Positive versus negative comparative advertising

Two studies examined cognitive responses to comparative advertising that was valenced, i.e., was either negative or positive. Negative comparative advertising featured the advertised brand derogating the comparison brand (I'm OK, you're not OK). Positive comparative advertising claimed superiority over the comparison brand in a nonderogatory manner (You're OK, I'm more OK). Subjects were exposed to either a negative comparative ad or a positive comparative ad. In study 1, the ad featured either a high or low share advertised brand and either a high or low share comparison brand while in study 2, the ad featured advertised and comparison brands with either a strong or a weak reputation. Across both studies, it was found that negative comparative advertising evoked significantly higher counterargumentation and lower claim acceptance than its positive counterpart. Also, when the advertised brand had a high share relative to the comparison brand, counterargumentation was lower and claim acceptance was higher vis-a-vis when the advertised brand had a low share relative to the comparison brand. Findings pertaining to brand reputation were mixed. Managerial and future research implications of the findings are discussed.     

Multinational Learning under Asymmetric Information

The aim of this paper is to analyze the competition between a multinational and the incumbent firm in a foreign market under asymmetric information about demand and unobservable outputs. It is shown that the incumbent firm increases its production in the first period to signal to the multinational that the demand is low. The multinational reduces its output in the foreign market in order to signal-jam. In addition, the multinational increases its production in the other market. However, total production of the multinational is lower. Implications for research and development expenditure by the multinational are examined.     

Human resource management in developing economies: a comparison of India and Thailand

This paper reports the results of surveys of firms that were conducted both in India and Thailand. The surveys centred on a wide range of human resource management practices (staffing, training, compensation and evaluation). The sample consisted of both the subsidiaries of multinational corporations and locally owned companies. Statistical analysis suggests pronounced differences in employment practices between India and Thailand in some areas, while considerable similarities in other areas. The study controls for a variety of organizational factors (e.g., firm size, ownership (foreign versus domestic), union status).     

Use of equal opportunities legislation and earnings differentials: a comparative study

This article traces the number of legal cases concerning gender, race and other forms of discrimination in the US, Canada and Britain where there is now up to a quarter of a century's experience. Substantial differences in the extent to which the legislation is used across countries and by different groups within each country are revealed.     

Japanese management in Singapore: Convergence of human resource management practices

This paper discusses the transfer and adaptation of Japanese human resource management practices to Singapore. By comparing Japanese parent companies, their subsidiary companies in Singapore, and comparable local Singaporean companies, the modifications to the practices of the Japanese parent companies and the adoption of local practices by Japanese management are made evident. The findings seem to uphold both the convergence and the contingency theses.Dr. Chong Li Choy is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Management, National University of Singapore. Prof. Hem C. Jain is from the Faculty of Administration, University of New Brunswick.     

Mixed duopoly, cross-ownership and partial privatization

This paper investigates the effects of cross-ownership on optimal privatization, and vice-versa, in mixed duopoly. It shows that cross-ownership is profitable to the private firm only if the level of privatization of the public firm is sufficiently high. In equilibrium, cross-ownership does not take place even if there is partial privatization. However, the possibility of cross-ownership significantly limits the socially optimal level of privatization in most of the situations. Moreover, it demonstrates that full nationalization is socially optimal, in case of sufficiently convex identical cost functions and homogeneous goods. These results have strong implications to both divestment and competition policies.