality for several decades. Focusing only on a subset of vulnerable job losers, the potential lifetime earnings losses from job loss related to the COVID-19 pandemic are predicted to be up to $2 trillion. Related losses in employment could imply a lasting reduction in the overall employment–population ratio. For these workers, losses in potential life years could be up to 24 million. Even at the low range, the resulting estimates are substantially larger than losses in potential life years from deaths directly due to COVID-19. New labour market entrants are at risk to suffer long-term losses in earnings and mortality as well. Based partly on experiences in other countries, the paper discusses potential reforms to short-time compensation programmes and unemployment insurance, which could help limit the short- and long-term harm from layoffs going forward.     

Collective versus Random Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambient Pollution

This paper presents an experimental study oftwo different pollution compliance games:collective vis-à-vis random fining as ameans to regulate non-pointpollution. Using samples from both Costa Ricancoffee mill managers and Costa Rican students,we find that the two games perform equivalentlybut, although they lead to efficient outcomesthrough Nash play in the majority of cases, theobserved frequency of Nash play is lower thantheoretically predicted. Moreover, we rejectthe hypothesis that managers and studentsbehave equally. Off the equilibrium, managerstend to over-abate, whereas students tend tounder-abate. This result suggests theimportance of considering subject pooldifferences in the evaluation of environmentalpolicies by means of experiments, particularlyif those policies involve certain forms ofmanagement decisions.