R&D Spillovers for Public R&D Productivity

ABSTRACT

This paper empirically investigates whether the productivity of a public (government-funded) R&D project improves when the aggregate R&D investment in the same technology field increases. Based on the unique project level data that cover almost entire public R&D projects in Korea, this paper shows that aggregate investment in other public R&D projects in the same technology field increases a public R&D project’s outputs both independent of its project expenditure (additive spillover effects) and interactive with its project expenditure (multiplicative spillover effects). The spillover effects from the aggregate private R&D investment in the same technology field also exist, but to a much lesser extent.     

矿井通风三维可视化系统及优化

系统建立了三维仿真框架,建立了三维空间属性模型和非空间属性模型,分别对空间数据和非空间数据进行储存和管理。并建立了Hardy-Cross迭代模型和离散反馈型神经网络模型优化通风网络模型。并以C#语言来实现系统的功能。     

露天边坡工程及FLAC数值分析

以高西沟露天煤矿的西北边帮作为研究对象,运用FLAC3D数值模拟软件,经过数值计算得到边坡安全系数为1.57,其与工程类比法计算得到的数值差不多,知该数值分析方法不仅能快速、准确的算出边坡的稳定性系数,还能够形象的描绘边坡的滑移临界场,是一种有效的边坡稳定性分析的方法。     

Morale hazard

We interpret workers’ confidence in their own skills as their morale, and investigate the implication of worker overconfidence on the firm's optimal wage-setting policies. In our model, wage contracts both provide incentives and affect worker morale, by revealing private information of the firm about worker skills. We provide conditions for the non-differentiation wage policy to be profit-maximizing. In numerical examples, worker overconfidence is a necessary condition for the firm to prefer no wage differentiation, so as to preserve some workers’ morale; the non-differentiation wage policy itself breeds more worker overconfidence; finally, wage compression is more likely when aggregate productivity is low.     

Sharing information in the credit market: Contract-level evidence from U.S. firms

We investigate the impact of lenders' information sharing on firms' performance in the credit market using rich contract-level data from a U.S. credit bureau. The staggered entry of lenders into the bureau offers a natural experiment to identify the effect of lenders' improved access to information. Consistent with the predictions of 35 and 36 and Pagano and Jappelli (1993), we find that information sharing reduces contract delinquencies and defaults, especially when firms are informationally opaque. The results also reveal that information sharing does not reduce the use of guarantees, that is, it may not loosen lending standards.     

Insider trading in credit derivatives

Insider trading in the credit derivatives market has become a significant concern for regulators and participants. This paper attempts to quantify the problem. Using news reflected in the stock market as a benchmark for public information, we find significant incremental information revelation in the credit default swap market under circumstances consistent with the use of non-public information by informed banks. The information revelation occurs only for negative credit news and for entities that subsequently experience adverse shocks, and increases with the number of a firm's relationship banks. We find no evidence, however, that the degree of asymmetric information adversely affects prices or liquidity in either the equity or credit markets.     

Investment busts,reputation, and the temptation to blend in with the crowd

We provide a real-options model of an industry in which agents time abandonment of their projects in an effort to protect their reputations. Agents delay abandonment attempting to signal quality. When a public common shock forces abandonment of a small fraction of projects irrespective of agents' quality, many agents abandon their projects strategically even if they are unaffected by the shock. Such “blending in with the crowd” effect creates an additional incentive to delay abandonment ahead of the shock, leading to accumulation of “living dead” projects, which further amplifies the shock. The potential for moderate public common shocks often improves agents' values.     

Transfers in Spanish State Retirement Pensions

A central issue in the recent reforms of state pensions in Spain has been to increase the proportionality between contributions and benefits along actuarially fair lines. The aim of this paper is to quantify the transfer component of social security retirement pensions, with transfer being understood as the difference between the pension effectively received and that which would be received under a system of actuarial fairness. The analysis is placed within a life-cycle framework, with particular reference to the distributive effects by income level. The results show that, in the past, there was a marked bias in favour of the objective of intergenerational and intragenerational redistribution, to the detriment of the objective of income insurance. This paper examines the factors that determine the final value of the transfer component within the entire Spanish pensions system.     

The Great Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co‐op: Anecdote or Evidence for the Optimum Quantity of Money?

This paper studies a centralized market with idiosyncratic uncertainty and money as a medium of exchange from a theoretical as well as an experimental perspective. In our model, prices are fixed and markets are cleared by rationing. We prove the existence of stationary monetary equilibria and of an optimum quantity of money. The rational solution of our model, which is based on the assumption of individual rationality and rational expectations, is compared with actual behavior in a laboratory experiment. The theoretical results are strongly supported by this experiment.