Firm level return-volatility analysis using dynamic panels

This paper examines “leverage” and volatility feedback effects at the firm level by considering both market and firm level effects, using 242 individual firm stock data in the US market. We adopt a panel vector autoregressive framework which allows us to control simultaneously for common business cycle effects, unobserved cross correlation effects in return and volatility via industry effects, and heterogeneity across firms. Our results suggest that volatility feedback effects at the firm level are present due to both market and firm effects, though the market volatility feedback effect is stronger than the corresponding firm level effect. We also find that the leverage effect at the firm level is persistent, significant and negative, while the effect of market return on firm volatility is persistent, significant and positive. The presence of these effects is further explored through the responses of the model's variables to market-wide return and volatility shocks.     

Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action

The best known achievement of the literature on resource-allocating mechanisms and their message spaces is the first rigorous proof of the competitive mechanism's informational efficiency. In an exchange economy withN persons andK+1 commodities (including a numeraire), that mechanism announcesK prices as well as aK-compenent trade vector for each ofN−1 persons, making a total ofNK message variables. Trial messages are successively announced and after each announcement each personprivately determines, usingprivate information, whether she finds the proposed trades acceptable at the announced prices. When a message is reached with which all are content, then the trades specified in that message take place, and they satisfy Pareto optimality and individual rationality. The literature shows that no (suitably regular) mechanism can achieve the same thing with fewer thanNK message variables. In the classic proof, all the candidate mechanisms have the privacy property, and the proof uses that property in a crucial way. ‘Non-private’ mechanisms are, however, well-defined. We present a proof that forN>K,NK remains a lower bound even when we permit ‘non-private’ mechanisms. Our new proof does not use privacy at all. But in a non-private mechanism, minimality of the number of message variables can hardly be defended as the hallmark of informational efficiency, since a non-private mechanism requires some persons to know something about the private information of othersin addition to the information contained in the messages. The new proof of the lower boundNK invites a new interpretation of the competitive mechanism's informational efficiency. We provide a new concept of efficiency which the competitive mechanism exhibits and which does rest on privacy even whenN>K. To do so, we first define a class ofprojection mechanisms, wherein some of the message variables are proposed values of the action to be taken, and the rest are auxiliary variables. The competitive mechanism has the projection property, with a trade vector as its action and prices as the auxiliary variables. A projection mechanism proposes an action; for each proposal, the agents then use the auxiliary variables, together with their private information, to verify that the proposed action meets the mechanism's goal (Pareto optimality and individual rationality for the competitive mechanism) if, indeed, it does meet that goal. For a given goal, we seek projection mechanisms for which theverification effort (suitably measured) is not greater than that of any other projection mechanism that achieves the goal. We show the competitive mechanism to be verification-minimal within the class of private projection mechanisms that achieve Pareto optimality and individual rationality; that proofdoes use the privacy of the candidate mechanisms. We also show, under certain conditions, that a verification-minimal projection mechanism achieving a given goal has smallest ‘total communication effort’ (which is locally equivalent to the classic ‘message-space size’) among all private mechanisms that achieve the goal, whether or not they have the projection property.     

Panel unit root tests in the presence of a multifactor error structure

This paper extends the cross-sectionally augmented panel unit root test (CIPS$CIPS$) proposed by Pesaran (2007) to the case of a multifactor error structure, and proposes a new panel unit root test based on a simple average of cross-sectionally augmented Sargan–Bhargava statistics (CSB$CSB$). The basic idea is to exploit information regarding the m$m$ unobserved factors that are shared by k$k$ observed time series in addition to the series under consideration. Initially, we develop the tests assuming that m⁰$m^0$, the true number of factors, is known and show that the limit distribution of the tests does not depend on any nuisance parameters, so long as k≥m⁰−1$k\ge m^0-1$. Small sample properties of the tests are investigated by Monte Carlo experiments and are shown to be satisfactory. Particularly, the proposed CIPS$CIPS$ and CSB$CSB$ tests have the correct size for all   combinations of the cross section (N$N$) and time series (T$T$) dimensions considered. The power of both tests rises with N$N$ and T$T$, although the CSB$CSB$ test performs better than the CIPS$CIPS$ test for smaller sample sizes. The various testing procedures are illustrated with empirical applications to real interest rates and real equity prices across countries.     

Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria

This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions. These sufficient conditions unify and generalize existing sufficient conditions. Our generalization of potential games is useful in other game theoretic problems where potential methods have been applied.     

South Korea’s finance–growth nexus: evidence from VARX analysis with financial crisis and openness

South Korea’s finance–growth nexus is empirically investigated by taking the elements of financial crisis and trade and financial openness through the newly developed approach of vector error-correction models (ECMs) with weakly exogenous I(1) variables (VARX). Considering financial development as a more complex phenomenon, we take into estimation two aspects of financial deepening that are measured by its size (private credit to GDP) and efficiency (private credit to total domestic deposits). The main findings are (1) financial efficiency contributes to accelerating economic growth; (2) the causality between economic growth and financial size is bilateral and negative; and (3) financial crisis is negative to both economic growth and financial development, whereas the growth-promoting effects of trade and financial openness are confirmed.     

GAINS FROM TRADE

In a social choice context, we ask whether there exists a rule in which nobody loses under trade liberalization. We consider a resource allocation problem in which the traded commodities vary. We propose an axiom stating that enlarging the set of tradable commodities hurts nobody. We show that if a rule satisfies this axiom, together with an allocative efficiency axiom and an institutional constraint axiom stating that only preferences over tradable commodities matter, gains from trade can be given to only one individual in the first step of liberalization.     

Quasi-stationary cardinal utility and present bias

This note gives an axiomatic foundation for utility exhibiting quasi-geometric discounting. In addition, it introduces a wider class of utility functions satisfying weakened stationarity, called quasi-stationary utility. Both are established as von Neumann-Morgenstern utility indices in a model of risk preference.     

Can everyone benefit from economic integration?

There is no Pareto efficient allocation rule which always encourages economic integration. Further, for any efficient rule treating indistinguishable agents identically in welfare terms, there is an economy in which a third of the agents are hurt upon integration.     

Child Benefit Payments and Household Wealth Accumulation

Using the life‐cycle/permanent income hypothesis, we theoretically and empirically assess the impact of child benefit payments on household wealth accumulation. Consistent with the predictions of the model, we find that higher cumulative benefits received increase current assets, higher future benefit payments lower asset holding, and that these effects systematically vary over the life cycle. We find different wealth responses to child benefit payments for liquidity constrained and unconstrained households, as predicted by the model.