川渝毗邻地区合作示范区协同发展研究 ———基于哈肯模型的实证分析

摘 要：本文将川渝毗邻地区合作共建区域发展功能平台统称为川渝毗邻地区合作示范区（以下简称“示范区”）,并以此为研究对象,通过泰尔L指数,测度示范区经济发展差异,随后运用哈肯模型、耦合协调和灰色关联度等方法进行协调度分析。研究发现,各示范区经济发展差异较小,经济发展趋同,加剧示范区之间的竞争,削弱协同合作,抑制比较优势的发挥和提升;成渝“双核”对示范区的辐射带动作用不明显,示范区总体与成渝“双核”的差距仍然较大;在示范区协同发展中,经济金融活动发挥着主导作用,经济环境与金融支持协调发展趋势向好,金融支持对示范区协同发展有显著的正向影响。基于此,建议大力发展新型金融业态,为优势产业发展营造良好的金融支持环境;开辟特色金融“试验区”,引入特色金融活水,有针对性地加强各示范区优势产业和特色产业的金融支持,进一步提升比较优势,强化示范区与成渝“双核”的经济联系,为成渝地区双城经济圈高质量发展提供重要支撑。     

Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions

Summary. This paper extends the work of Ray and Vohra [3]. It ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can sign binding agreements and their actions have externalities. The emphasis, however, is placed on situations with multiple outcomes and how agents behave in the presence of such multiplicity. In particular, a deviating coalition considers all the likely outcomes that may prevail upon its deviation, and selects (if possible) a subset of them. Three augmentations of Ray and Vohra's [3] solution concept are defined, capturing three distinct behavioral assumptions. Efficiency of and the relation between the three notions are discussed. Received: October 9, 2001; revised version: April 22, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I wish to thank Licun Xue, Joseph Greenberg and the participants of PET 2000 for very helpful suggestions. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for his/her valuable comments. The paper has been previously circulated under the title Binding Agreements.     

Publishing performance in economics: Spanish rankings (1990–1999)

Abstract. This paper contributes to the growing literature that analyses the Spanish publishing performance in Economics throughout the 1990s. Several bibliometric indicators are used in order to provide Spanish rankings (of both institutions and individual authors) based on Econlit journals. Further, lists of the ten most influential authors and articles over that period, in terms of citations, are reported. We are grateful to many colleagues who made very useful remarks to preliminary versions of this paper, as well as to two anonymous referees. We are particularly indebted to Xavier Sala-i-Martín, without whose invaluable help this work would not have been possible. All errors or omissions are of our exclusive responsibility.     

Testing of unit roots and other fractionally integrated hypotheses in the presence of structural breaks

Tests of unit roots and other nonstationary hypotheses that were proposed by Robinson (1994) are applied in this article to the Nelson and Plosser's (1982) series. The tests can be expressed in a way allowing for structural breaks under both the null and the alternative hypotheses. When applying the tests to the same dataset as in Perron (1989), we observe that our results might be consistent with those in Perron (1989) when testing the nulls of trend-stationarity or a unit-root. However, we also observe that fractionally integrated hypotheses may be plausible alternatives in the context of structural breaks at a known period of time. Final version received: August 2000/Final version accepted: August 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the European TMR grant No. ERBFMRX-CT-98-0213. Comments of two anonymous referees are also acknowledged.     

Distributional assumptions and a test of the dual labor market hypothesis

Recent application of the switching regression model to allocate workers into the primary and secondary labor markets is considered to be the best solution to the classification problem of the empirical testing of the dual labor market theory. In such models, normality of the error terms is assumed. This paper adopts the switching regression model to test the dual labor market theory by assuming different distributions of the error terms. The test results strongly support the dual labor market theory regardless of the assumption one makes about the error terms. However, the results indicate that different distribution can lead to different percentage distributions of workers in the two segments. In particular, the normal distribution generates more workers in the primary segment than the non-normal distributions. Therefore, care must be taken not to generalize the type of industries or occupations that fall under the primary and secondary segments. First version received: October 2000/Final version received: March 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  I would like to thank Kevin Lang, Robert Marshall, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. I am grateful for comments received from the session participants of the Western Economic Association International Conference, San Francisco, CA, June 28–July 2, 1996, and the Midwest Economic Association Conference, Kansas City, 1997. I thank George Bonney, the Chief Statistician of Fox Chase Cancer Center, Philadelphia for his comments. Any remaining errors are my responsibility. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from Penn State Research and Development Grant, 1995.     

Human–capital investment and the wage gap

Summary. According to empirical studies, the wage differential by skills evolved non–monotonically in the past decades although the relative supply of skilled labor steadily increased. The present paper provides a theoretical explanation for this finding. In our setting, technological change intertemporally alters the human–capital investment incentives of heterogeneous individuals. As a consequence of changing incentives, the time path of the relative wage is U–shaped while there is a rise in the share of skilled workers. Received: November 28, 2000; revised version: January 30, 2001     

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price. Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000     

国有企业民营化的均衡模型

本文是来自于中国近年来实行民营化改制实践的一个理论结晶。该研究在中国特定的渐进改革基础上 ,讨论了民营化发生的原因和阻力 ,以及国有企业的利益相关者在改制过程中的利益权衡行为 ,并根据它们的相互关系和目标行为建立了民营化的均衡模型。模型的核心是企业家的最优目标函数 ,这是关系到企业能否实现成功改制的关键。模型的约束条件反映了利益相关者的基本利益保障 ,不会由于改制而受到损害。因此 ,均衡条件的满足表明了最优化改制的实现。通过对模型的分析发现 ,能够满足民营化最优均衡的退出条件 ,就是国有企业退出的最佳时机选择。企业净资本价值、企业家对股权的收购值与职工补偿值之间的合理比例的区间 ,是形成民营化均衡模型的最优解的取值范围。模型的政策含义在于纠偏作用 ,尤其是政府实际的退出时机与改制均衡的最佳退出时机的不一致 ,对于职工利益的损害或缺乏企业家最优目标行为的改制 ,都是脱离了最优轨道的结果 ,需要进行纠正     

The effect of fertility on labour force participation: The Spanish evidence

Abstract. The aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of fertility on the decision of labour force participation of married females in Spain, allowing for the existence of unobserved characteristics that affect both fertility and participation. We use a pooling of five waves of the European Household Panel for Spain (1994–1998). Results indicate that not taking into account the unobserved characteristics that affect both variables imposes on average a strong downward bias on the true effect of fertility on participation. This bias is especially strong for highly educated females. We are grateful to Raquel Carrasco and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Financial support from Gobierno Vasco (PI-1999-160)), Ministry of Education and Science (BE2000-1394), Instituto de la Mujer and Universidad del País Vasco (UPV 00035.321-13511/2001) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Is capital a collusion device?

Summary. We examine how irreversible capital reduces the possibility of a duopoly to sustain implicit collusion by grim strategies, when the product is homogenous and firms compete in quantities. Compared with the case of reversible capital, there are two countervailing effects: Deviation from an existing collusion is less attractive, because capital once installed causes costs forever. But the punishment will also be less severe due to the high capacity the deviating firm can build before punishment starts. The last effect dominates, meaning that the commitment value of capital is negative for all firms. If capital is irreversible, collusion breaks down for realistic magnitudes of interest rates. Received: April 30, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2001