Testing the orthodoxies of land degradation policy in Swaziland

This paper explores Swaziland's National Action Programme (NAP) to combat desertification; the country's main strategy for implementing the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). It considers whether this policy tackles real problems supported by micro-level scientific evidence and local experiences, or whether it further reinforces popular orthodoxies about land degradation. Data from one case study chiefdom in Swaziland are used to test two key orthodoxies identified within the country's NAP: (1) the presentation of degradation as a neo-Malthusian problem resulting from population pressure and (2) the assumption that the poor are responsible for degradation of their environment, in particular, the over-use of forest areas and the degradation of soils. It is found that diverse rural livelihoods inherently deliver patches of degradation at the micro-level but it is not necessarily population pressure or poor people that cause the degradation. Households with varying assets simultaneously degrade and conserve different parts of the land resource through pursuing different livelihood activities. The data indicate that while the NAP focuses on mythical problems grounded in the orthodoxies, policy attention is directed away from the more serious land degradation issues affecting rural livelihoods. The findings of this study provide a more nuanced understanding of the gaps between land degradation policy, local conservation practice and environmental and livelihood outcomes, and suggest that policymakers need to evaluate more critically the outdated and simplistic degradation orthodoxies on which much current policy is based. Stronger links need to be made between scientific and policymaking communities, while more credence should be given to land users’ own knowledges, perspectives, concepts and categories surrounding issues of soil conservation and degradation. It is suggested that steps need to be taken towards the development of broadly applicable benchmarks and indicators that bring together local and scientific knowledges across levels. Without this, popularised orthodoxies will continue to provide a basis for inappropriate land policy.     

Religion,administration & public goods: Experimental evidence from Russia

In this paper, I argue that religion matters for the provision of public goods. I identify three normative foundations of Eastern Orthodox monasticism with strong economic implications: 1. solidarity, 2. obedience, and 3. universal discipline. I propose a public goods game with a three-tier hierarchy, where these norms are modeled as treatments. Obedience and universal discipline facilitate the provision of threshold public goods in equilibrium, whereas solidarity does not. Empirical evidence is drawn from public goods experiments run with regional bureaucrats in Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Russia. The introduction of the same three norms as experimental treatments produces different results. I find that only universal discipline leads to the provision of threshold public goods, whereas solidarity and obedience do not. Unlike in Protestant societies, in Eastern Orthodox societies free-riding occurs at lower than at higher hierarchical levels. Successful economic reforms in Eastern Orthodox countries start with the restructuring of the middle- and lower-ranked public sector. Authoritarian persistence is defined by the commitment of the dictator to overprovide public goods.     

The turn in recent economics and return of orthodoxy

This paper examines change on the economics research frontier,and asks whether the current competition between new researchprogrammes may be supplanted by a new single dominant approachin the future. The paper discusses whether economics tends tobe dominated by a single approach or reflect a pluralism ofapproaches, and argues that, historically, it has alternatedbetween the two. It argues that orthodoxy usually emerges fromheterodoxy, and interprets the division between orthodoxy andheterodoxy in terms of a core–periphery distinction. Regardingrecent economics, the paper maps out two different types ofcombinations of new research programmes as being synchronicor diachronic in nature. It treats the new research programmesas a new kind of heterodoxy, and asks how a new orthodoxy mightarise out of this new heterodoxy and traditional heterodoxy.It discusses this question by advancing two views regardinghow to different types of combinations in the new research programmesmight consolidate along the lines of three shared commitmentswith traditional heterodoxy to form a new orthodoxy in economics.     

Business ethics: A 3000-year-old orthodox perspective which impinges on contemporary business decisions

The exigencies of orthodoxy have determined and continue to determine the business relationships and decisions of many groups. These demands consequently affect the form and content of business transactions and records. The care, under Jewish law, with which a contract of guarantee has to be constructed if it is not to bring about a relationship among borrower, lender and guarantor that would be regarded by rabbinical authorities as usurious illustrates the method, complexity and contemporary relevance of orthodox analysis.     

Communism as the unhappy coming

We show that Eastern Orthodox believers are less happy compared to those of Catholic and Protestant faith using data covering more than 100 countries around the world. Consistent with the happiness results, we also find that relative to Catholics, Protestants and non-believers, those of Eastern Orthodox religion have less social capital and prefer old ideas and safe jobs. In addition, Orthodoxy is associated with left-leaning political preferences and stronger support for government involvement in the economy. Compared to non-believers and Orthodox adherents, Catholics and Protestants are less likely to agree that government ownership is a good thing, and Protestants are less likely to agree that getting rich can only happen at the expense of others. These differences in life satisfaction and other attitudes and values persisted despite the fact that communist elites sought to eradicate church-going in Eastern Europe, since communists maintained many aspects of Orthodox theology which were useful for the advancement of the communist doctrine. The findings are consistent with Berdyaev’s (1933, 1937) hypothesis of communism as a successor of Orthodoxy.