Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature

I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants in laboratory public goods experiments are “conditional cooperators” whose contributions to the public good are positively correlated with their beliefs about the average group contribution. Conditional cooperators are often able to sustain high contributions to the public good through costly monetary punishment of free-riders but also by other mechanisms such as expressions of disapproval, advice giving and assortative matching.     

Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Copper Mining on Peru’s Recent Economic Growth

Peru is the second-largest producer and exporter of copper in the world. This paper proposes a novel approach to assess short-run and long-run effects of copper on Peru’s recent economic growth. Annual data over the 2014–2018 period were used to calculate a Mining Contribution Index (MCI). An institutional quality indicator of the World Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum measured the dependence of Peruvian economic growth on mining and the quality of its institutions, respectively. Then, monthly data during the period 2005–2018 were used to run vector autoregressive (VAR) and vector error correction (VEC) models to measure copper’s effects on the country’s economy over time. VAR-VEC models included copper production, exports, international price, investment, taxes paid by producing companies, and Peru’s gross domestic product (GDP). Stationarity and causality of variables were verified with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Granger tests, respectively. Due to the presence of non-stationary variables, a VEC model was implemented to forecast short- and long-run effects. The main results show that real GDP responds to copper output and other related explanatory variables differently, depending upon the instrument applied. Peruvian GDP has increased dependence on copper mining. The quality of its institutions could explain the presence of Dutch Disease or resource curse theory. Short- and long-run effects of copper output on GDP were generally statistically non-significant. GDP was statistically significant in relation to other mining variables, such as copper exports and the international price of copper.

     

Good standing and cooperation

Indirect reciprocity is generally considered one of the leading mechanisms to explain how cooperation may emerge by natural selection. The basic intuition is that establishing a reputation of being a helpful individual increases the probability of being in turn helped. Two models have been proposed to describe how indirect reciprocity may work: the standing model (Sugden 1986/2004 in The economics of rights, cooperation and welfare. Blackwell, Oxford.) and the image-scoring model (Nowak and Sigmund 1998a in Nature 393:573–577, b in J Theoretical Biol 194:561–574). Although there is evidence that the former model would perform better under a wide set of circumstances, it is often maintained that it requires individuals with an implausibly large capacity of processing recursive information. In this paper, I argue that this is not actually the case. I further emphasize that even if the hypothesis of indirect reciprocity is unable to give a fair account of the ecological bases of cooperation, it has inspired a deal of research precious to social sciences.     

Prune or cut down: salience and Sugden’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Economics of Rights</Emphasis>, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Co</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">operation and Welfare</Emphasis>

In The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare (1986), Robert Sugden follows the tradition from Thomas Schelling and David Lewis in ascribing a central role to the notion of salience within his theory of convention. However, against this, Bruno Verbeek (Instrumental rationality and moral philosophy, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002) has argued that an empirically adequate notion of salience may not be incorporated into a generic account of convention without circularity obtains. This paper examines Verbeek’s argument against a background of experimental as well as theoretical work on coordination problems. It finds that the argument fails to consider at least two candidate theories of salience that may be incorporated into the theory of convention without circularity: cognitive hierarchy theory that iterates Sugden’s notion of psychological salience and Schelling salience. Thus, in the end Verbeek’s criticism of the role ascribed to salience in theories of convention may be dismissed, though its discussion draws a fruitful perspective.     

Strategic niche management: towards a policy tool for sustainable development

Strategic niche management (SNM) is a recently developed approach that could help induce a broad socio-technical transition towards more sustainable development. It is designed to facilitate the introduction and diffusion of new sustainable technologies through protected societal experiments in fields such wind energy, biogas, public transport systems, electric vehicle transport and eco-friendly food production. A major challenge in SNM concerns the processes by which such experiments can evolve into viable market niches and ultimately contribute to a broader shift towards sustainable development. This paper sheds more light on this issue by systematically consolidating the main SNM studies, and by bringing in new insights from the literature that is in some sense complementary to SNM. These are studies on the development and commercialisation of radical innovations in large companies, and literature about infant industry protection and broader industrialisation processes in developing countries. A number of suggestions for implementing SNM are given.     

Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior

Second chance offers in online marketplaces involve a seller conducting an auction for a single object and then using information from the auction to offer a losing bidder a take-it-or-leave-it price for another unit. We theoretically and experimentally investigate this practice and compare it to two sequential auctions. We show that the equilibrium bidding strategy in the second chance offer mechanism only exists in mixed strategies, and we observe that this mechanism generates more profit for the auctioneer than two sequential auctions. We also observe virtually no rejections of profitable offers in the ultimatum bargaining stage.