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41.
Klaus Kultti 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):721-728
We establish a link between von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the Nash solution in a general n-player utility set. The stable set-solution is defined with respect to a dominance relation: payoff vector u dominates v if one player prefers u even with one period delay. We show that a stable set exists and, if the utility set has a smooth surface, any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution when the length of the period goes to zero. 相似文献
42.
Ma (in Econ. Theory 8, 377–381, 1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (Econometrica 58, 1475–1480, 1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always
reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented –
and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 – is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that
even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as “symmetric.”
We thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. B. Klaus’s and F. Klijn’s research was supported by Ramón y Cajal
contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The work of the authors was also partially supported through the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (BEC2002-02130 and SEJ2005-01690) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2005-00626 and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA). 相似文献
43.
Carbon Taxes and Joint Implementation. An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis for Germany and India
Christoph Böhringer Klaus Conrad Andreas Löschel 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2003,24(1):49-76
Germany has committed itself toreducing its carbon emissions by 25 percent in2005 as compared to 1990 emission levels. Toachieve this goal, the government has recentlylaunched an environmental tax reform whichentails a continuous increase in energy taxesin conjunction with a revenue-neutral cut innon-wage labor costs. This policy is supposedto yield a double dividend, reducing both, theproblem of global warming and high unemploymentrates. In addition to domestic actions,international treaties on climate protectionallow for the supplementary use of flexibleinstruments to exploit cheaper emissionreduction possibilities elsewhere. One concreteoption for Germany would be to enter jointimplementation (JI) with developing countriessuch as India where Germany pays emissionreduction abroad rather than meeting itsreduction target solely by domestic action. Inthis paper, we investigate whether anenvironmental tax reform cum JI providesemployment and overall efficiency gains ascompared to an environmental tax reformstand-alone. We address this question in theframework of a large-scale general equilibriummodel for Germany and India where Germany mayundertake JI with the Indian electricitysector. Our main finding is that JI offsetslargely the adverse effects of carbon emissionconstraints on the German economy. JIsignificantly lowers the level of carbon taxesand thus reduces the total costs of abatementas well as negative effects on labor demand. Inaddition, JI triggers direct investment demandfor energy efficient power plants produced inGermany. This provides positive employmenteffects and additional income for Germany. ForIndia, joint implementation equips itselectricity industry with scarce capital goodsleading to a more efficient power productionwith lower electricity prices for the economyand substantial welfare gains. 相似文献
44.
45.
We estimate quarterly cointegrating vector autoregressive models for the Eurozone and the USA based on long-run restrictions
derived from a dynamic open economy model. Three long-run relations between the Eurozone and the USA emerge: relative purchasing
power parity, international interest parity and a stationary output gap between the two economies. Generalized impulse response
functions show differences in the dynamic adjustment of the two economies. Due to the I(1)-characteristic of both output series
and the stability conditions imposed by the long-run equilibrium relationships, shocks to the model produce level effects
only, while growth rates converge to their long-run averages.
相似文献
Thomas UrlEmail: |
46.
Spatial growth and industry age 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Klaus Desmet 《Journal of Economic Theory》2009,144(6):2477-2502
Between 1970 and 2000 employment growth across U.S. counties exhibited very different patterns in manufacturing and services. Whereas manufacturing employment growth was negatively related to initial manufacturing employment across the entire distribution of counties, service employment growth was positively related to initial service employment for intermediate sized counties. This paper presents a theory to rationalize these facts. Local sectoral growth is driven by technological diffusion across space and depends on the age of the sector. The theory correctly predicts the relation between county employment growth and initial county employment in manufacturing at the turn of the 20th century. 相似文献
47.
Corrigendum to “Stable matchings and preferences of couples” [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75–106]
We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in [B. Klaus, F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75–106] or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings [KK05, Theorem 3.3] and a maximal domain result [KK05, Theorem 3.5] are adjusted accordingly. 相似文献
48.
An Experimental Bribery Game 总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7
Abbink Klaus; Irlenbusch Bernd; Renner Elke 《Jnl. of Law, Economics, and Organization》2002,18(2):428-454
Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocityrelationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negativewelfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. Weseparate the influences of these factors in an experiment. Ina two-player game, reciprocation is economically inefficientthrough negative externalities. A control treatment withoutexternalities is also conducted. In a third, so-called suddendeath treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusionfrom the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocitycan establish bribery relationships, where negative externalitieshave no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reducescorruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated. 相似文献
49.
Klaus Conrad 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2001,19(4):361-381
The purpose of the paper is to narrow the gap between the widespread use of voluntary agreements and research on the rationale of such approaches. A topical example are voluntary agreements of many industries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions because of global warming. If the industry anticipates that taxes and fees will be introduced in the coming years, it seems rational to act in advance in order to mitigate the tax levels.The conventional approach in strategic trade and tax models was to look at a two-stage game where governments set taxes first and then firms react. In such a policy regime the government is concerned about the international competitiveness of its firms and sets taxes below marginal damages. In this paper, we consider a policy regime with a reversed timing. Firms commit themselves in the face of emission taxes to abatement efforts and to lower levels of the environmentally intensive output. Then the government introduces the tax. Under this timing of strategies the tax is equal to marginal damage. Firms waive profit and reduce output in order to use less of the polluting input. The reward for this behavior will be a less strict use of policy instruments and hence lower abatement costs in the near future. 相似文献
50.
Unidirectional search is an evolutionarily stable outcome in an economy where homogenous buyers and sellers can either move
or stay. It is more efficient than bidirectional search. In unidirectional search, it is more efficient if the more numerous
agents move and the less numerous agents stay, than vice versa. 相似文献