Banking competition and welfare

We develop a simple general equilibrium model in which investment in a risky technology is subject to moral hazard and banks can extract market power rents. We show that more bank competition results in lower economy-wide risk, higher social welfare, lower bank capital ratios, more efficient production plans and Pareto-ranked real allocations. Perfect competition supports a second best allocation and optimal levels of bank risk and capitalization. These results are at variance with those obtained by a large literature that has studied a similar environment in partial equilibrium, they are empirically relevant, and carry significant implications for policy guidance.     

Risk measurement distortion: an improved model of return smoothing

We examine the effects of smoothed hedge fund returns on standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of return and on correlation of returns using a MA(2)-GARCH(1,1)-skewed-t representation instead of the traditional MA(2) model employed in the literature. We present evidence that our proposed representation is more consistent with the behavior of hedge fund returns than the traditional MA(2) representation and that the traditional method tends to overstate the degree of smoothing observed in hedge fund returns. We examine methods for correcting the distortive effects of smoothing using our representation.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">GTE Sylvania</Emphasis> and Interbrand Competition as the Primary Concern of Antitrust Law

Footnote 19 of the landmark U.S. antitrust decision in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) declares that “Interbrand competition … is the primary concern of antitrust law.” We trace the antecedents and influence of this declaration, argue that it is inappropriate, and conclude that it should be abandoned.     

Guanxi and leader member relationships between American managers and Chinese employees: open-minded dialogue as mediator

Effective open relationships with employees can help foreign managers rely upon and utilize the local knowledge of their employees. One hundred and sixty-three Chinese employees from various industries in China were surveyed on their relationships (leadership–member relationship and personal guanxi) with American and Chinese managers, their constructive controversy, that is, their constructive controversy with them, and the job assignments and promotions received from their managers. Results support the hypotheses that quality leader–member relationship and personal guanxi promoted their constructive controversy, which in turn facilitated employees receiving challenging jobs and promotions. Results suggest that leader–member relationship and Chinese value of guanxi may be important for enhancing their constructive controversy; this kind of open dialogue can be a foundation upon which American managers can develop the confidence to give their Chinese employees challenging tasks and promotions.

Analysis of Systemic Risk in the Insurance Industry

In this paper, we discuss the systemic relevance of the insurance sector. Systemic risk is defined as the propensity of a financial institution to be undercapitalised when the financial system as a whole is undercapitalised. By the law of large numbers, traditional lines of insurance with idiosyncratic non-catastrophic risks cannot be systemic. On the contrary, undiversified insurers specialised in activities whose insured risks are highly correlated with GDP are systemic. In the life insurance sector, some contractual clauses such as unhedged minimum guarantees and free options to surrender raise the chance of systemic relevance. On the contrary, life insurers satisfying the classic solvency capital requirements contribute to the liquidity of financial markets thanks to the long-termist approach of their portfolio management. Finally, using historical data in the U.S. on the contribution of different sectors to the aggregate volatility of the economy, we show that investment banking is almost twice as volatile as aggregate GDP, while insurance is one fifth as volatile as aggregate GDP. The insurance sector thus appears to be a stabilising force of the economy.     

Managing the risk of loan prepayments and the optimal structure of short term lending rates

Loan pricing is an extremely important aspect of bank operations because loans are typically over two-thirds of bank assets. Many researchers have analyzed the theoretical and empirical impact of how different factors should and do affect fixed rate loan rates and loan prepayments. However, a theoretical decision making model for maximizing expected profit in a declining rate environment has not been developed. After describing the conditions for the optimal loan rate, we develop numerical solutions for it under varying conditions. The varying conditions include the trend in interest rates, volatility of interest rates, and loan maturity. We thank Yen Low and Hamed Bagherpour for their assistance.     

The characteristics and development of the Swiss franc repurchase agreement market

With the reinterpretation of repurchase agreements (repos) by the tax authority and the revision of the national bank law in 1997, allowing the Swiss national bank (SNB) to use repos as monetary policy instrument, the prerequisites for the development of a Swiss franc repo market were given. The development of the repo market in Switzerland only came up in 1999 with the provision of an integrated trading and settlement system provided by SegaInterSettle AG (SIS), Eurex and Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) in collaboration with the SNB. The following paper provides an overview of the basic characteristics and structure of the Swiss franc repo market as well as of the development it has undergone since 1999. It also discusses what motives and reasons the banks possess to actively participate in the Swiss franc repo market. The content of the publication is the sole responsibility of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of Credit Suisse.     

An application of the two-stage Bivariate Probit–Tobit model to corporate financing decisions

Most of the previous studies on the firms’ debt-equity choice utilize the standard single equation Probit (or Logit) model as if firms face a single dichotomous decision to issue debt or equity, but not both. The main purpose of this study is to use a two stage Bivariate Probit–Tobit model to examine the factors affecting the choice between internal and external funding and between debt and equity as well as the size of issues. Our results indicate that the Bivariate-Probit estimation is more efficient than that of two independent Probit equations. An examination of factors that affect the choice of financing form and the size of issue support the predictions of trade-off theory. The pecking order’s prediction that, if external funding is needed, firms issue debt first and then equity finds no support in this study as firms with higher information asymmetry have propensity to issue equity rather than debt. While information asymmetry affects the choice between debt and equity, we find no evidence that it influences the size of issue.