在西部民族地区完善财政生态补偿机制的对策建议

我国目前已经形成中央政府主导的对西部民族地区生态环境建设的财政补偿机制,但现行补偿机制具有很大的不稳定性、补偿不充足性、非长期高效性的特点,本文探讨如何为生态环境建设建立一种长效、稳定的兼容政府纵向和省区际间、流域间政府横向的财政补偿机制.     

金融风险管理的演进:动因、影响及启示

近半个世纪以来,无论是金融风险管理的理念和组织架构,还是金融风险管理的具体内容和方法,都发生了巨大的变化。本文从金融机构对自身利益的追逐、外部环境的复杂多变、金融理论与技术的进步以及人们对重大损失性事件的反思等方面,深刻地揭示了推动金融风险管理演进的主要因素,沿着这一思路,本文进一步分析了这一演进给金融领域带来的深远影响及其对我国金融业发展的启示意义。     

中国农村金融体系的资金配置功能分析

按照金融功能观,资金配置是金融体系最重要的功能.中国农村金融体系未能有效地发挥资金配置功能,是因为过去的农村金融改革主要遵循金融机构观.金融机构观使得农村金融体系不能适应外部环境,从而也就不能满足农村经济发展的需要.     

Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem

Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting.     

集体钉住汇率制与地区金融稳定——兼评人民币汇率制度改革

20世纪90年代以来,东亚地区是国际金融比较动荡的地区之一。麦金农主张东亚各经济体实行“集体钉住美元”制度,以保证地区金融稳定。从理论和实践分析,集体钉住汇率制有其内在的稳定机制,也有内源性的动荡缺陷,稳定性和脆弱性同存。目前东亚各国和地区非正式的共同“软钉住美元”,有一定的合理性;但从长远看,这种集体钉住美元制度难以维持。当前人民币汇率改革不会影响东亚地区的金融稳定,维持国内金融稳定,才能防止地区金融动荡。     

2006年石油价格展望

本文对影响2006年石油价格的因素做了系统分析。认为2006年形成油价风险的主要动因已从需求的波动转向供给的波动;2006年油价将由于供求的脆弱平衡维持高位运行的格局,并且,由于供给链中潜在的危机,油价波动性将会非常大;但在全球经济增速下降、石油需求增长放缓、石油生产国家和公司仍然在努力满足市场需求、炼油瓶颈有望缓和的大背景下,油价在2006年按2005年可比价格计不会大幅上升,不会对全球经济产生重大负面影响。     

Board Members and Company Value

This essay surveys research about the value of individual members of boards of directors. When directors join or exit corporate boards, company stock prices respond, often in magnitudes of 1% of firm value or more. Related research shows that when a significant event impacts the stock price of one company, the effects are transmitted to other companies that share board members in common with the primary company. Share price reactions are sensitive to variables such as a director’s occupation, independence, and professional qualifications. Together, this evidence suggests that a well-functioning market for directors might already exist, making direct regulation unnecessary and possibly counter-productive.     

Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany

Recent empirical work shows evidence for higher valuation of firms in countries with a better legal environment. We investigate whether differences in the quality of firm‐level corporate governance also help to explain firm performance in a cross‐section of companies within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a broad corporate governance rating (CGR) for German public firms, we document a positive relationship between governance practices and firm valuation. There is also evidence that expected stock returns are negatively correlated with firm‐level corporate governance, if dividend yields are used as proxies for the cost of capital. An investment strategy that bought high‐CGR firms and shorted low‐CGR firms earned abnormal returns of around 12% on an annual basis during the sample period.     

运用治国方略精神指导财政工作

我国在20世纪90年代提出依法治国和以德治国相结合的治国方略,本文在分析了我国治国战略的历史渊源和时代特征的基础上,提出应该运用治国方略的精神指导财政工作.     

Industry aspects of takeovers and divestitures: Evidence from the UK

This paper examines takeover and divestiture activity at the industry level for the population of UK firms over the period 1986–2000. Consistent with US research, takeovers in the UK cluster both across industries and over time. The evidence for divestitures indicates clustering across industries only. The paper further investigates whether broad and specific industry shocks (e.g., growth, free cash flow, concentration, deregulation, foreign competition, technology, stock market performance) explain takeover and divestiture clustering at the industry level. The results suggest that broad shocks increase (decrease) the likelihood of takeovers (divestitures), although not significantly for takeovers. Specific industry shocks that increase the likelihood of takeover activity include low growth, the threat of foreign competition and high stock market performance. For divestitures, high industry concentration and deregulation increase activity. Little evidence is found for deregulation as a significant factor in explaining takeover activity.