People,Actors, and the Humanizing of Institutional Theory

In much contemporary institutional scholarship, the term ‘actor’ is used as a shorthand for any entity imbued with agency. Talking about actors in institutions thus serves the necessity of allocating agency before returning to the analysis of institutional structures and processes. We find this approach to actorhood limiting, conceptually and normatively. Grounded in the perspective of pragmatist phenomenology, we assert the need for distinguishing between persons and actors, and the value of integrating the person into institutional analysis. We conceive of persons as humans with a reflective capacity and sense of self, who engage with multiple institutions through the performance of institutional roles. People may acquire actorhood by temporarily aligning their self with what is expected from a particular actor-role in an institutional order. Conversely, institutions enter people’s lifeworld as they are personified in people’s social performances. We outline this perspective and examine conceptual and normative implications that arise from the integration of human experience in institutional analysis.     

Family allowances as welfare improvements

The present paper studies the equilibria of a simple overlapping generations model of pure exchange in which money is traded. There is a continuum of agents in each generation and population growth is endogenous via voluntary decisions on children. Any monetary steady state has to satisfy the golden rule that the interest rate equals the growth rate. Still such a monetary steady state may be inefficient. If raising children is not excessively profitable, then there exists a transfer scheme, in favor of those who raise children, which improves upon the steady state.     

Physical Search

Unidirectional search is an evolutionarily stable outcome in an economy where homogenous buyers and sellers can either move or stay. It is more efficient than bidirectional search. In unidirectional search, it is more efficient if the more numerous agents move and the less numerous agents stay, than vice versa.     

“Itô's Lemma” and the Bellman Equation for Poisson Processes: An Applied View

Using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, we derive both a Keynes-Ramsey rule and a closed form solution for an optimal consumption-investment problem with labor income. The utility function is unbounded and uncertainty stems from a Poisson process. Our results can be derived because of the proofs presented in the accompanying paper by Sennewald (2006). Additional examples are given which highlight the correct use of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the change-of-variables formula (sometimes referred to as ``Itô's Lemma'') under Poisson uncertainty.     

Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, discounting, and Nash bargaining

We establish a link between von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the Nash solution in a general n-player utility set. The stable set-solution is defined with respect to a dominance relation: payoff vector u dominates v if one player prefers u even with one period delay. We show that a stable set exists and, if the utility set has a smooth surface, any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution when the length of the period goes to zero.     

Trees and decisions

Summary. The traditional model of sequential decision making, for instance, in extensive form games, is a tree. Most texts define a tree as a connected directed graph without loops and a distinguished node, called the root. But an abstract graph is not a domain for decision theory. Decision theory perceives of acts as functions from states to consequences. Sequential decisions, accordingly, get conceptualized by mappings from sets of states to sets of consequences. Thus, the question arises whether a natural definition of a tree can be given, where nodes are sets of states. We show that, indeed, trees can be defined as specific collections of sets. Without loss of generality the elements of these sets can be interpreted as representing plays. Therefore, the elements can serve as states and consequences at the same time.Received: 23 January 2003, Revised: 2 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D70. Correspondence to: Klaus RitzbergerWe are grateful to Larry Blume, Ariel Rubinstein, Jörgen Weibull, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the universities of Vienna, Salamanca, and Heidelberg for helpful comments. Financial support from the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under project P15281 is also gratefully acknowledged.     

The Power of Networks: Integration and Financial Cooperative Performance

Abstract ** :  The purpose of this paper is to perform a cross‐country survey of the level of integration of systems of financial cooperatives (FC) and its effect on measures of performance. We develop a classification scheme based on a theoretical framework that builds on published work using transaction cost economics (TCE) to explain integration of large numbers of financial cooperatives into networks. We identify three critical levels of increasing integration we call respectively atomized systems, consensual networks and strategic networks. Further, we test some of the propositions that result from the theoretical framework on an international sample of financial cooperative systems. Based on this analysis we can conclude that: (i) Integration is less (more) important in developing (more developed) countries and for very small (large) financial cooperatives as a determinant of efficiency. However, integration tends to reduce volatility of efficiency and performance regardless of development. (ii) Integration appears to help control measure of managers' expense preferences that tend to affect performance of FC. (iii) Despite high costs of running hub‐like organizations in highly integrated system, these systems economize in bounded rationality and operate at lower costs than less integrated systems.     

Stable matchings and preferences of couples

Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for “responsive couples markets”, viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation.     

Optimal macroeconomic policies in a financial and economic crisis: a case study for Slovenia

In this paper, we study different and, in particular, “optimal” reactions of fiscal (and to some extent monetary) policies to the financial and economic crisis of 2007–2009 in Slovenia, a small open economy that is part of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Using an econometric model of the Slovenian economy, we simulate the effects of the global crisis under the assumption of no-policy reactions, i.e. assuming that macroeconomic policies are conducted without attempting to deal with the effects of the crisis. Next, we study the possibilities of fiscal policy reducing or even annihilating the effects of the crisis. We also investigate the optimal reaction of fiscal policies based on the assumption that Slovenian policy-makers behave as though they were optimizing an objective function. We show that optimal policies call for only a very modestly active countercyclical role of fiscal policies. There are strong trade-offs between countercyclical fiscal policies and the requirements of fiscal solvency.     

Is more competition conducive to the macroeconomic performance in the euro area?

One of the main goals of the European Union, laid down, inter alia, in the Lisbon Strategy and in the “Europe 2020” Strategy, is to raise employment. One important means of supporting the creation of new jobs is to increase competition. In this paper, it is shown that on average the mark-up, i.e. the deviation of prices from marginal cost in the euro area still exceeds the levels observed in the UK and in the US. After completion of the Single Market Programme in 1993, the mark-up has declined in the euro area and even more in the UK. Nevertheless, there is a strong cross-country variation between Member States, with a particularly high mark-up ratio found for Italy. Panel estimations show that total factor productivity growth, labour productivity growth and the labour market performance in the euro area could be improved by reducing the mark-up. This could be achieved by a proper institutional design. More competition could indeed improve the macroeconomic performance.