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1.
Teresa C. Lacerda 《Business Horizons》2019,62(2):185-197
An economic recession is a type of crisis originated from external factors that may imperil an organization’s survival depending on the intensity and duration of the crisis. In peripheral European countries, such as Portugal, the recent financial crisis had devastating effects on various business activities. As a result, Portugal represents an important case study in examining how some corporate leaders have handled the economic recession successfully. I interviewed 20 corporate managers to capture their perceptions of the leadership traits and behaviors exhibited by their CEOs in guiding their companies through the recession. In economic recessions, negative constraints do not affect the most effective leaders, who instead erect barriers against the high-pressure conditions to create a supportive, positive work environment. In order to achieve maximum effectiveness, leaders must act as blocking agents against the negative social impacts of the economic crisis, including the fragility of trust in organizational life (i.e., a barrier against distrust), uncertainty of the future (i.e., a barrier against uncertainty), and toxic emotions (i.e., a barrier against toxic emotions). 相似文献
2.
This study endeavors to enhance political marketing literature about the impact of lobbying on firm performance. Our sample is composed of 140 U.S. firms and spans the years 2007–2014 to encompass the 2007–2009 recession and the subsequent recovery period. Our findings indicate that lobbying expenses positively contribute to firm performance. Also, government contracts in both ways, dollar amount and number of government contracts, act as mediators between lobbying expenses and firm performance. In addition, organizational slack moderates the relationship between lobbying expenses and government contracts. The managerial implications suggest that lobbying expenses can be leveraged as a potent tool for firm performance. Firms with larger lobbying efforts acquired both, higher dollar amounts and a greater number of government contracts. 相似文献
3.
We examine the effect of media coverage on firm-level investment efficiency. We find that media coverage reduces under-investment but increases over-investment. The negative effect of media coverage on under-investment is more pronounced in firms affected by greater information asymmetry and poorer corporate governance. The positive effect of media coverage on over-investment is driven by media-induced CEO overconfidence. Additional results show that both investment- and non-investment-related news coverage decrease under-investment, while non-investment-related news coverage is more influential in increasing over-investment. In general, higher news optimism is associated with less under-investment but more over-investment. Moreover, media coverage affects investment efficiency through its information dissemination rather than information creation function. Collectively, our results suggest that firms’ media visibility promotes more over-investment than under-investment. 相似文献
4.
Jun Hu Huiying Wu Sammy Xiaoyan Ying Wenbin Long 《Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics》2021,17(1):100237
Unlike most of the literature that examines the relationship between corporate philanthropy and financial performance, this study investigates the mechanisms through which corporate socially responsible behaviors produce financial outcomes. We propose that corporate philanthropy improves corporate competitiveness by eliciting positive responses from stakeholders, who assess a firm’s philanthropic contribution in relation to its rivals to determine what level of support they wish to provide to the firm. We predict that a firm’s philanthropy relative to its rivals has a positive effect on its product market competitiveness, and that this positive effect is moderated by three conditions that influence stakeholder response: stakeholder attention to philanthropy, its perceived legitimacy, and expectations of corporate giving. Our predictions are generally supported by our analyses. Overall, this paper shows that strategic philanthropy has a quantitative dimension, and firms obtain the market competitiveness associated with corporate philanthropy by integrating their rivals’ positions into their decision making. 相似文献
5.
《Journal of World Business》2018,53(6):781-793
Human rights (HR) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) are both fields of knowledge and research that have been shaped by, and examine, the role of multi-national enterprises in society. Whilst scholars have highlighted the overlapping nature of CSR and HR, our understanding of this relationship within business practice remains vague and under-researched. To explore the interface between CSR and HR, this paper presents empirical data from a qualitative study involving 22 international businesses based in the UK. Through an analysis based on sensemaking, the paper examines how and where CSR and HR overlap, contrast and shape one another, and the role that companies’ international operations has on this relationship. The findings reveal a complex and multi-layered relationship between the two, and concludes that in contrast to management theory, companies have bridged the ‘great divide’ in varying degrees most notably in their implementation strategies. 相似文献
6.
This paper studies the lobbying against trade liberalization by both a firm and a union in the same industry. We find that the relationship between their political activities depends on the effect of political activity by one on the marginal effectiveness of political activity by the other. We also show that, when they are strongly risk-averse and their political activities are strategic complements, trade liberalization is likely to be successful if business is brisk, the foreign firm's production cost is high or the number of union members is small. However, when they are not strongly risk-averse, these results hold reversely. 相似文献
7.
Jun Kawamoto 《Accounting, Business & Financial History》2001,11(3):331-348
The Japanese disclosure system of consolidated statements was introduced in 1977 and extensively revised in 1997. The role of the bureaucracy has been significant in these developments and seems to be part of Japan's closed culture. However, other explanations could also be applied. In particular, although Japanese firms opposed such disclosures on the basis of preparation costs, the Japanese government had to modernize the disclosure system, including consolidation, in order to develop the securities market regardless of an individual company's interests. 相似文献
8.
Models with a premium on external finance produce counterfactual predictions about liquidity management. We address this shortcoming by introducing a fixed cost of increasing external finance into an otherwise standard investment/financing problem. This additional financial friction is well-motivated by case studies and our analysis shows that it generates more realistic predictions about liquidity management: firms hold external finance and idle cash simultaneously, and may invest an additional dollar of cash flow in liquidity rather than repaying external funds or investing in productive capital. In addition to better fitting the stylized facts about the time-series and cross-sectional pattern of liquidity holding, these results may help shed light on the fragility of estimates of investment–cash flow sensitivities. 相似文献
9.
Johan Lagerlöf 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2004,106(1):123-142
The model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) chosen directly by an elected policy‐maker, and the other (pollution) stochastically dependent on the amount of roads. Both a one‐country and a two‐country version of the model are analyzed; the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation. The welfare effects of providing the policy‐maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated, and it is shown that more information hurts some—sometimes even all—citizens. In particular, the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse. Implications for the welfare effects of “informational lobbying” are also discussed. 相似文献
10.
We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated. 相似文献