Modelling cost complementarities in terms of joint production

Cost complementarities arise from synergies in the production of heterogeneous goods. It is shown that synergies can be accounted for in terms of shared public inputs (roughly) if and only if synergies decrease as the scope of production increases. This case of “substitutive” synergies is argued to be typical. The key technical tool is a novel interpretation of conjugate Moebius inversion in terms of higher-order differences.     

Optimale Preispolitik bei dynamischen deterministischen Absatzmodellen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

A monetary economy with counterfeiting

We apply a search-theoretic model of fiat money to study the equilibria in which counterfeit money is accepted. Circulation of counterfeit money presupposes that the agents are impatient and that the punishment for holding it is not too severe. When the stock of genuine money is small counterfeit money may improve the efficiency of the economy. We establish that a monetary economy can be created with private provision of (counterfeit) money as long as the ruler has control over punishments. Totally noncooperative provision will fail as the economy will become flooded with money.     

Uncertain spatial demand and price flexibility: A state space approach to duopoly

Sufficient conditions for a unique price equilibrium, in terms of the uncertainty distribution and the state contingent consumer distributions, are given for spatial duopoly. Also considered are efficiency and endogenous locations for the symmetric case and comparative statics on price flexibility.     

How effective is European merger control?

This paper applies an intuitive approach based on stock market data to a unique dataset of large concentrations during the period 1990–2002 to assess the effectiveness of European merger control. The basic idea is to relate announcement and decision abnormal returns. Under a set of four maintained assumptions, merger control might be interpreted to be effective if rents accruing due to the increased market power observed around the merger announcement are reversed by the antitrust decision, i.e. if there is a negative relation between announcement and decision abnormal returns. To clearly identify the events' competitive effects, we explicitly control for the market expectation about the outcome of the merger control procedure and run several robustness checks to assess the role of our maintained assumptions. We find that only outright prohibitions completely reverse the rents measured around a merger's announcement. On average, remedies seem to be only partially capable of reverting announcement abnormal returns. Yet they seem to be more effective when applied during the first rather than the second investigation phase and in subsamples where our assumptions are more likely to hold. Moreover, the European Commission appears to learn over time.