Contract Mixing in Franchising as a Mechanism for Public-Good Provision

This paper is concerned with the coexistence of company-owned units and franchised units in business format franchising and their different contractual arrangements. Drawing insights from case studies that indicate both the development and the maintenance of company-wide brand names and unit-specific sales activities are crucial to a franchise company, we construct a multitask model to account for such contract mixing in franchising. Intuitively, low-powered contracts are offered to some managers to induce effort for brand-name development and maintenance, while high-powered contracts are offered to the remaining managers to elicit sales activity and capture the beneficial effect of the company brand name. Franchising can thus be viewed as an organizational agreement for production involving brand-name products and services.     

Global Drivers of and Local Resistance to French Shareholder Activism

Shareholder activism in France has made significant advances during the past 25 years even as it continues to face formidable sources of local resistance. But if the list of corporate governance improvements since 1989 described by the authors might lead one to conclude that France now has minority shareholder protection and shareholder activism comparable to those of the U.S. or U.K., powerful local interests, including much of French management, labor, and government, continue to mount effective resistance to such forces for change. The French government still works closely with French business elites and unions to manage both individual companies and the general economy. And government officials continue to speak publicly of “protecting” French firms from “illegitimate” foreign shareholders. Accordingly, the authors characterize French corporate governance as a “hybrid” model of shareholder activism, one that incorporates the perspectives and interests of the classic French stakeholder model as well as an emerging shareholder value movement. Although foreign institutional investors have increased their shareholdings in French companies and promoted “best practice” governance rules, particularly with respect to voting rights, local forces will continue to resist aggressive shareholder activism. Such a hybrid model makes the outcomes of shareholder activism less predictable, a risk that foreign investors and companies often respond to by seeking alliances with local proxy advisers and investor associations to gain “legitimacy.”     

Bridging the Gap between Interest Rates and Investments

The links between interest rates, cost of capital, hurdle rates, and capital allocation have been remarkably weak during the last few years. For instance, whereas the current yield on the World Government Bond Index is a paltry 1.2%, survey evidence suggests that the median reported investment hurdle rate of S&P 100 companies is as high as 18%. In this report, members of J.P Morgan's corporate finance advisory group explain why the cost of capital for most companies is unlikely to increase materially even if interest rates rise as projected. This suggests that companies have room to lower their hurdle rates. Moreover, as the authors argue, a reduction in hurdle rates is likely to be beneficial since excessively high hurdle rates can have the effect of reducing value by sacrificing profitable growth opportunities and increasing the firm's risk profile. The report concludes with a framework for corporate hurdle rates and capital allocation strategies designed to help companies make better investment decisions.     

财政压力、货币超发与明代宝钞制度

本文遵循“财政压力-政府行为”分析框架来剖析“大明宝钞”崩坏的制度根源。“大明宝钞”制度的崩坏根源于以财政为中心的宝钞制度设计缺陷。这种制度设计是为了满足政府财政开支需求与避免财政危机。易言之，明代财政压力促成了货币财政化的宝钞制度设计，导致了货币超发，最后致使宝钞崩坏并退出流通领域。财政压力是古今政府的常态。财政压力并非必然导致政府采取掠夺性的货币政策。在英国，国王的财政压力导致了以限制王权为目的的《大宪章》和“光荣革命”。明代中国，为何没有在财政压力之下走上制度变革之路，这个问题实在令人深思。     

Progressive taxation and the intensity and timing of investment

This paper examines the effect of progressive taxation on a firm's investment intensity and timing decisions using a real options approach. The firm possesses a perpetual option to invest in a project at any instant by incurring an irreversible investment cost at that time. The amount of the irreversible investment cost determines the intensity of investment that augments the value of the project. Tax progression is specified in a particular case of a constant marginal tax rate with an exogenously given tax exemption threshold that makes the average tax rate increase with the tax base. We show that the firm's investment decisions are neutral to tax progression only when the exogenously given tax exemption threshold is sufficiently large. When tax neutrality does not hold, we show that progressive taxation has a perverse effect on investment intensity. Finally, we show that progressive taxation induces the firm to invest earlier as compared to the case under proportional taxation (i.e., in the absence of any tax exemption).     

MODELING UNCERTAIN FORECAST ACCURACY IN SUPPLY CHAINS WITH POSTPONEMENT

We examine a situation where a manufacturer operates in a two‐mode production environment. The first mode could involve overseas vendors and manufacturing facilities. If additional units are later required, the company must use its second mode—more expensive last‐minute domestic vendors and manufacturing sites. We develop a new methodology for analyzing the impact of forecast accuracy on the decision to postpone production. We examine the interaction of forecast accuracy, shortage vs. holding costs, transportation costs and the cost of postponing production in the supply chain of a single product facing uncertain demand. Our model can be used to analyze the cost of important changes, such as increasing forecast accuracy, reducing the cost of backorders, lowering the cost of delaying production, or lowering transportation costs. Our model allows a firm to understand its overall cost structure so that it can accurately evaluate the impact of improved forecast accuracy and lowered costs in the context of postponement.     

PRIVATE EQUITY: SOURCES AND USES

Private equity capital is playing a large and growing role in the funding of small to medium-sized, high-growth businesses. Today's private equity investment typically takes the form of purchase of a minority interest in a post-start-up, high-technology company followed by an IPO a few years later. A large number of such investors are scouring the markets for new investment possibilities and the competitive pressures are growing.
Although private equity investors can and often do add significant value to a company, private equity is potentially expensive, in terms of both loss of ownership and loss of control over long-term strategic decisions of the company. Owner-managers who want to retain as much of both as possible are advised to install more formalized business procedures, expand the company's outside relationships, and become more familiar with the company's financial needs and options. These changes should reduce capital needs, reduce the costs of private equity funding, and increase negotiating leverage when dealing with large, sophisticated private capital investors.     

A Reconsideration of the Rationality Postulate: 'Right Hemisphere Thinking' in Economics

A bstract . The cardinal postulate of neoclassical economics is that individuals and entrepreneurs seek to maximize their unique positions in the world. Yet behind this postulate is an even more fundamental premise: that men are rational and can discern their own best interests. From Adam Smith on, it has been accepted that reasonable men act to maximize their own pecuniary advantage and in most economic models even the potential for irrationality is ignored. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly obvious from the research conclusions of other disciplines ( psychology, philosophy, political science, and sociology in particular) that the simplistic notion of " economic man ," posited so often in the economics literature, is more fancy than fact. There is an implicit recognition that the neoclassical assumptions may not be correct in the developing area of economic behaviorism. The economic behaviorists, however, adopt a more general definition of rationality, substituting what might be called a "modified rationality postulate" for the global rationality assumed in neoclassical theory. As a result, their conclusions do not differ greatly from those of the neoclassicists. Fortunately, ideas are now crystallizing in psychology which may enable us to shed light on decisions which previously would have had to be classified as non-rational, irrational, or unexplainable. Some of those ideas are explored.