对金融危机下农业政策性银行支持涉农企业发展的思考

全球金融危机的扩散和蔓延,正在对中国实体经济带来冲击与影响,而涉及粮棉油生产、收购、加工及其他农产品加工企业也未能独善其身,由于涉农企业受到较大的冲击,进而影响到农业生产的稳定和农民的增收。在这场金融危机面前,农业政策性银行如何充分履行职能,支持涉农企业摆脱困境,促进农业和农村经济的良性循环。本文通过抽象调查与思考,较深刻地分析了金融危机对涉农企业及信贷支农的影响,提示了涉农企业在这场金融危机中应把握的发展机遇,提示了农业政策性银行在这场金融危机中应承担的支农、护农责任及采取的对策建议。     

应对上海世博会 加快发展苏州现代服务业

本文主要研究了上海世博会对苏州服务业的影响,提出了借力上海世博会,苏州现代服务业发展的思路和具体措施,为苏州现代服务业的发展出一份绵薄之力。     

资产透明度、监管套利与银行系统性风险

资产不透明的金融机构过度依赖批发性融资进行监管套利不利于系统性风险的防控。在此背景下,本文首先在经典银行道德风险模型的基础上引入关联性,从资产透明度和监管套利的视角分析银行系统性风险累积的内在机理。而后利用2007-2018年中国上市银行微观数据,构建资产透明度指标和系统性风险指标(SRISK、MES),对理论推论进行实证检验。主要结论有:(1)资产不透明、监管套利会提高银行的系统性风险。(2)监管套利弱化了资产透明度和资本监管机制对银行系统性风险承担的约束作用,资产透明度与资本监管机制在约束系统性风险承担中的协调作用不明显。(3)以大银行为主的债权银行受监管套利的影响相较于受资产透明度的影响更明显。在此基础上,我们对完善金融风险防范体系以及监管机制提出了若干建议。     

Multiple bank regulators and risk taking

The potential for banks to arbitrage between regulators exists both in the US, with its multiple federal banking regulators, and in Europe, due to multinational banking. This paper models multiple regulators that have an agency bias, which can give rise to a “race to the bottom”. The model is used to analyze the interaction between the regulatory equilibrium and several salient pre-crisis features: rising bank leverage; wholesale funding with asymmetric information; and increasing supervisional costs to disentangling bank asset exposures. Each of these raises bank risk taking on its own, but regulatory competition is shown to be an amplification mechanism.     

从消费视角看健康服务业的结构性机遇

依据产业组织理论的相关性原则,对于健康服务业的内部结构进行规范性研究,着重探索在以消费主导为动力的经济增长模式下,给产业发展带来的结构性机遇:给予保健产业以独立的发展空间、从政策上加大对于保健产业上游\"健康筛查体系\"的研究和实践的扶持力度;配合保健商业险种的市场投放;加快完善保健产业的产业链条,是健康服务业进入快速良性发展轨道的三大支撑点。     

商业银行监管资本套利的均衡分析

监管资本套利,产生于巴塞尔协议资本监管框架的缺陷,是一种利用资本监管制度之间的差异性以及制度内部的不协调性,运用某种手段在不改变实际风险水平的情况下提高资本充足率水平的行为。通过对以下问题的探讨:商业银行监管资本套利所获得的收益在银行与资金需求方之间的配置比例;针对某种资产的监管资本套利,对其他资产供求双方所产生的隐性套利收益的表现形式及其归属程度;由商业银行异质性所导致的监管套利顾客现象;信息不对称情况下,市场对于套利者与非套利者的逆向选择等等,认为银行监管部门应适当引导符合政策意图的套利行为,提高政策引导调控能力。     

上市公司增长机会、增发数量与股价反应

以2007年至2009年成功增发的A股上市公司为样本,对我国上市公司增发数量与股价变动的相互关系进行研究,结果表明:上市公司的增发数量内生于其增长机会,增长机会越大的公司增发数量占发行前总股本的比率也越高;股市对上市公司的过度增发会做出显著的负面反应,但仅有微弱的证据表明谨慎增发会导致股价下跌;公开增发的上市公司较之于定向增发的上市公司具有更多的过度增发倾向,且股价反应也更剧烈。     

How quickly is temporary market inefficiency removed?

I provide evidence on the length of time it takes for arbitrageurs to exploit attractive investment opportunities. A unique data set from the Internet sports betting market allows me to focus on the speed of investor response in an environment that is not affected by the joint hypothesis problem. The market does not instantly converge to an efficient level after mispricing occurs, but the adjustment process is rapid. Arbitrageurs remove many of these opportunities within minutes of them being created and the majority are gone within an hour. Arbitrage opportunities that are more difficult to find last for longer.     

Investment opportunities and dividend omissions

This study examines the market's reaction to dividend omission announcements and finds that if dividends are skipped to preserve cash for good investments, investors do not necessarily regard the omission as negative information. Markets penalize firms for dividend omissions only in the absence of a good stream of investments. In addition, the positive relation between investment opportunity and abnormal stock returns around the announcements is stronger when the level of information asymmetry between management and the rest of the market participants is low. Additional tests reveal that good omitters overcome underperformance faster in the post period. Overall, the results suggest that financial markets interpret differently the information conveyed in the announcement of dividend omission depending on the firm's future prospects.